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Preface
The work presented in this PhD thesis was carried out at the Department of Geology 
and Mineral Resources Engineering at NTNU from January 2006 until December 2008. 
The project was funded by Statoil ASA and was carried out in close cooperation with 
the Strategic University Program “Green Innovation”.  
This work has been an enjoyable and challenging mental process. As an employee of 
Statoil ASA in the Oil and Gas division, I started out with the approach that climate 
policies probably would harm the market for oil and gas companies. After reading some 
literature related to climate change, I realised that it is the other way around. We have 
an obligation to make sure that the energy system becomes sustainable.  
Humans are very short sighted, and prioritise economic growth and increased welfare at 
the expense of the environment. The total energy use is strongly coupled to the size of 
the economy, and the type of energy use is coupled to the type of capital goods that we 
have invested in. This takes time and resources to change. A strong disruptive change 
might be needed to shift the energy system into a different and sustainable path. This 
change could be a “peak oil” situation, accelerating climate costs, political and 
economical instability or even war.  
I think we have to change the energy system. I think we will remain short sighted, 
continue to optimise welfare and hope for the best for the future generations. Change 
towards sustainability has to be done within this context.
Can “peak oil”, climate policies and technological learning create business 
opportunities for sustainable energy production, or is there a need for a stronger force to 
move down the learning curve? Can Norway use this opportunity to create a 
competitive position within sustainable energy production capable of replacing the 
value creation in the Norwegian oil and gas industry? Hopefully, this thesis would 
serve as a strategic basis for evaluation of policy options to increase Norwegian 
welfare.
viii
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Executive summary 
The best way to predict the future is to invent it.
(Kay 1994; quoted in May 1996 p 157) 
Norwegian oil production has passed the peak and is currently declining. It is likely that 
Norway will be a net importer of oil within two decades. Norwegian gas production is 
expected to remain high in the next two decades before it will start to decline. To 
maintain the Norwegian welfare beyond the oil and gas era, alternative businesses are 
required to maintain Norwegian value creation. This thesis investigates the future 
contribution of sustainable energy production to the future Norwegian value creation. 
The major drivers for change in the future energy markets are expected to be energy 
security and climate policies. This thesis investigates the following question: 
How can Norway develop an industry based on sustainable energy 
production capable of replacing the declining value creation from the 
Norwegian oil and gas industry? 
Scenario analysis and system dynamic modelling are used as the basis for a strategic 
analysis and estimation of future Norwegian value creation in offshore wind production 
and carbon capture and storage (CCS).
This thesis finds that the global energy market will be increasingly dependent on 
limited oil and gas supplies from a limited number of geopolitical unstable locations 
with high investment risks. It is likely that it will be increasingly more difficult to 
maintain a high production level of fossil fuels due to resource constraints and 
geopolitical instability, leading to increased insecurity in energy supplies. 
There is a common view that climate change will lead to severe changes in the long run 
and have major implications for human society. Due to the long time between cause 
and effect, climate changes will occur rather slowly. The industrialised world can adapt 
to most of these changes while climate change will be more damaging in the 
developing world (Stern 2007, p xix). Due to the potential severe implications of 
climate change the precautionary principle developed by the UN should apply to global 
xclimate policies (UN 1992). This work estimates the accumulated European cost of 
climate damages due to CO2 emissions to $129 per metric ton by the end of this century 
in the modelled reference case. These costs are expected to increase exponentially into 
the future due to the irreversible nature of climate changes.  
This thesis finds that reproduction of energy-related CO2 emission scenarios by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) requires fossil fuel resources three 
times higher than the level currently estimated by the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) (IPCC 2007c, p 187; IEA 2008b, p 218). This study finds that future CO2
emissions from estimated fossil-fuel resources seem insufficient to cause a catastrophic 
climate development. However, coal resources are very uncertain, and to ensure 
stabilisation of atmospheric CO2 concentration it is necessary to implement global 
policies that lead to extended use of renewable energy and CCS at coal power plants.
It is found that climate change may reduce welfare and associated energy demand. 
Limited fossil energy resources may temporarily limit the economic growth until high 
energy prices lead to energy efficiency gains and renewable energy production capacity 
to fuel further growth. This economic setback may be eliminated by proper energy 
policies to promote renewable energy production. 
This work concludes that CCS is unlikely to play a significant role in the future value 
creation in Norway, while offshore wind has the potential of becoming a major 
Norwegian industry. A more active policy towards climate change in Norway, aiming 
to develop renewable energy production, can change the path of the energy system in 
Norway and Europe towards a renewable path at acceptable costs. This will be 
beneficial for Norway and for Europe in terms of value creation, energy security and 
climate mitigation.  
The analysis in this thesis shows that future value creation from offshore wind 
production on the Norwegian continental shelf, delivering electricity to the European 
market, is comparable to the value creation from the current Norwegian oil and gas 
industry. Development of an offshore wind industry in Norway can increase the 
accumulated Norwegian value creation by more than 10 %, or more than $ 2500 billion, 
by the year 2100 provided that Norway acts early to create competitive advantages in 
xi
respect of European industries. Sensitivity analysis using the simulation model 
developed in this work (CE2-model) indicates that severe climate change may reduce 
the potential value of Norwegian offshore wind resources. It is therefore in Norway’s 
interest to achieve strong international cooperation to reduce global CO2 emissions. 
A portfolio standard is a regulatory measure to increase the fraction of renewable 
energy in the total energy mix. A policy based on portfolio standards for CO2 emissions 
combined with a carbon taxation that is reinvested in renewable energy production and 
CCS seems to be the most efficient policy in terms of accelerating renewable energy 
production and carbon capture and storage to reduce global CO2 emissions significantly 
(Gerlagh and Zwaan 2006). The modelling in this study finds that a global carbon tax 
of $90/ton would contribute to a 50 % reduction in global energy-related CO2 emissions 
without harming the world economy. This would limit the increase in average 
temperature on earth to 3 oC relative to pre-industrial temperature. 
The analysis in this work lead to the conclusion that developing a leading industry 
based on sustainable energy production in Norway will require stable policies over 
several decades and instruments such as: 
- Include the environmental costs of CO2 emissions in the cost of energy and 
products through a carbon tax of $90/ton (Internalise Externalities). 
- Recycle carbon tax back to renewable energy investments.  
- Establish public procurement programmes where governments require a high 
degree of renewable energy in public purchases.
- Increase public R&D on renewable energy. 
To achieve sustainable development, economists need to think differently on how to 
define economic development and to a larger extent include the value of natural 
resources in the measurement of economic development. Governments should focus 
more on increasing the long-term value of the national resource base of natural capital, 
human capital and manufactured capital, rather than the present way of thinking, where 
short- term outputs from these resources are optimised. Second, governments must 
internalise externalities in energy prices without discounting future generations. A 
change towards a sustainable energy system is urgent. The energy system becomes 
xii
more locked-in to fossil fuel as more investments are directed towards these energy 
types. A shift towards sustainable energy production will require greater efforts the 
longer decisions to change are deferred. 
This work describes how Norway can unlock the path to a sustainable energy future 
and contribute to a change in the global energy supply system toward sustainability.  
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11 Introduction and scope 
There is currently a strong focus on climate change globally. There is also a growing 
concern about energy security in many energy-importing nations. This contributes to 
increased demand for clean and secure energy supplies. The purpose of this thesis is to 
investigate the potential value creation of a transition from oil and gas production 
towards environmentally sustainable energy production in Norway. The potential for 
value creation of two business opportunities, Offshore Wind Power and Carbon 
Capture and Storage, have been estimated using scenario analysis, system dynamic 
modelling and net present value calculations (NPV).
As illustrated by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) in figure 1 below, 
Norwegian petroleum production has peaked, and is now approaching a decline phase 
(NPD 2005), which eventually will create a need for new business development and 
value creation in Norway to maintain the current welfare level.   
Figure 1: Total Petroleum Production on the Norwegian Continental Shelf 1970–2030. 
Norway is a significant oil and gas producing nation. The decisions of the European 
nations, Norway’s main market, with respect to energy and climate policies will have 
major impact on the value of the nation’s oil and gas reserves. The transition towards a 
sustainable energy system in Norway and in Europe is an opportunity for industrial 
2development to secure welfare for future generations in Norway. This opportunity can 
potentially be developed into a major export industry aiming to supply the European 
market, given the right incentives and support from the Norwegian government. A new 
industry based on sustainable energy production can contribute to close the gap 
between future value creation and the future cost of public services and welfare as 
predicted by Statistics Norway and illustrated in figure 2 below (Sand, Schiefloe et al. 
2005, p 178). New industrial development in Norway is required to close the estimated 
value creation gap of $40 billion per year by 2030. 
Figure 2: Norwegian Value Creation Gap (Sand, Schiefloe et al. 2005, p 178)  
At the same time as the petroleum revenues decrease in Norway, the costs of the 
welfare system in Norway will continue to increase as the share of the elderly 
population increase, leaving an increasing economic burden on the working population 
(Stortingsmelding 2009, p 63, 140). Norway has to develop new industries capable of 
replacing the petroleum revenues to secure the capacity to maintain the public welfare 
system in Norway beyond the petroleum era.  
The task is highly interdisciplinary and complex. The value of environmentally 
sustainable energy production is influenced by two main elements; contribution of 
energy supplies to economic development and reduced cost of climate change. 
Petroleum Production 
Value Creation Gap 
Revenues from the 
petroleum fund 
Value Creation Gap 
Norwegian Domestic Product without public services 1978-2030 
Traditional Goods and Service 
Production 
3Understanding the risk and uncertainty of energy supply interruptions and climate 
change are important in order to estimate the potential threat to the future welfare. This 
work investigates how Norway can achieve the required technological innovations for 
development of sustainable energy production. This thesis investigates the following 
question:
How can Norway develop an industry based on sustainable energy 
production capable of replacing the declining value creation from the 
Norwegian oil and gas industry? 
This thesis investigates the impact of climate policies and energy security on European 
energy demand, and the impact of innovation policies in Norway and Europe on zero 
emission energy supplies to the energy market. This thesis focuses on the European 
energy market because the growth in the Norwegian energy market seems insufficient 
as the driver of a major industrial development. The main focus in this work has 
therefore been to investigate the future value of electricity exports from Norwegian 
sustainable energy production to the European market. Offshore wind and gas power 
with CCS has been the main focus in this thesis due to the limited expansion potential 
for hydro power, onshore wind and solar power in Norway.
The energy future can be created but will require visions to guide the path to the future. 
The society will only realise a sustainable energy future if it decide to get there (Hamel 
and Prahalad 1994). This work may contribute to discovery of a path to a sustainable 
future. 
This thesis aims to identify options to close the future Norwegian value creation gap 
through industrial development within sustainable energy production to secure 
European energy supplies. The work presented here leads to the conclusion that 
Norway has at least one option to close the value creation gap. It is through a focused 
effort to develop an offshore wind industry in Norway.
4
52 Theoretical background 
The Earthscan report, “Limits to Growth – the 30 year update” (2005) claims that the 
global system is currently in an unsustainable situation, and that there are limits to 
growth on the planet – limits on resources, food, environment, and to the population the 
Earth can support over time (Meadows, Randers et al. 2005, p 234). Meadows et al. 
(2005) concluded that the people of the world have to act soon to establish a sustainable 
world. Without actions to create sustainability, the global population will face 
enormous challenges in providing sufficient goods, energy and food to a growing 
population. Future generations may experience recession, hunger, conflicts, and 
reduced living standards (Meadows, Randers et al. 2005, p 176-179). 
The global population is expected to increase by 30 % in the next 25 years, of which 
80–90 % of the growth is expected to be in developing countries (IEA 2004, p 43-46). 
To establish a sustainable global development, with growth in population and living 
standards, it will be necessary to develop sustainable energy production and improved 
energy efficiency.
The main question from the previous chapter can be divided into the following sub 
questions:
• What is sustainable energy production? 
• How large are the different energy production potentials? 
• What is the climate impact of energy production? 
• How will climate policies develop?  
• How can the Norwegian value creation and welfare be sustained? 
This chapter will set the scene by investigating main elements that influence the 
development and value creation in future energy markets as described in the questions 
above. Energy demand depends mainly on economic growth which might be slowed 
down by climate damages, while energy supplies depend on energy security and energy 
6price. The background in this chapter provides the basis for modelling and analysis of 
the energy and climate challenge as illustrated in figure 3 below. 
Norwegian value 
creation gap
Scenario 
Analysis
Strategic 
Analysis
Norwegian 
Strategic Options
Value of Norwegian 
Strategic Options
• Energy Security
• Climate change
• Geopolitical stability
• Energy Resources
• Offshore competence
• Geopolitical position
• Financial resources
• Barriers to change
• Innovation Policy
Figure 3: Work flow in the thesis 
The energy markets in the last years have been characterised by a substantial increase 
in global energy demand, especially in China and India, caused by the strong economic 
growth in these countries. At the same time it is observed that the capacity to deliver 
fossil energy may be limited due to limited production capacity and lack of 
infrastructure development, such as pipelines, refining and terminal capacities (Ruth 
2005). Nations are concerned with security of supply of oil, gas and power leading to 
an increasing nationalization of energy production and distribution worldwide. 
Substantial investments in production capacity and infrastructure are needed in many 
countries to secure necessary access to energy (IEA 2004, p 32; IEA 2008b, p 39-40). 
The Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC 2007a, p 803) has concluded 
that emission of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere will change the future climate on 
earth and estimates the atmospheric temperature to increase by 2 to 6o C by the year 
2100, which is a tremendous increase from the current average temperature of 17o C.
7The Stern review found that ignoring climate change will damage economic growth, 
creating risks of major disruption of economic and social activity later in this century 
and in the next, on a scale similar to those associated with the great wars and the 
economic depression of the first half of the twentieth century. Stern recommends a 
mitigation investment strategy, where strong action is taken to reduce emissions to 
avoid severe consequences in the future (Stern 2007, p xv-xix).
The energy market will face at least two major challenges in a 10–20 year perspective. 
The oil and gas production will reach a point where it cannot meet demand. Secondly 
the concern about climate damages caused by fossil fuel consumption may lead to 
incentives to promote the use of CCS and renewable energy. The need for policies to 
reduce carbon dioxide emission combined with the probability that oil and gas 
resources within a few decades cannot meet energy demand, represent an opportunity 
for sustainable energy production.
To understand the future value creation potential in sustainable energy production, it is 
of particular interest to investigate what sustainability is, the importance of energy to 
economic development, the energy security situation in a medium- to long-term 
perspective and the consequences of climate change caused by fossil energy 
consumption.  
2.1 Sustainability 
Sustainable development is defined by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development as “Development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs” (Brundtland 1987). 
This definition raises at least one fundamental question; how can the world balance the 
needs of future generations relative to the needs of the present generation? 
Herman Daly (1996) views the economy as a subsystem of the ecosystem. Daly (1996) 
argues that economists and society should recognise that the economy is not exempt 
from natural laws and that economy cannot be explained by natural laws either. 
Economic growth can be anti-economic because the marginal physical throughput may 
cause environmental costs to increase faster than production benefits, thereby making 
8society poorer, not richer (Daly 1996, p 11). Sustainable development would, according 
to Daly (1996, p 31), mean a change in the current economic norm of economic growth 
towards qualitative improvement or development as the path of future progress. This 
would mean a shift towards a steady-state economy where the aggregate throughput of 
matter and energy is constant. 
Sustainable development necessarily means a radical shift from a growth 
economy and all it entails to a steady-state economy, certainly in the North, 
and eventually in the South (Daly 1996, p 31). 
Sustainable development means living within local and global environmental 
constraints. Trade, in a sustainable world, would lead to a situation where some 
countries try to live beyond their own environmental constraints which would depend 
on other countries’ willingness to limit their own environmental impact (Daly 1996, p 
165).
The thermodynamic law of entropy states that the energy and matter in the universe 
move towards a less useful state. An entropic flow is a flow where matter and energy 
become less useful. One example is fossil fuels – when fossil fuels are burned to 
produce energy, the energy itself is not lost, but it is very often turned from useful work 
to useless heat. The same is true for economies, which are limited by the availability 
and throughput of matter and energy (Georgescu-Roegen 1971; Reynolds 1999; Daly 
and Farley 2004, p 29). The expansion of population and physical capital will gradually 
force humanity to use an increasing share of the production output to handle constraints 
on environment and natural resources (Meadows, Randers et al. 2005, p xi).
Eventually so much capital is diverted to solving these problems that it 
becomes impossible to sustain further growth in industrial output. When 
industry declines, society can no longer sustain greater and greater output in 
the other economic sectors: food, services, and other consumption. When 
those sectors quit growing, population growth also ceases (Meadows, 
Randers et al. 2005, p xi). 
9Randers (2000), one of the authors of “Limits to growth – the 30 year update”, reflected 
about the history of sustainable development, and observed that it took nearly ten years 
after the introduction of the concept of sustainable development in 1986 (Brundtland 
1987) for global society to formulate the three elements of sustainable development; 
financial sustainability, environmental sustainability, and social sustainability. Since the 
publication of the original “Limits to Growth” in 1972 (Meadows, Randers et al. 1972), 
Randers (2000) observes that the world has changed from a world constrained by 
resource scarcity to a world limited by the capacity of the environment to absorb 
pollution. The Earth has much more fossil fuel than society can burn without causing 
serious climate change. Randers (2000) concludes that society, and particularly 
democratic societies, have difficulty facing up to issues where the costs precede the 
benefits and that achievement of global sustainability is far off. Moxnes (2000) found 
that the typical political behaviour is to delay necessary protective measures until the 
development takes an unexpectedly negative turn and becomes severe enough. 
We have learnt that action is slow when the benefits are far in the future, 
and almost imperceptible when the benefits are also uncertain (Randers 
2000).
Economic growth is measured by most economists by measuring gross domestic 
product (GDP). GDP is a good measure of economic costs, but it is not a good measure 
of economic development (Dasgupta and Mäler 2001). Increasing environmental costs 
leads to increased GDP, but could in principle reduce the productive capacity of the 
society. An improved measure of sustainable economic development should be 
developed, focusing on the capacity of a nation, region or the world to sustain or 
maintain productive capacity per capita on a century timescale.  
2.1.1 Sustainable economic development 
Sustainable economic development can be seen as one of two possible paradigms.  The 
first paradigm is often seen as the weak sustainability position assumes that almost all 
kinds of natural capital can be substituted by man-made capital. The second paradigm, 
known as strong sustainability position, assumes that many of the most fundamental 
services provided by nature cannot be replaced by services produced by humans or 
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man-made systems. In this view, certain essential natural resources will be lost forever 
with no substitutes once they are consumed, and the economy will decline as the 
resource output declines (Tilton 1996; Reynolds 1999; Daly 2005; Ayres 2006). Daly 
(2005) argues that a strong sustainability position will require a shift from economic 
growth, which is not sustainable, towards economic development, which presumably is 
sustainable. The sustainable economy must at some point stop growing, but it does not 
need to stop developing. Investments in a sustainable world would be mainly for the 
replacement of capital and qualitative improvement rather than for quantitative 
expansion (Daly 2005). 
Reynolds (1999) found that economic growth can continue without limits if the 
elasticity of substitution between resources or between capital and resources is 
sufficiently large and if technologies increase the productivity of resources faster than 
their exhaustion. However, he also found that the elasticity of substitution for any two 
inputs must always go to zero, indicating that there are limits to economic growth. 
Dasgupta and Mäler (2001) found that the economy’s productive capacity, and the 
welfare of the population, is determined by the manufactured capital, human capital and 
natural capital. Most definitions of sustainable development include the condition that 
per capita welfare should never decline. This will be satisfied as long as the changes in 
the aggregate capital, such as natural resources, productive capital and human capital, 
are positive (Atkinson 2000; Beckerman 2001). 
It is, however, as Beckerman (2001) states difficult to see how sustainability and 
welfare in a distant future should be of any importance for the relatively poor peoples 
of the world that strive for increased economic welfare and material throughput. 
2.1.2 Sustainable energy services 
In its report, “World Energy Outlook” for 2006 and 2008, IEA concludes that the world 
is not on course for a sustainable energy future. In the baseline scenario, IEA finds that 
CO2 emissions will be almost two and a half times the current level by 2050. Increasing 
transport demand will continue to increase the demand for oil, and the carbon intensity 
of the world’s economy is expected to increase due to greater reliance on coal for 
power generation and production of liquid transport fuels in developing countries with 
domestic coal resources (IEA 2006a, p 25; IEA 2008b, p 123, 139). 
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The world is facing twin energy-related threats: that of not having adequate 
and secure supplies of energy at affordable prices and that of environmental 
harm caused by consuming too much of it (IEA 2006b, p 37). 
Jaccard (2005) argues that a sustainable energy system must have good prospects for 
enduring indefinitely in terms of the type and level of energy services it provides while 
the production and consumption of energy must not exceed the rate at which it can be 
absorbed by the ecosystem. Jaccard (2005) found that a sustainable energy system will 
require the development of renewable energy sources, higher energy efficiency, and 
zero emission fossil fuels combined with a shift in end-use applications towards 
electricity and hydrogen as energy carriers. Innovations and deployment of these 
technologies will originate in the most developed economies, and will be driven by 
emerging market conditions and markets created by government policies (Jaccard 2005, 
p 318-319; Nuttall and Manz 2008). In a sustainable energy system 
the known, cumulative impacts of the energy system must be negligible and 
any extraordinary risks it poses must be extremely unlikely (Jaccard 2005, 
p 11-12). 
Security of energy supply is very important for most regions and countries of the world, 
and it is probably unlikely that a sustainable energy system can be developed without 
strong emphasis on domestic resources in the energy mix. The most abundant unused 
energy source, on a short time scale, appears to be coal for many of the large energy- 
consuming countries. Countries without adequate local energy resources are vulnerable 
in terms of the security of energy supplies (Ediger, Hosgör et al. 2007).
2.1.3 Sustainable environment 
According to Ayres (1996), the developed countries with less than 20 % of the world 
population consume approximately 80 % of its resources. The current population of 6.5 
billion people is expected to increase to around 9 billion by year 2050 (UN 2006). 
Ayres argues that bringing all these up to a low-to-average middle-class standard of 
living would imply a fivefold increase in aggregate material and energy consumption 
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which would push the limits of natural resources and the biosphere far beyond 
sustainability (Ayres 1996).
Continued economic development is essential; but continued economic 
development along present lines is ecologically unaffordable (Ayres 
1996).
Ayres (1996) found that if the people of the developing world increase their welfare 
through continued increase in consumption of materials and energy, sustainability 
would imply that the developed world would have to cut back its aggregate use of 
material and energy resources by 90 %. This can only be achieved through a reduced 
living standard, or a change from material demand towards service demand, combined 
with a sharp increase in the productivity of materials and energy (Ayres 1996). The 
current economic growth is not sustainable for the indefinite future because of 
increasing scarcity of materials and energy, and the resulting environmental pollution 
of a finite environment (Ayres 2001). Daly has suggested three simple rules to help 
define the sustainable limits to material and energy throughput (from Meadows, 
Randers et al. 2005, p 54): 
- For a renewable resource, the sustainable rate of use can be no greater than the 
rate of regeneration of its source. 
- For a non-renewable resource, such as fossil fuels, the sustainable rate of use 
should be less than the rate at which a renewable resource can substitute it.
- For a pollutant, the sustainable rate of emission can be no greater than the rate at 
which that pollutant can be recycled, absorbed, or rendered harmless. 
As Nuttall and Manz (2008) describe the challenge, short-term benefits might be 
outweighed by long-term environmental effects:
In a world unable and/or unwilling to reduce its carbon footprint, the energy 
security benefits of increased coal use could be outweighed by a 
catastrophic climate tragedy: rising sea levels, hurricanes and drought; and 
the death and destruction caused by these events (Nuttall and Manz 2008). 
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2.2 Economic growth 
Economic growth is the main driver of energy demand and the main cause of 
environmental pollution. Achieving sustainable economic development will require a 
stronger coupling between economic theory, natural resources and the capacity of the 
environment to recycle pollution. The purpose of this section is to describe how 
economic growth comes about, and how the combined effects of limited energy 
resources and climate change may limit economic growth. It is important to keep in 
mind, as Solow (2000) emphasised, that a theory cannot explain everything and that a 
model will always be a simplified description of the economy. The theory as it is 
described here is based on the standard neoclassical model, and expanded to include 
energy supply and climate impact. 
Of course one must not go too far; a theory capable of explaining anything 
that might possibly be observed is hardly a theory at all (Solow 2000, p 4). 
A sustained economic growth rate in per capita GDP of more than 2 % per year is a 
modern invention. In the years between 1850 and 1950 the growth rate was below 1 %, 
and before the industrial revolution and the use of fossil energy sources, it was 
essentially zero (Jones 2002, p 11). Theories of economic growth started with Adam 
Smith in 1776, who found that growth of output and living standards depended on 
investment, capital accumulation and labour specialisation. The modern or neoclassical 
growth theories are based on the work by Solow and Swan which was published in 
1956 (Solow 2000). The neoclassical growth theory analysed the role of physical 
capital accumulation and discovered the importance of technological progress as the 
ultimate driving force behind sustained economic growth. Paul Romer (1986) and 
Robert Lucas (1988) tried to fill this gap and developed endogenous growth theories to 
explain how innovation and human capital contributed to technological progress 
(Aghion and Howitt 1998, p 7; Jones 2002, p 2; Thirlwall 2006, p 122-164). 
In 1958 Nicholas Kaldor summed up six elements that a growth model for advanced 
industrial economies must be capable of reproducing (Solow 2000, p 7-8):
(1) Real output per person grows at a more or less constant rate.
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(2) The stock of real capital grows at a more or less constant rate exceeding the rate 
of growth of labour input. 
(3) The ratio of “real” capital to output is almost constant.  
(4) The rate of profit on capital has a horizontal trend. 
(5) The rate of growth of output per person can vary widely from one country to 
another.
(6) Economies with a high share of profits in income tend to have a high ratio of 
investment to output.  
An economy growing according to the first three of these rules is in a “steady state”. Its 
output, employment, and capital stock grow exponentially, and its capital/output ratio is 
constant (Solow 2000, p 2-3). Solow concluded that: 
The steady state is not a bad place for the theory of growth to start, but may 
be a dangerous place for it to end (Solow 2000, p 7). 
Solow (2000) emphasised that successful theorising is to make the simplifying 
assumptions in such a way that the final results are not very sensitive. In his Nobel 
Lecture he stated: 
Naturally I hope that growth theory can serve in both ways: as a background 
on which to hang multi sector models that probably try to do more than can 
be done, and as a framework for simple, strong, loosely quantitative 
propositions about cause and effect in macroeconomics (Solow 2000, p 
xxvi).
2.2.1 Production function 
A closed economy has no flux of labour, capital, energy, materials and knowledge 
across borders. In an open economy, however, there is flux of all these factors 
depending on the difference in costs, welfare, trade barriers etc. (Jones 2002; Barro 
2004). Theories of economic growth have developed a lot in the last few decades, and 
endogenous growth theories have contributed substantially to the understanding of how 
economic growth comes about. Endogenous growth models explain how technological 
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progress develops, and how increased efforts in R&D, human capital and infrastructure 
contribute to economic growth (Aghion and Howitt 1998; Barro 2004). Solow (2000) 
found that the three main factors in modelling economic development are: 
• Allocation of Capital 
• Allocation of Labour 
• Technological progress. 
The total production of a country is the sum of the production from all the businesses 
and public services within that country. How a country chooses to distribute its wealth 
between public and private consumption by use of taxation is not a part of this work. 
However, the impact of tax and subsidies on the allocation of resources among different 
energy sources has been investigated. The standard set of neoclassical equations 
developed by Solow (2000) has been used as the basis for the modelling. Based on the 
available literature on endogenous growth theory, some elements related to 
technological progress in the energy sector have been included. The basic growth 
model is built around two equations; a production function and a capital accumulation 
equation. The basic equation for production is described by Solow (Solow 2000; Jones 
2002, p 22) as a standard Cobb-Douglas production function: 
)1(),,( αα −== LBKLKBFY    
where B is the total factor productivity, K is the capital employed and L is the labour 
force used in production. The value share of capital and labour has been relatively 
constant over time, with a capital share Į of around 0.3 (Fiddaman 1997, p 82; Jones 
2002, p 14). The equation show that as capital and labour accumulates, and technology 
improves, the production output of a society will increase. 
2.2.2 Capital 
Capital accumulation is one of the major drivers for economic growth in the industrial 
world, together with human capital and technological progress. Industrial capital in the 
growth equation refers to the hardware in operation – the machines and factories 
needed to produce the goods. A fraction of the output from production is used each year 
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to increase the capital stock through investments, expanding the capacity for future 
production (Meadows, Randers et al. 2005, p 39). Solow assumes a very simple 
equation for capital accumulation: 
dKIdKsY
dt
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where s is the savings rate, I is the investments and d is the capital depreciation. The 
savings rate is the fraction of the total production output that is used for investments to 
accumulate physical capital, typically around 25 %. The depreciation describes how 
large a fraction of the capital stock that depreciates every year. Assuming that d = 0.05 
is similar to an average lifetime of the capital of 20 years, where 5 % of the machines 
and factories in the model economy wear out each year. The accumulation of capital is 
therefore dependent on two major factors, the investment of capital and the depreciation 
of capital. 
Energy supplies are essential for utilisation of the industrial capital. A vehicle, for 
example, needs energy to operate, and without energy, the value of the vehicle for 
production is in principle zero. The same applies for industrial capital. Economic growth 
since the industrial revolution has been driven by utilising machines powered by fossil 
fuels as a substitute for human and animal labour (Ayres 2001; Ayres and Warr 2005). 
The capital requires a certain amount of energy to perform normal operations, and if this 
energy is not supplied, the productivity of the capital will be reduced. This can be 
described and modelled by substituting capital in the growth equation with operating 
capital (Fiddaman 1997, p 80-88). The simple approach used in this thesis assumes that 
operating capital can be calculated using the following equation: 
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where Es is actual energy supplies and ER is energy requirement, and ı is the energy-to-
capital elasticity. If the energy-to-capital elasticity is zero, there would be no impact of 
reduced energy supplies to operating capital. A value of one indicates that all capital is 
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equally energy efficient, while a factor between zero and one indicates that the least 
effective capital will be closed down first in the case of energy shortages.  
Depreciation of capital consists of two elements; the normal depreciation of capital due 
to wear and tear, and depreciation caused by climate change. Depreciation due to 
climate change describes the amount of destruction and repair/replacement of capital 
that are required due to damage caused by a changing climate.  
The economic model as described in this thesis assumes that energy and man-made 
capital are complements rather than substitutes. If energy and capital are substitutes, 
neither of them can be a limiting factor since the productivity of one does not depend 
much on availability of the other. When they are complements the one in shortest 
supply is the limiting factor (Daly 1996, p 78). 
In the modelling of the coupled energy-economy-climate system in this thesis, it is 
assumed that the short-term substitution elasticity between energy sources is bound to 
the type of capital, and it will therefore be close to zero. Since capital and energy are 
complements, short-term elasticity between capital and energy has to be low. However, 
it cannot be zero, because this would imply that demand would be independent of price, 
and that consumption of other goods would be reduced, in principle to zero, to maintain 
energy consumption. The long-term elasticity is controlled by the replacement of 
capital, and will be higher than the short-term elasticity (Fiddaman 1997, p 84-87). 
As described above, low energy supplies relative to energy requirements will reduce the 
operating capital and limit production output. Development in energy requirement will 
be discussed further in the next section. 
2.2.3 Energy requirement 
Neoclassical economic theory assumes that technological progress creates growth and 
that resource consumption is a consequence, not a cause, of growth. Economic history 
shows that the reality is more complex, where it often has been higher-grade energy 
resources and higher-grade structural resources that have created growth, not just 
technology alone. The standard economic assumptions and mathematical characteristics 
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of the Cobb-Douglas function implies that energy flows do not contribute much to 
aggregate productivity and growth (Reynolds 1999; Ayres 2001). Ayres found that the 
observed economic growth in the USA could be explained almost entirely by 
substituting technological progress and labour by electric power consumption in the 
growth equation (Ayres 2001; Ayres and Warr 2005).  
Energy requirement is a function of capital multiplied by the average energy efficiency 
indicator (EEI) as described in the equation below. E0 is the initial energy requirement 
and K0 is the initial capital. 
EEI
K
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There are three major types of capital that require substantial amounts of energy; 
transport capital, residential capital and industrial capital.
The transport sector is a very important driver of energy requirements. Over history, a 
general trend in all regions of the world has been observed, where the passenger 
distance travelled per capita is equal to 1 km/$ of GDP per capita (Farrell and Kammen 
2007b). Slowing this growth in transport demand would require either a substantial 
reduction in demand for mobility or a shift towards public transportation. Neither is 
likely to happen unless the fuel prices increase substantially (Turton 2006). 
It is difficult to model how energy efficiency in the residential and industry sectors will 
improve, how fast it will go, and why it will improve. There is a large potential for 
improvement in energy efficiency by utilising existing technologies, and within a few 
years there will be new technologies available that can contribute to even larger 
improvements. However, these improvements will not happen fast due to the embodied 
energy efficiency in existing capital. Improvements will be driven mainly by the cost of 
energy and regulations. Today, the energy price seems to be too low for such changes 
to happen and the short- term environmental cost caused by energy use and pollution is 
too low to enforce fundamental changes in regulations.  
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The use of energy efficient technologies will be motivated by price and regulations, and 
improve faster with higher energy prices caused by market, carbon pricing or energy 
tax.  Energy efficiency is embodied in the capital stock and energy uses are limited by 
the thermodynamic laws and can never reach zero. As new capital is installed and 
discarded, the average energy efficiency in the capital adjusts as a co-flow to capital 
(Fiddaman 1997, p 96).  
Energy price seems to be the driver for energy efficiency improvement. Newell et al. 
(2006) found that the majority of energy efficiency improvements were due to changes 
in energy prices and changes in energy-efficiency standards, rather than being 
autonomous. Unander (2004) found that energy efficiency improved across most 
sectors and countries from 1973 through to the mid to late 1980s, with more modest 
improvements since then. Unander (2004) concluded that: 
Changes caused by the oil price shock in the 1970s and the resulting 
energy policies did considerably more to control growth in energy demand 
and reduce CO2 emissions than the energy efficiency and climate policies 
implemented in the 1990s (Unander 2004).  
Several studies question the impact of energy efficiency improvements on the total 
energy consumption due to the rebound effect. The rebound effect can be described as 
the tendency to use the energy savings to increase consumption of other energy 
intensive goods or services such as travelling. Frondel et al. (2008) studied the 
historical rebound effect in Germany and concluded that the effect is approximately 60 
%. Jaccard (2005) found that it is unlikely that energy efficiency improvements will 
stop the primary energy system from expanding almost three-fold towards the end of 
this century. However, IEA found in their alternative energy scenarios that improved 
energy efficiency will lead to reduced need for investments in energy supply and is a 
cheap, fast and environmentally friendly way to meet the world’s energy needs (IEA
2006a, p 28): 
Improved energy efficiency in the buildings, industry and transport sectors 
leads to between 17 % and 33 % lower energy use than in the Baseline 
scenario by 2050 (IEA 2006a, p 28). 
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The energy requirement per capital unit will continue to decline as energy losses are 
reduced or utilised for useful purposes. The energy efficiency improvement rate is 
mainly a factor of energy cost and capital investments rate, where increasing energy 
costs and capital turnover will lead to faster decline in energy requirement per capital 
unit.
2.2.4 Energy demand 
Energy demand at low energy prices is equal to the physical energy requirement as 
described in the previous section. If energy price increases to levels above the marginal 
productivity of energy, short- term energy demand would be lower than the energy 
requirement as described in the previous section. Energy demand can be estimated by 
the equation: 
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MPE is the marginal productivity of energy supply, Pe is the energy price and Ș is the 
energy demand adjustment coefficient (Fiddaman 1997, p 86). The marginal 
productivity of energy supply can be derived from the equations described in the 
previous sections and is:
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An alternative approach to modelling energy demand is described by Webster et al. 
(2008), who found that energy demand can be described by the equation: 
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The parameters with subscript 0 refer to a reference or initial value of modelling. 
Webster et al. (2008) found that the price elasticity of energy ȕ is -0.23 and the income 
elasticity ș is 0.34 for the US economy (Webster, Paltsev et al. 2008). The income 
elasticity reflects the energy improvements in production capital, as increased GDP will 
require more capital with associated energy needs. This equation indicates that 
doubling of energy price due to market or CO2 costs would reduce the energy demand 
by 15 %. Testing of both models in the CE2 simulation model developed in this thesis 
give approximately similar energy demand. 
2.2.5 Technological progress 
Solow (2000) found that technological progress is the dominant engine of growth 
which explains about 80 % of the economic growth in modern economies. While Solow 
(2000) regarded technical progress as an exogenous factor, others, such as Romer 
(1986) and Lucas (1988), consider it to be endogenous to economic growth (Isoard and 
Soria 2001), and Ayres and Warr (2005) found that it could be explained almost 
entirely by energy input. Most models of climate change assume an exogenous overall 
productivity growth of about 2–3 % per year (Löschel 2002). Solow (2000) concluded 
that technological progress finds its way into production through the use of new and 
different capital equipment, and that this mechanism is omitted from his growth model. 
Therefore, policies to increase investment would lead to faster transfer of new 
technology and affect growth rates. Solow (2000) noticed that: “It appears that the ones 
that invested fastest were best able to take advantage of the available knowledge” 
(Solow 2000, p xxiii).
Many researchers have concluded that innovation and entrepreneurship should have a 
stronger position within macroeconomic theory. Landstöm (2005) stated that the 
dominating macroeconomic theory based on economic equilibrium does not include 
entrepreneurship as a driving force, while this was a central driving force for economic 
development in Schumpeter’s economic theories (Landström 2005, p 49-50). 
Schumpeter recognised that:  
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The ruling paradigm of the economics of development rests on the classical-
neoclassical view of a world in which change is gradual, marginalist, non-
disruptive, equilibrating, and largely painless (J. B. Nuggets and P. A. 
Yotopoulos quoted in Schumpeter 1934, p l).  
Porter (1990) stated that: “The doctrine that is embedded in classical economics is at 
best incomplete and at worst incorrect”. Lazonick (2003) found that the theory of 
market economy lacks an explanation of the successful growth of the wealthy 
economies, leading to a tendency to see developed markets in labour, capital and 
products as causes rather than consequences of economic development. Stiglitz (1987) 
emphasised the importance of technological progress in traditional economic theory 
when he stated that:
in the long run the growth rates in all countries should be related only to the 
rate of technological progress (Stiglitz 1987). 
Endogenous growth theories try to explain and model the factors within the economy 
that drive technological progress. In the Romer (1986) model, technological progress is 
modelled by a quite simple equation where the labour force is divided into R&D labour 
and production labour, where the contribution of R&D labour to technological progress 
is modelled. The Lucas (1988) model tries to explain technological progress through 
the development of human capital, rather than input of labour force alone (Jones 2002, 
p 100). Solow (2000, p 102) argues that an endogenous growth theory needs to be 
based on serious analysis of the determinants of innovation and technological process, 
but Solow (2000, p 123) sees difficulties in making a good model. However, Solow 
(2000, p 180) thinks it is a mistake to divide growth theory into an “exogenous” and an 
“endogenous” branch because every economic theory will have to stop somewhere and 
rest on some exogenous elements. 
Endogenous growth is relevant for modelling technological progress. However, when 
trying to understand the energy supply system, or impacts of climate change, the focus 
is on energy supplies to support economic growth or technological progress. For 
modelling of the energy system, an exogenous approach as described by Fiddaman 
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(1997, p 83) seems to be sufficient for generating scenarios with respect to energy 
demand. Endogenous growth theories are useful for understanding the mechanisms for 
technological progress in the energy sector and discussing prioritisation of limited R&D 
resources between different energy sectors.
2.3 Energy security 
Energy supplies works as the blood in the economy and reliable energy supplies are 
necessary to secure economic development and the welfare of the population in all 
nations. To secure the welfare of the population in Norway and Europe, reliable energy 
supplies are required.
In World War I, Sir Winston Churchill made the decision to shift the power source of 
the British navy’s ships from coal to oil to make the fleet faster than the German fleet. 
This switch from domestic coal to insecure oil supplies from Persia lifted energy 
security to a national strategic issue. Churchill’s response to this challenge was: “Safety 
and certainty in oil, lie in variety and variety alone” (Yergin 2006). 
The usual definition of energy security is simply availability of sufficient supplies at 
affordable prices (Yergin 2006). IEA (2006a) conclude in their scenario analysis that:
Secure, reliable and affordable energy supplies are fundamental to economic 
stability and development. The threat of disruptive climate change, the 
erosion of energy security and the growing energy needs of the developing 
world will pose major challenges for energy decision makers (IEA 2006a, p 
25).
In his State of the Union address in 2006, the US President George W. Bush stated that 
keeping USA competitive requires affordable energy, and he announced that the country 
had a serious problem: “America is addicted to oil, which is often imported from 
geopolitical unstable parts of the world.  The best way to break this addiction is through 
technology” (Bush 2006).
President Bush stated that the goal of the US is to replace more than 75 % of the oil 
imports from the Middle East by 2025 (Bush 2006).  The Swedish government has also 
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decided to be independent of imported oil within 2025, and is currently investing a lot of 
effort on the development of bio energy (Persson 2006). The current focus on energy 
security is driven by a tighter oil market and by increasing oil prices (Yergin 2006). 
During the last decade there has been a large increase in the demand for oil, mainly 
driven by the economic growth in China and India. These countries have changed from 
self-sufficiency to a dependence on global energy markets, and they are concerned about 
their increasing cost of energy imports. According to Yergin (2006), future energy 
supplies will be constrained by international affairs, politics, energy investment and new 
technological development. Yergin (2006) found that there are four principles to 
maintain energy security: 
1. Diversification of supply.
2. A “security margin” in the energy supply system.  
3. Stability in the global market.  
4. Open information flow for a well-functioning market. 
Energy security is even more important in times of war than in peace. Lack of domestic 
energy resources would require substantial energy storage capacity, combined with 
alliances with energy-rich countries to secure the energy supplies to the military force 
in case of a war situation (Economides and Oligney 2000). In the State of the Union 
address in 2008, President Bush included the environmental challenges in the energy 
security challenge. 
To build a future of energy security, we must trust in the creative genius of 
American researchers and entrepreneurs and empower them to pioneer a 
new generation of clean energy technology. Our security, our prosperity, 
and our environment all require reducing our dependence on oil (Bush 
2008).
There is reason to be concerned about security of energy supplies in North America, 
Europe and Asia Pacific, where the economic growth is based on a relatively high 
fraction of imported energy (BP 2007). Europe imports about half of its energy 
consumption and is very reliant on Russia, North Africa and the Middle East as energy 
providers. North America and the Asia Pacific regions import about one-quarter of their 
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energy consumption and will become more dependent on energy imports as the 
economy and energy requirement expands (BP 2007). Nordhaus and Boyer  (2000, p 
53-55) conclude that if fossil fuel supplies are relatively price-inelastic as seen in recent 
years, i.e. supplies will not increase significantly due to price increases, then carbon-
energy prices will rise sharply as the limits of these resources are reached. The 
significant energy price increases in the last few years may indicate that the global 
energy supply approach these limits, which will be discussed further in the survey of 
global energy resources in the next section. 
2.3.1 Energy resources 
This section will present a survey of the energy resources available in the twenty-first 
century, both fossil fuels and renewable energy, as seen today. The total energy system 
can be defined as the “combined processes of acquiring and using energy in a given 
society or economy” (Jaccard 2005, p 6).  
The definition above includes the different sources of primary energy and  the 
secondary energy that these primary sources are transformed into (Jaccard 2005, p 6). 
In this transformation from primary to secondary energy, such as electricity, and finally 
to useful work, there is an energy loss of approximately 86 % (Ayres and Warr 2005). 
The vast majority (95 %) of the current world commercial primary energy consumption 
is based on fossil fuels such as coal, gas and oil. The regional numbers show some 
differences reflecting the regional differences in energy availability (BP 2007). 
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Figure 4: World Primary Energy Consumption is to a large extent based on fossil fuels, with 95 % 
of commercial energy consumption is based on oil, gas and coal (BP 2007). 
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IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2008 (2008b, p 38) concludes that the world’s energy need 
will be almost 45 % higher in 2030 than they are now. According to IEA and CERA 
(Yergin 2006, p 74-75), the Earth’s fossil energy resources are sufficient to meet demand 
until 2030. They find that the global production of conventional oil will not peak before 
2030 if necessary investments are made. An increasing share of future supplies is 
expected to come from “non-traditional oils” such as ultra-deep waters, oil sands, natural 
gas liquids, gas-to-liquids, coal-to-liquids, etc. (Esser 2005). 
2.3.1.1 Fossil energy sources 
Reserves are generally defined as proven resources, while the quantity of resources 
includes undiscovered resources that are expected to be found. The remaining global 
reserves of conventional oil have been stable around 1200 billion barrels during the last 
few years due to increases in recovery and new discoveries that compensate for oil 
extraction. Most literature sources estimate the oil resources to be two to three times the 
amount of the estimated reserves (BP 2007; WEC 2007; IEA 2008b).  
Unconventional oil such as oil shale and extra-heavy oils occurs in large volumes in 
relatively few locations. Oil shale is mainly located in the USA and Russia, with an 
estimated total in-place volume of 2800 billion barrels. However, the cost of extracting 
oil from oil shale is high and the current expected recovery is low. Extra-heavy oil is 
mainly located in Venezuela and Canada, with a total in-place volume of 5500 billion 
barrels. The production of these volumes requires large amounts of steam to heat the oil 
to make it flow, which consumes 10–40 % of the total primary energy output. In total, a 
recovery of up to 10–20 % can be expected from these resources (WEC 2007, p 120-
129).
Several authors, such as Simmons (2005) and Aleklett (2006), argue that the world oil 
production are close to a peak, and that world oil production will start to decline within a 
few years. They argue that the remaining reserves, especially in the Middle East, will be 
insufficient to supply the world with the growing need for energy. This is a reasonable 
conclusion, based on reserves numbers alone. However, if resources are included the 
picture changes fundamentally. Reserves are estimated based on expected recovery from 
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discovered resources, with current recovery methods, and should be considered as a 
pessimistic estimate. If the undiscovered resources and unconventional oil are included, 
resources which are highly uncertain, the picture will be different. Based on reserves 
figures from the BP statistical review (2007), resource figures from IEA (2004, p 94) and 
reserves and resource figures from World Energy Council (2007), low, medium and high 
estimates have been established for remaining resources. These figures are listed in  table 
1 and 2 below. In “World Energy Outlook 2008”, IEA (2008b, p 205) has published a 
more comprehensive update of resource estimates and production forecasts, giving 
slightly higher oil resource numbers than those presented here, which could defer peak 
petroleum by approximately five years. 
Table 1: Conventional oil reserves and resources at the end of 2006 
Production 
Rate
Cumulative 
Production
Remaining 
Reserves
Additional 
Resources Total Low Medium High Low Medium High
mill bbl/day bill bbl bill bbl bill bbl bill bbl bill bbl bill bbl bill bbl bill bbl bill bbl bill bbl
North America 13,7 209 59,9 50 318,9 270 290 320 61 81 111
Latin America 6,88 75 103,5 50 228,5 180 200 230 105 125 155
Europe 2,4 36 7,1 4 47,1 43 47 50 7 11 14
Norway 2,78 22 8,5 5 35,5 30 35 40 8 13 18
Eurasia (FSU) 12,3 147 128,9 200 475,9 275 375 475 128 228 328
Middle East 25,59 277 742,7 300 1319,7 1000 1150 1350 723 873 1073
Africa 9,99 96 117,2 200 413,2 210 310 420 114 214 324
Asia Pacific 7,94 83 40,5 20 143,5 120 135 150 37 52 67
Total 81,58 945 1208,3 829 2982,3 2128 2542 3035 1183 1597 2090
Total Oil ResourcesConventional Oil Total Remaining Oil Resources
Table 2: Unconventional oil reserves and resources at the end of 2006 
Production 
Rate
Cumulative 
Production
Remaining 
Reserves
Additional 
Resources Total Low Medium High Low Medium High
mill bbl/day bill bbl bill bbl bill bbl bill bbl bill bbl bill bbl bill bbl bill bbl bill bbl bill bbl
North America 1 5 200 500 705 200 400 705 195 395 700
Latin America 0,6 15 250 500 765 250 450 765 235 435 750
Europe 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eurasia (FSU) 0 1 70 100 171 70 100 171 69 99 170
Middle East 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Asia Pacific 0 0 40 0 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
Total 1,6 22 560 1100 1682 561 991 1682 539 969 1660
Unconventional Oil Total Unconventional Oil 
Resources
Total Remaining 
Unconventional Oil Resources
Based on these figures for resources, oil production profiles have been established as 
illustrated in figure 5. The basic formula assumes that the production of conventional oil 
increases by 7 % per year until 40 % of the total resources are produced. Then it is 
assumed that oil production will decline at a rate of 7 % from the point where more than 
50 % of the total resources are produced. The most pessimistic view would be to base the 
production estimates on the reserves only, while a more optimistic view would be to 
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include the figures for resources. Unconventional oil is more difficult. There are 
enormous resources in the ground, but they are technologically difficult and 
economically expensive to produce. It is assumed that the production of unconventional 
oil can be increased by 7 % per year until 20 % of the total resources are produced and 
that unconventional oil production will decline at a rate of 5 % when more than 40 % of 
the total resources are produced. This gives a continued increase in production of 
unconventional oil in the entire period, reaching a maximum level of 17 million barrels 
per day in 2046. Figure 5 shows a low estimate of future oil production, based on 
reserves only, on the left and a high estimate on the right based on resource numbers. 
Figure 5: Estimated future oil production based on reserve and resource estimates 
Figure 5 above demonstrate several important points: 
- Continued investment in increased capacity in the Middle East will be important 
for continued increase in oil supply. 
- The world will approach a peak in oil production within two to three decades.  
Predicting the peak of oil production is difficult due to the poor quality of world oil 
resource estimates and political instability in oil supply regions, which has a serious 
impact on the oil production output (Belhaj and Lay 2008). Greene et al. (2006) found 
that the peaking of conventional oil production is almost certain to occur within the 
next two decades and deserves immediate and serious attention to prepare for the 
transition to other energy sources. IEA found that the increase in oil prices in the last 
five years have not resulted in significant reductions in global demand or increases in 
oil production and that current investments will be insufficient to replace declining oil 
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production (Mouawad 2008). Fatih Birol, the chief economist at the International 
Energy Agency in Paris concluded that:
According to normal economic theory, and the history of oil, rising prices 
have two major effects, they reduce demand and they induce oil supplies. 
Not this time (Mouawad 2008).
The global oil supply from non-OPEC sources is expected to decline and these will 
probably become less relevant for the global oil supply (Iledare and Pulsipher 1999). 
As the world approach the “peak oil” situation, society will learn that past “energy 
crisis” experience will be insufficient, mainly because the “peak oil” situation will 
create a severe shortage of liquid fuels for the transportation sector and result in 
dramatically higher oil prices, causing economic stress in the major oil-importing 
nations. Government intervention to secure production of large amounts of substitute 
energy will be required to avoid the economic and social implications of oil peaking 
(Hirsch, Bezdek et al. 2005, p 64-67). 
The gas resources used in this study are estimated based on BP and World Energy 
Council (WEC) figures, and are listed in table 3 below (BP 2007; WEC 2007, p 160-
163).
Table 3: Gas reserves and resources at the end of 2006 
Production 
Rate
Cumulative 
Production
Remaining 
Reserves
Additional 
Resources Total Low Medium High Low Medium High
BCM/day TCM TCM TCM TCM TCM TCM TCM TCM TCM TCM
North America 754,4 25 7,98 4 36,98 33 35 40 8 10 15
Latin America 144,5 2,25 6,88 4 13,13 9 12 15 6,75 9,75 12,75
Europe 202,7 7,4 2,43 1 10,83 10 11 12 2,6 3,6 4,6
Norway 87,6 1,1 2,89 1 4,99 4 5 6 2,9 3,9 4,9
Eurasia (FSU) 779,3 20,3 58,1 40 118,4 80 100 120 59,7 79,7 99,7
Middle East 335,9 4,3 73,47 20 97,77 80 90 100 75,7 85,7 95,7
Africa 180,5 2,4 14,18 20 36,58 16 25 40 13,6 22,6 37,6
Asia Pacific 377,1 5,7 14,82 15 35,52 20 30 40 14,3 24,3 34,3
Total 2862 68 181 105 354 252 308 373 184 240 305
Gas Total Gas Resorces Total Remaining Gas 
Resources
Production profiles based on these reserve and resource estimates indicates an 
increasing production, particularly in Russia, the Caspian region and the Middle East, 
with a peak production output around 2030 of between 3.5 and 6 Trillion Cubic Meter 
(TCM) per year (ref figure 6). The market share of gas will probably increase in the 
next few decades as gas becomes more important as an energy source. The Middle 
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East, North Africa and Eurasia (FSU) will play a significant role in the future gas 
supply to Europe (Al-Fattah and Startzman 2000).  
Figure 6: Expected gas production based on reserve and resource numbers 
The exponential growth of energy demand will cause unforeseen problems for most of 
us. The illustration below is taken from “Limits to Growth – the 30 year update” (2005) 
and is an excellent example of the consequences of exponential growth. 
In 2000 the world reserve-production ratio for natural gas was 65 years, 
which means that if current known reserves continued to be used at 2000 
consumption rates, they would last until the year 2065. Two things will 
happen to make that simple extrapolation wrong. One is that more reserves 
will be discovered. The other is that gas use will grow above the 2000 rate 
(…) Suppose, for purposes of illustration, that the gas resources in the end 
will prove sufficient to supply the world at the 2000 usage rate for 260 years 
(…) If gas consumption continues to grow as it has since 1970, at about 2.8 
percent per year, the 260-year resource endowment would plummet 
exponentially. It would be exhausted not in 2260, but in 2075; it would last 
not 260 but only 75 years. The point is not that the world is about to run out 
of natural gas. The considerable resources that remain will be essential as a 
transition fuel on the way to more sustainable energy sources. The point is 
that fossil fuels are surprisingly limited, especially when used exponentially 
and they should not be wasted (Meadows, Randers et al. 2005, p 93-95).
Coal resources are generally thought of as abundant, allowing for increased coal 
consumption far into the future, enabling substitution of declining crude oil and natural 
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gas supplies which could potentially lead to catastrophic consequences for the world’s 
climate. The quality and extent of coal resources are poor, both on global and national 
levels. The energy watch group (2007) concluded that global coal reserves are 
concentrated in six countries; the USA, Russia, India, China, Australia and South 
Africa, of which the USA has 30 % of all reserves and is the second largest producer. 
China is the largest producer but possesses only half the reserves of the USA. Most coal 
extracted (85 %) is consumed domestically. Global coal production may increase by 
about 30 % until it stabilises around 2020 (Zittel and Schindler 2007, p 4-6). Security of 
supply are significant incentives for continued use of coal in the USA, China, India and 
Europe, even in a carbon-constrained world (Ansolabehere, Beer et al. 2007). Coal 
resources are estimated based on BP and WEC figures and are listed in table 4 below 
(BP 2007; WEC 2007, p 9-21). The coal resources might be as much as five to ten 
times higher than estimated in this thesis, which would cause a major climate problem 
for society if the CO2 were emitted to the atmosphere.  
Production 
Rate
Cumulative 
Production
Remaining 
Reserves
Additional 
Resources Total Low Medium High Low Medium High
mill ton/yr bill ton bill ton bill ton bill ton bill ton bill ton bill ton bill ton bill ton bill ton
North America 1128 75 254,4 200 529,4 330 430 530 255 355 455
Latin America 81 3 19,9 5 27,9 25 27 30 22 24 27
Europe 603 70 38 0 108 110 111 112 40 41 42
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eurasia (FSU) 490 50 227 35 312 280 300 320 230 250 270
Middle East 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Africa 262 15 50,7 0 65,7 65 66 70 50 51 55
Asia Pacific 3511 150 297 120 567 450 500 600 300 350 450
Total 6075 363 887 360 1610 1260 1434 1662 897 1071 1299
Coal Total Coal Resorces Total Remaining Coal 
Resources
Table 4: World Coal resources 
Production profiles (ref figure 7) indicate that coal production can increase significantly 
over the next 25 years if the energy demand continues to grow as expected and if there is 
a need to substitute oil and gas production. Coal will probably remain important with 
respect to energy security in Asia, North America and Europe.  
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Figure 7: Expected future coal production potential based on reserves and resource estimates 
Stern (2007) concludes that there are enough fossil fuels to meet world consumption 
demand at a reasonable cost until 2050 as illustrated in figure 8. Stern finds that a large 
increase in real fossil fuel prices is not necessary to increase supply. However, price 
increases through energy or carbon tax would be necessary to limit energy demand and 
emissions growth (Stern 2007, p 212-213). 
Figure 8: Availability of oil by price (Stern 2007, p 212). 
Brandt and Farrell (2006) found that significant amounts of liquid fuels could be 
produced at reasonable cost by use of enhanced oil recovery and gas- and coal-derived 
synthetic liquid fuels. However, this would create an increasing greenhouse gas 
emissions per energy unit, as illustrated in the lower part of figure 9, where emissions 
are separated into fuel combustion and production and processing emissions by a 
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dashed line. The increased cost in petroleum development has been large during the last 
five years following the increase in oil price. StatoilHydro expects that the cost of tar-
sand production in Alberta would be around $80 per barrel (Løvås 2008), a cost level 
which is 150–200 % higher than the estimates of IEA (Stern 2007, p 212-213) and 
Brandt and Farrell (2006), above. 
Figure 2: Global supply of liquid hydrocarbons from all fossil resources and associated costs in 
dollars (top) and GHG emissions (bottom) (Farrell and Brandt 2006). 
Currently, alternatives to conventional oil, such as unconventional oil, gas-to-liquid and 
coal-to-liquid are relatively more expensive, but as these sources are developed, 
economies-of-scale and economies-of-learning could result in substantial cost 
reductions. In the North Sea, oil production costs decreased from $35 to $15 per barrel 
from the late 1970s to 1990 due to learning (Jaccard 2005, p 157). 
2.3.1.2 Renewable energy resources 
The renewable energy potential in the world is large but relatively expensive compared 
with current fossil fuels. This will change, however, as the renewable industry gain 
experience and improve the technologies. The main renewable energy sources are; 
biomass, bio-fuels, hydro power, wind power and solar power.  
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Biomasses are mainly used as a non-commercial energy source for heat generation for 
residential purposes, but also as a commercial fuel for centralised heat production and 
distribution. Biomass is probably the main energy source for the population in the 
developing world (Jaccard 2005, p 23), and an important energy source in many 
developed countries such as Norway. Due to the large, non-commercial volume of 
biomass production and use, reliable records of the volumes involved are not available. 
Biomass is a sustainable source of energy which reduces greenhouse gas emissions 
because the energy comes from plants which take a similar amount of carbon dioxide 
out of the atmosphere as they release when they are burned (Pittock 2005, p 177). The 
global potential for biomass energy production is only sufficient to replace a few 
percent of current fossil-fuel usage without reducing food security and exacerbating 
climate change (Field, Campbell et al. 2007). 
Bio-fuels are liquid or gaseous fuels for transport purposes produced from biomass, 
which may be pure bio-fuels for dedicated vehicles, or a blend of bio-fuels and fossil 
fuels that can substitute for conventional motor fuels (Demirbas 2008). Farrell found 
that by using current technologies, it is possible to push the bio-fuel fraction of 
transportation fuel up to 2–3 %, while market shares beyond that would have to be 
based on different technologies. In the United States, roughly 23 % of the current corn 
crop is used for ethanol production which in turn provides 3 % of the nation’s 
transportation fuels (Tollefson 2008). In its Alternative Policy Scenario, IEA found that 
bio-fuels could account for 7 % of the road-fuel consumption in 2030 compared with 1 
% in 2008. IEA commented that:  
Rising food demand, which competes with bio-fuels for existing arable 
and pasture land, will constrain the potential for bio-fuel production using 
current technology (IEA 2006b, p 44). 
Hydro power is the main electricity source in Norway and accounts for approximately 
99 % of the electricity production (WorldBank 2006). Worldwide, hydropower 
generated 2800 TWh of electrical power in 2005. The total technical potential is 
estimated to 16000 TWh, where half of the potential is considered to be economically 
feasible at current electricity prices. The potential is, naturally, largest in areas with a 
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lot of water and high mountains such as Brazil, Congo, Canada, the USA, China, India 
and Russia (WEC 2007, p 279-283). 
The global economic potential of wind power is estimated at between 20000 and 40000 
TWh per annum (Pittock 2005, p 175), which is substantial compared with the current 
worldwide electricity consumption of 15000 TWh per year (IEA 2007, p 92-93). The 
potential is probably significantly higher if the potential of offshore wind is included. 
The technical potential for offshore wind power in Norway is estimated to 14000 TWh 
per year (ENOVA 2007), approximately equal to the current global electricity 
consumption. The cost of offshore wind production, where the wind force is higher and 
more stable, and the turbines can be larger, is expected to be below $ 0.10/kWh within 
a few decades, which would be comparable with solar power (Gether 2007). The total 
electricity production from wind power at the end of 2006 was 160 TWh per year, of 
which 70 % was produced in Europe, mainly in Germany, Spain and Denmark, and 20 
% in the USA (WEC 2007, p 479-488). 
Solar energy has a substantial technical potential, estimated to be four times current 
global energy consumption. However, at present the cost of generating electricity from 
photoelectric solar cells is not competitive with fossil fuels, except in areas not served 
by electricity distribution systems (Pittock 2005, p 173). Japan, Germany and the USA 
are currently the main producers of solar energy, with almost 80 % of the global 
production. The total output is approximately 7 TWh per year and increases by 40 % 
per year (WEC 2007, p 387).
The main problem with renewable energy sources today, except for hydro power, is that 
they are more expensive than fossil-fuel power. The average European electricity price 
in 2008 was approximately $ 0.09/kWh (Nordpool 2008). Solar-PV currently has a cost 
between $ 0.20/kWh and $ 0.30/kWh (WEC 2007, p 387-392), but is expected to be 
produced at costs below $ 0.10/kWh in 2050 due to technological development (Vries, 
Vuuren et al. 2007). “The combined potential of the wind-solar-biomass options can in 
most regions supply future electricity demand at costs below 0.10 $/Kwh” (Vries, 
Vuuren et al. 2007). 
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One challenge for wind and solar power is that output does not necessarily match 
demand, which requires electricity storage for later use when there is insufficient base 
load to supply the need. This effect could be resolved by investments in improved 
distribution systems, allowing for longer electricity transport and by energy storage in 
hydropower dams, compressed air and hydrogen. Some of the base load needs to be 
provided by traditional power plants or geothermal energy. Tester et al. (2006) found 
that geothermal energy can provide 800 TWh per year of base-load electric power and 
heat in the United States with minimal environmental impacts. The global geothermal 
energy production was 130 TWh/year in 2004 (WEC 2007, p 427). 
Enormous amounts of renewable energy are available worldwide, but currently most 
renewable energy production is too expensive to produce and distribute to be able to 
compete against fossil fuels. The challenge in terms of creating a sustainable energy 
system is to reduce the costs of renewable energy sources fast enough to make it 
competitive against coal power as the world approach “peak petroleum”, to avoid a 
“lock-in” to coal power.
2.3.1.3 Nuclear energy 
Nuclear energy has been high on the political agenda lately as a climate-friendly 
solution to the energy challenge. Nuclear electricity generation was 2600 TWh in 2005, 
supplying approximately 16 % of the world electricity consumption. At the beginning 
of 2007 there were 435 plants, with almost 300 located in the main producing countries; 
Japan, Korea, the USA, Russia, Germany and France (WEC 2007, p 235). Deutch et al. 
(2003) concluded that it is technically possible to expand current worldwide nuclear 
capacity to 8000 TWh by the year 2050, which could reduce annual carbon dioxide  
emissions from coal plants by 1.8 billion tonnes compared with a business-as-usual 
scenario. However, Deutch et al. (2003, p ix) found that in a deregulated market, 
nuclear power is not cost competitive with coal and natural gas. Zittel et al. (2006) 
highlight two important aspects related to the development of nuclear power in the next 
decades; the supply of uranium and the addition of new reactor capacity. Zittel et al. 
(2006) finds it unrealistic to believe that nuclear breeding reactors or thorium reactors 
will play a significant role in the next few decades. They found that the discovered 
uranium reserves are sufficient for 30 years of supply, and if estimates of undiscovered 
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resources from the Nuclear Energy Agency are included, the possible resources would 
double or at best quadruple (Zittel and Schindler 2006, p 4). With exponential growth 
in nuclear power output, it is unlikely to expect uranium resources to last more than 30 
years. IEA (2006a; 2008b) expects nuclear output to be almost constant towards 2030 
because of “their large capital cost; public opposition due to the perceived threats of 
radioactive waste and nuclear accidents; and the possible proliferation of nuclear 
weapons” (IEA 2006a, p 29). 
Storing nuclear waste is a major environmental problem related to nuclear power, and if 
society applies the precautionary principle to nuclear waste, as it intends to do with CO2
emissions. Society should, as Jaccard argues, avoid producing such waste until it has a 
solution to safely handle the waste materials.  
The assumption that humans can safely handle radioactive waste seemed 
arrogant. Leaving a stockpile of such material for others to deal with went 
completely against my values of taking responsibility for one’s impact on 
the earth and one’s obligations to future generations (Jaccard 2005, p 2).
Motivated by the significant national thorium resources in Norway, Kara et al. (2008) 
studied the potential for utilizing thorium reactors in Norway and concluded that 
development of a thorium reactor currently is not within the capability of Norway.  
Kara et al. (2008) found  that:
The current knowledge of thorium-based energy generation and the geology 
is not solid enough to provide a final assessment regarding the potential 
value for Norway of a thorium-based system for long term energy 
production (Kara, Kullander et al. 2008). 
Nuclear fusion could be an option in the latter part of the twenty-first century, with far 
less radioactive waste, if feasibility can be demonstrated in the next few decades 
(Pittock 2005, p 173). Nuclear fusion could potentially be game changing in the energy 
market, but will not be a commercial option for the next 40–50 years (ITER 2005). 
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Nuclear power is not a sustainable energy source because of two main factors; the 
limited nuclear fuels available and the environmental issues related to storing nuclear 
waste.
2.3.2 Energy distribution infrastructure 
The expansion of energy consumption will require massive investment in energy-
supply infrastructure. A shift from liquid fuel to electricity in the transport sector would 
reduce the total primary energy consumption, but increase the need for investments in 
electricity distribution. The positive side of such a shift in the transport sector is that it 
could lead to smoother electricity consumption during the day, utilising the low demand 
periods during night time for the charging of vehicles. Electrification of transportation 
gives the opportunity to utilise existing distribution infrastructure, compared to 
hydrogen as an energy carrier which would require investments in a new distribution 
infrastructure. IEA estimates that a cumulative investment of just over $26 trillion is 
required in the period 2008–2030, of which the power sector accounts for 56 % and oil 
investment accounts for 20 %. More than 50 % of these investments are expected to be 
in developing countries. IEA (2006b, p 40; 2008b, p 39) questions the willingness and 
ability of major oil and gas producers to invest such amounts due to “shortages of 
skilled personnel and equipment, regulatory delays, cost inflation, higher decline rates 
at existing fields and geopolitics”. 
A large market share for solar and wind energy may create challenges in the 
distribution system because the distribution grid is not designed for moving large 
amounts of electric power from a sun- or wind-rich location to the energy consuming 
cities. It is generally designed for local distribution (Wald 2008). Large volumes of 
solar power and wind power in the energy supply chain will require solutions for 
electricity storage.
Typical energy loss in the distribution system is in the order of 5–10 % for both fossil 
fuels and electricity. This loss is due to friction in oil and gas pipelines requiring 
compression, fuel consumption for transporting fuels from one location to another, and 
electric resistance in power cables leading to heat loss. 
39
2.3.3 Power production facilities 
IEA (2007) expects that the global electricity demand will double in the next 25 years, 
reaching 30,000 TWh/year in 2030. In 2005, IEA (2007) estimated that 40 % of the 
global electricity generation was in coal-fired power plants, 20 % in gas-fired power 
plants, 7 % from oil-fired power plants, 16 % from hydro power, 2 % from non-hydro 
renewable, and 15 % from nuclear power. IEA (2007, p 92) expects coal, gas and non-
hydro renewable to increase their market shares towards 2030. Figure 10 illustrates the 
current challenge related to power production. However, in the next 25 years, half of 
existing production capital will be replaced due to depreciation. Investments in new 
capital would be twice the existing capital, meaning that three-quarters of the power 
generation capital in 2030 has not yet been constructed, and could in principle be 
renewable energy production. 
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Figure 10: Sources of electricity generation (BP 2007).  
The electric generating efficiency of coal-fired power plants averaged about 35 % in 
2003, and for gas-fired power plants the electric efficiency averaged 42 %, with a range 
from 33 % in Russia to 49 % in Western Europe, where combined-cycle gas turbines 
has been introduced (IEA 2006a, p 178). Integrated coal gasification combined-cycle 
(IGCC) plants are expected to achieve efficiencies above 50 % within ten years, while 
combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT) can approach 60 % (Jaccard 2005, p 186; IEA 
2006a, p 180-181). Adding CO2 capture and storage (CCS), which is energy intensive 
with current technologies, would result in a 10–30 % increase in coal and gas 
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consumption to produce the same amount of electricity. Current CCS design gives a 39 
% increase in fuel consumption and 85 % reduction in CO2 emissions (IEA 2006a, p 
204).
2.3.4 Energy prices 
Future energy prices will determine how the energy system and the society will develop 
in terms of energy production, distribution capacity and changes in energy demand 
caused by energy efficiency improvements. Energy prices are mainly determined based 
on the short-term supply/demand balance and not by scarcity of future energy 
resources.
The amounts of oil above ground ready for use have much more influence 
on price than the amounts lying beneath the ground as future resources. The 
market is blind to the long term and pays no attention to ultimate sources 
and sinks, until they are nearly exhausted and it is too late for attractive 
solutions (Meadows, Randers et al. 2005, p 228). 
In a perfectly competitive market, the price of energy would be determined by demand 
and supply which would determine the equilibrium price. Conventional neoclassical 
economic theory assumes that natural resources are infinitely plentiful and the market 
value reflects the supply and demand balance, which leads to undervaluation of 
exhaustible natural resources such as fossil energy (Cohen and Winn 2005). Kaufmann 
et al. (2008) found that the stocks of crude oil have a large influence on crude oil prices 
while refining capacity does not impact the prices very much. During the last few years, 
the increase in storage capacity has been considerably slower than the increase in 
demand, leading to oil price increases (Kaufmann, Dees et al. 2008). 
Modelling global energy prices is difficult due to the numerous unknowns involved and 
the complexity of their interrelations. Regional modelling is difficult because it is 
misleading to isolate a single regional economy from the global economy. Belhaj and 
Lay (2008) found that oil prices historically have been excluded from the normal 
supply/demand balance and masked by different geopolitical factors. Belhaj and Lay 
(2008) expect an increase in oil price of approximately 6 % per year for the next two 
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decades, until it peaks at $ 150–180 per bbl in 2025. However, growth in China and 
India, combined with government energy subsidies, might cause further increase in the 
oil prices. This may lead to the development of alternatives to fossil fuels, which could 
bring the oil prices back to normal levels (Belhaj and Lay 2008). IEA’s 2004 reference 
scenario assumed that the oil price would fall back to $ 22 per barrel in 2006, and then 
climb steadily to $ 29 per barrel in 2030 (IEA 2004). In IEA’s World Energy Outlook 
2007, it assumes that the world energy resources are sufficient to meet the projected 
demand growth to 2030 (1.8 % per year), and that the oil price will fall back to around 
$ 60 per barrel by 2015 and stabilise there (IEA 2007). IEA’s World Energy Outlook 
2008 expects that the oil price will increase towards $ 122 per barrel in 2030 (IEA 
2008b, p 68-69). This trend indicates first of all that the price mechanisms are poorly 
understood and secondly that the world approach a supply restricted oil market. 
The price in a market can be modelled as a simple function of demand and supply. If 
demand is higher than supply then prices should increase, and if demand is lower than 
supply then prices should decrease. Equilibrium price can then be modelled by using 
the equation (Sterman 2000, p 539-541): 
s
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=
Pe is the current price of energy, Pequil is the equilibrium price of energy and S is the 
elasticity of price to energy demand/supply balance. Energy demand and supply will be 
calculated based on the physical energy requirement and the physical capacity through 
the energy value chain. Energy demand will then be controlled by the relationship 
between marginal productivity of energy to energy price, and energy supply by 
marginal return on energy capital to capital cost.  
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Figure 11: Historic world oil price and oil consumption. 
Figure 11 above illustrates the global oil consumption and the oil price in the period 
from 1965 to 2005 (BP 2007). As the figure shows, there is a clear response to 
increasing oil prices in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, where the growth in energy 
demand relative to GDP growth slowed down, caused by an increased focus on energy 
efficiency when investing in new capital goods such as cars and factories.
2.3.5 Carbon dioxide emissions 
There are several environmental issues related to energy production and use, such as 
local pollution and smog, carbon dioxide emissions, fresh water consumption, 
competition between bio-fuel and food production, transport routes, noise from wind 
turbines, large hydro-electric dams and so on. This work however, focuses on the 
carbon dioxide problem.  
Before the industrial revolution, atmospheric CO2 concentrations were stable at around 
280 parts per million (ppm). CO2 emissions, due to an increasing combustion of fossil 
fuels and deforestation, has increased the atmospheric concentration of CO2 to
approximately 386 ppm, of which fossil fuel combustion accounts for 75-85 % (Jaccard 
2005, p 43; IPCC 2007a, p 26). According to the World Bank (2006) and IPCC 
(2007c), the global energy-related CO2 emissions in the year 2000 were 23.2 billion 
tons, where the majority of the emissions are related to energy production (WorldBank 
43
2006; IPCC 2007c, p 103). The total emissions of greenhouse gases measured in CO2
equivalents in the year 2000 is estimated to be around 42 billion ton, where energy-
related CO2 emissions account for approximately 60 % of the greenhouse gases as 
illustrated in figure 12 below (Jaccard 2005, p 50; Stern 2007, p 196; IPCC 2007c, p 
103).  These non-energy greenhouse gas emissions are mainly from methane gas related 
to agriculture and changes in land use (IPCC 2007c, p 103). 
Figure 12: Global GHG Emissions in 2000, by source (Stern 2007, p 196).
Stern (2007, p 194) found that the profitable fossil-fuel resources are probably 
sufficient to increase the CO2 concentrations well beyond 750 ppm, with the risk of 
dangerous climate-change impacts. To avoid severe climate changes while relying on 
fossil fuels, almost all carbon from fossil fuel use must be captured and stored, 
requiring permanent storage capacity for over 6000 billion tonnes of carbon (Jaccard 
2005, p 197).
CO2 capture and sequestration (CCS) is the critical enabling technology that 
would reduce CO2 emissions significantly while also allowing coal to meet 
the world’s pressing energy needs (Ansolabehere, Beer et al. 2007). 
The current level of CO2 emissions is constrained by the efficiency and type of the 
existing stock of capital or equipment, with a low short-run price elasticity of demand 
(Newell, Jaffe et al. 2006). As an example of this challenge, two-thirds of the coal-fired 
power plants are more than 20 years old with average energy efficiency below 29 % 
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and they emit more than 3.9 billion ton of CO2 per year. If all these coal-fired power 
plants were replaced by modern plants with new technology and an efficiency of 45 %, 
they would emit 36 % less CO2 (IEA 2006a, p 188).
CO2 emissions are strongly dependent on energy consumption, which again is 
dependent on economic growth. Figure 13 illustrates the relationship between CO2
emissions per capita and GDP per capita in the USA.  
Figure 13: Annual emissions of CO2 per capita vs. GDP, USA (Stern 2007, p 207).
The CO2 emissions per capita in Norway were approximately half of the emissions in 
the USA in the year 2000, with approximately the same level of GDP (WorldBank 
2006). The main reason seems to be the large fraction of hydro power in Norwegian 
electricity production, compared with the large fraction of coal in the US combined 
with higher energy efficiency in the Norwegian transport sector. This demonstrates that 
significant reductions in world energy consumption and CO2 emissions can be achieved 
without welfare loss by utilizing existing technologies. 
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Figure 14: Carbon dioxide emissions per capita and GDP in year 2000 (WorldBank 2006). 
2.4 Climate change 
Climate change is important because it will limit economic growth and welfare 
development in different regions of the world and impose significant changes to the 
energy system through climate policies. Without climate change and climate policies, 
the world would probably turn to coal for energy security rather than renewable energy 
and CCS.
Climate change may have a significant impact on the future of the human population. 
Scientists are quite confident that human activities cause global warming and climate 
change, but there is still substantial uncertainty with respect to the size and 
consequence of global warming (Houghton 2004; IPCC 2007a, p 1-17).
The greenhouse gases were first discovered in 1896 by a Swedish chemist, Svante 
Arrhenius, who estimated that doubling the concentration of carbon dioxide would 
increase the global average temperature by 5°C–6°C (Houghton 2004, p 17). To many 
people, a temperature change of 2–5°C does not seem to be significant. It is a small 
change compared with the seasonal cycle of temperature change. The main impacts of 
future climate change will not be the temperature change, but significant changes in 
rainfall (Archer 2007, p 150).
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Ice-core measurements show that there have been significant temperature variations on 
Earth in the last 650000 years and that the carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere have a 
strong correlation to global temperature. Current atmospheric concentrations of carbon 
dioxide and methane are higher than they have been for the last 650000 years (Meadows, 
Randers et al. 2005, p 119; Siegenthaler, Thomas F et al. 2005). 
Figure 3: A composite CO2 record over six and a half ice age cycles, back to 650,000 years before 
present (Siegenthaler, Thomas F et al. 2005).
In the last 65 million years, the Earth’s climate system has changed from relatively high 
temperatures with ice free poles to a colder climate with massive continental ice-sheets 
and polar ice caps (Pearson and Palmer 2000). The primary force that drive this long-
term climate change is the Earth’s orbital geometry which affects the distribution and 
amount of incoming solar energy (Zachos, Pagani et al. 2001). The relationship between 
changes in the Northern Hemisphere summer insolation (NHSI) on orbital timescales and 
temperature data based on į18O data sampled from stalagmites in the Sanbao cave in 
China demonstrates a clear correlation between insolation and temperature for the past 
224000 years (Wang 2008). In figure 16 below, these data are compared with data from 
the Vostok ice core.
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Figure16: Relationship between temperature and solar insolation (Wang 2008). 
The European Project for Ice Coring in Antarctica found that there is a lag of 
atmospheric CO2 concentration of 1900 years after temperature change (Siegenthaler, 
Thomas F et al. 2005). This indicates that the historic CO2 concentration in the 
atmosphere to a large degree is a consequence of a shift in equilibrium between 
atmosphere and ocean caused by changes in ocean temperature due to changes in solar 
insolation.
Changes in greenhouse gas concentrations increase the atmospheric absorption of 
outgoing radiation and can therefore cause climate change on Earth. IPCC  (2007a) 
estimates the temperature increase in the atmosphere since 1850 to be approximately 
0.76°C. The oceans have also warmed during the last 50 years, accounting for more 
than 80 % of the changes in the energy content of the Earth’s climate system (IPCC 
2007a, p 37, 47). 
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Figure 17: Global mean temperature increase since 1850 (IPCC 2007a).
Based on models and observations, IPCC (2007a) found that the equilibrium climate 
sensitivity, the equilibrium temperature change at a doubling of CO2 concentration, is 
likely to be between 1.9°C and 4.4°C with a best estimate of about 2.9°C. However, 
IPCC (2007a) found that there is a possibility of climate sensitivity above 6°C. The 
largest uncertainty in the estimates is related to cloud feedbacks (IPCC 2007a, p 65-66). 
A 3°C increase from pre-industrial temperature would eliminate most of the Greenland 
Ice Sheet, causing a sea level rise of approximately 7 metres, while the Antarctic Ice 
Sheet probably will remain too cold for widespread melting (IPCC 2007a, p 80). Figure 
18 below gives an estimate of temperature change caused by changes in CO2
concentration, and has been used in the rest of this thesis (IPCC 2007a, p 66).  
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Figure 18: Expected temperature change at equilibrium from pre-industrial level based on IPCC.  
The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide is dependent on the carbon dioxide 
emissions and the carbon flux from atmosphere to the biosphere, oceans and carbonate 
deposits. The oceans contain approximately 50 times more carbon than the atmosphere 
and are probably responsible for the large changes in atmospheric CO2 over the glacial 
cycles. On geological timescales of millions of years, geological processes contribute to 
stabilise atmospheric CO2 and the climate of the Earth (Archer 2007, p 96). The major 
sink for anthropogenic CO2 over the past 200 years has been the ocean, which has 
contributed to reduce the atmospheric CO2 concentration by about 55 ppm. The ocean 
uptake has so far removed approximately 35 % of the historic anthropogenic CO2
emissions. However, the ocean’s uptake might slow down as the ocean temperature 
increases (Sabine, Feely et al. 2004). 
Increasing atmosphere temperature increases the temperature of the ocean surface, 
which decreases the solubility of CO2 in water. This results in degassing of CO2 to the 
atmosphere. This will work as a positive feedback mechanism, accelerating the CO2
concentration and temperature increase in the atmosphere. As the temperature increases 
the biosphere will increase uptake of CO2. This negative feedback loop should 
contribute to stabilise carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere (Archer 2007, p 
88-94). The strength and balance of these two mechanisms will be the major factors 
deciding how nature will handle carbon dioxide emissions. 
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Cox et al. (2000) found that the terrestrial biosphere will act as an overall carbon sink 
until about 2050 in a “business as usual” scenario, but it will turn into a source 
thereafter, and by 2100, the ocean uptake rate will be balanced by the terrestrial carbon 
source. This will result in higher atmospheric CO2 concentrations and higher 
temperatures than current IPCC estimates (Cox, Betts et al. 2000). Due to ocean 
temperature increases, it is likely that the ocean uptake will also slow down and 
contributes to an even greater increase in CO2 concentrations. 
2.5 Economic impact of climate change 
Climate change is usually modelled as a reduction in productivity (Fiddaman 1997; 
Nordhaus and Boyer 2000). In this thesis, an approach where climate change increases 
depreciation has been used as described in section 2.2.2.
The economic system can be explained by a few feedback loops. Capital accumulation, 
population and productivity growth drive economic growth. Capital requires energy 
input to be efficient, which creates carbon emissions. Carbon emissions increase CO2
concentration and cause temperature increase and climate change. Damage is created 
by changes in climate, which increase the depreciation rate of capital and slow 
economic growth (Fiddaman 2002). The impact of climate change will vary between 
different regions. Nordhaus et al. (2000) found that: 
Russia and other high income countries are likely to benefit slightly from a 
modest global warming. At the other extreme, low-income regions – 
particularly Africa and India – and Western Europe appear to be quite 
vulnerable to climate change. The United States appears to be relatively less 
vulnerable to climate change than many countries (Nordhaus and Boyer 
2000, p 14). 
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) estimated the cost of catastrophic impacts such as 
increased frequency of storms and flooding to be approximately 1 % of GDP at 2.5°C 
warming and 7 % at 6°C warming. The impact is expected to be approximately twice 
the average in Europe and India. Europe is vulnerable due to the potential shifts in 
ocean currents and significant costal and agricultural impacts. India is vulnerable to 
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climate changes because of the potential shifts in the water cycle. Russia is expected to 
experience losses on the global average, while the remainder of the world is expected to 
have losses around half of global average (Nordhaus and Boyer 2000, p 90-98). 
Based on IPCC (2007b) it is reasonable to assume limited impact on the global 
agricultural output up to 3°C warming, and an exponential decline in productivity of 2 
% per 1°C for temperature increases above 3°C, doubling for each degree. However, 
total agricultural output is expected to continue to increase due to improvements in 
agricultural efficiency for the next 30–50 years (IPCC 2007b, p 300). In total, global 
food production per capita is expected to remain constant for a global warming of up to 
3°C, but with large regional differences.
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) found that a warming of 2.5°C would cause damage of 
about 2 % of GDP while a warming of 6°C would cause damage costs of 10 % of GDP. 
They estimated the cost of future climate damages to around $4 trillion in present value 
(Nordhaus and Boyer 2000, p 95 and 129). The Stern Review (2007) found that the cost 
of climate change could be at least 5 % of GDP, maybe as much as 20 %. Stern (2007) 
estimated the cost of climate change at 0–3 % of GDP at a warming of 2–3°C, and 5–10 
% of GDP at a warming of  5–6°C (Stern 2007, p 161). 
A reasonable assumption would be to base expected global and regional climate cost on 
Nordhaus et. al. (2000, p 90-91), which is supported by Stern (2007) and IPCC (2007b). 
Based on Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), the following aggregated cost of climate change 
has been used: 
Region Damage at 3°C warming 
(Cost in  % of GDP) 
Damage at 6°C warming 
(Cost in  % of GDP) 
Norway 1 5 
Europe 4 17 
North America 1 5 
Asia Pacific 2 10 
Rest of the World 3 11 
Table 5: Aggregated economic impact of climate change 
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The damages used in the modelling are estimated to have a variance of +/- 50 %, with a 
normal distribution. Stern (2007) concluded that: “We badly underestimated the degree 
of damages and the risks of climate change”, and argues that governments and business 
should invest between 1 and 2 % of global GDP annually in new technologies and 
efficiency measures to avoid climate change of catastrophic proportions. In Stern’s 
view:
We need to have zero carbon electricity, or very close to it, by 2050. That 
means carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) in electricity by 2050, it 
means nuclear, it means renewables (Stern, quoted in Fortson 2008). 
Due to the long time between cause and result, climate changes will come rather 
slowly, which makes it possible for the industrialised world to adapt to the changes 
with sensible policies to minimise the economic impact. Meeting the energy needs of a 
growing world in an environmentally sound fashion will require substantial investment 
and continuing technological innovation (Esser 2005). This will require that consumers 
will have to be willing to pay the full cost of energy – including the environmental 
costs – to make these technologies competitive (IEA 2004, p 31).  
2.6 Innovations and technological change 
In the entrepreneurial process, human, technical and financial resources are used to find 
new ways of satisfying needs. This is an uncertain process which requires 
experimentation with alternative approaches that may prove technically and 
economically unsuccessful (Ergas 1987). Entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial activity 
require; the existence of opportunities, the ability to recognise information about 
opportunities, a decision to act upon an opportunity, the ability to bear risks, 
organisation and innovation (Shane 2003, p 6-8). The role of the entrepreneur is to 
break traditional patterns to maximise value creation requiring more experimenting and 
risk taking than are needed in a more traditional role (Landström 2005, p 90). 
Entrepreneurial theories have two main directions; Schumpeterian opportunities, which 
result from disequilibrating forces, and Kirznerian opportunities, which are the result of 
equilibrating forces, where the entrepreneur utilises existing disequilibrium in the system 
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to bring the economy closer to equilibrium. Kirznerian opportunities reinforce 
established ways of doing things, whereas Shumpeterian opportunities disrupt the 
existing system (Shane 2003, p 20; Landström 2005, p 48). Kirznerian opportunities can 
be described as a process of continuous improvement to close market gaps by reducing 
costs and improving the existing product to satisfy customer’s needs. Schumpeterian 
opportunities are more disruptive in its character, where they create or open up the 
market for new products and concepts that did not existed to the customers before. Shane 
(2003) defines an entrepreneurial opportunity as:
A situation in which a person can create a new means-end framework for 
recombining resources that the entrepreneur believes will yield a profit (…) 
rather than just optimising within an old framework (Shane 2003, p 18). 
There are three categories of Schumpeterian opportunities, which introduce changes that 
create potential for entrepreneurial profit (Shane 2003, p 23). These are: 
- Technological changes 
- Political and regulatory changes 
- Social and demographic changes. 
Technological changes are the most important source of entrepreneurial opportunity 
because these changes make it possible for people to allocate resources in more 
productive ways (Shane 2003, p 24). Political decisions can facilitate entrepreneurship 
through changes in how society is organised. This can be through deregulation or other 
institutional changes (Davidsson 2004, p 11). There is currently a lot of focus on how 
policies and regulatory changes can contribute to the development of renewable energy, 
through instruments such as subsidies, green certificates and feed-in tariffs. The 
understanding of technology progress and learning curves is essential in developing 
strategies for renewable energy technologies. Learning effects and economies of scale 
are of major importance for technology policies because new technological innovations 
often require public support at the early stages of their development. The learning curve 
represents the technological progress associated with a technology due to improvements 
by R&D, experimentation and implementation throughout the production process, 
directed by social and economic policies as well as economic opportunities (Isoard and 
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Soria 2001). Technology learning rates between 5 % and 35 % have been experienced in 
the energy industry (Neuhoff 2008), which is consistent with theories of learning and 
economies of scale, as illustrated in figure 19 below (Stern 2007, p 254). 
Figure 19: Cost evolution and learning rates for selected technologies (Stern 2007, p 254). 
For opportunities that require economies of scale or large amounts of capital, innovation 
by large firms is favoured because the opportunity is difficult to exploit on a scale that 
most new firms can achieve with the resources that they possess (Shane 2003, p 123). 
Offshore wind power and CCS is an opportunity for Norway to create a disruptive 
change.
Leadership in sustaining innovations – where information is known and 
plans can be made – is not competitively important. In such cases, 
technology followers do about as well as technology leaders. It is in 
disruptive innovations, where we know least about the market, that there are 
such strong first-mover advantages. This is the innovator’s dilemma 
(Christensen 1997, p xxii). 
The strategies for confronting disruptive technological change should be plans for 
learning and discovery rather than plans for execution because markets that do not exist 
cannot be analysed (Christensen 1997, p 143). Several authors have described the 
established firm’s inability to pursue new entrepreneurial opportunities. Utterback 
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(1996) found that getting off the current path when discontinuities surface and 
identifying a path to the future is  difficult:  
Only the prospective and imminent loss of the established business can 
justify a shift by a major firm, but this often seems impossible or incredible 
to them, even when it is clearly beginning (Utterback 1996, p 231).
Porter (1990) found that change is unnatural in successful companies, because powerful 
forces are at work to avoid and defeat it. However, creating sustainable advantages often 
means that a company must make its existing advantage obsolete. Established firms will 
usually not invest in opportunities that cannibalise their existing operations, which 
creates strong incentives against pursuing opportunities that are based on radical 
innovations (Shane 2003, p 226). A bureaucratic organisational structure as often are 
found in large organisations will increase the likelihood of a spin-off because the 
exploitation of uncertain entrepreneurial opportunities requires an organisational 
flexibility that is not present in such organisations (Shane 2003, p 228). Perez (2003) 
found that established firms will invest to improve solutions to their own products and 
processes when they face paradigm constrictions which could involve minor uses of 
radical new technologies. As the low-risk investment opportunities in established 
paradigms begin to diminish, there is a growing mass of capital looking for profitable 
uses that is willing to venture in new directions. Financial capital is mobile, while 
production capital is tied to concrete products, and works as an enabler of a massive shift 
in investment required by technological shifts (Perez 2003, p 71-73).  
Energy technologies will need to make significant advances to stabilise atmospheric CO2
concentrations at acceptable levels. The reference case by IPCC (2007b) assumes that 
the majority of these technological innovations will come about without a policy that 
focuses on creating the conditions for such innovations to occur (Pielke, Wigley et al. 
2008). Technological innovations are unlikely to happen by themselves, however. A 
shift towards a sustainable path will require significant governmental support to 
overcome the initial barriers related to costs and barriers to entry. 
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2.7 The political landscape 
The political landscape will determine the ability of the nations to solve the challenges 
of energy and climate. It will also have implications on the ability of nations to develop 
competitive advantages within the energy sector. This section will discuss present 
policies within different areas and the implications of these policies. 
2.7.1 Economic policy 
Economic growth is necessary to end poverty. In the current economic system growth 
takes place in the already rich countries and continues to widen the gap between rich and 
poor. From 1960 to 1995, the richest 20 % have increased their income compared to the 
poorest 20 % by approximately a factor of three. In poor countries, industrial capital per 
capita hardly grows because immediate requirements leave little output for industrial 
investment (Meadows, Randers et al. 2005, p 41-45). Developing countries are unlikely 
to see their incomes and living standards increase without improved access to modern 
energy services (IEA 2004, p 30). 
We define growth as an increase in throughput, which is the flow of natural 
resources from the environment, through the economy, and back to the 
environment as waste. It is a quantitative increase in the physical dimension 
of the economy and/or of the waste stream produced by the economy. This 
kind of growth, of course, cannot continue indefinitely, as the Earth and its 
resources are finite. While growth must end, this in no way implies an end 
to development, which we define as qualitative change, realization of 
potential, evolution towards an improved, but not larger structure or system 
– an increase in the quality of goods and services provided by a given 
throughput. The idea of “sustainable development” (…) is development 
without growth – that is, qualitative improvement in the ability to satisfy 
wants (needs and desires) without a quantitative increase in throughput 
beyond environmental carrying capacity. Carrying capacity is the population
of humans that can be sustained by a given ecosystem at a given level of 
consumption, with a given technology. Limits to growth do not necessarily 
imply limits to development (Daly and Farley 2004, p 6). 
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Ayres (1996) argues that it is theoretically possible to have economic growth in the 
sense of providing better and more valuable services to consumers without necessarily 
consuming more physical resources. Daly (1996) argues that sustainability as a concept 
is not incorporated into economic theory because the economics of the past 50 years 
has been focused on economic growth or growth in gross national product. Economic 
theory assumes that unlimited growth is possible because it assumes that there is no 
economic limit where the marginal costs of further growth become greater than the 
marginal benefits (Daly 1996, p 27). Many economists assume that there are infinite 
resources, through substitution. However, the implication of diminishing elasticity of 
substitution is that there are limits of substitution where it will be difficult to cut down 
on pollution or energy use based on substitution alone. The economic history shows 
that resource and environmental limits have not halted growth in the past and 
economists argue that it will not do so in the future. Daly (1996) and Reynolds (1999) 
argue that the only way to reduce pollution or energy use below a certain point is by 
cutting consumption and reducing living standard (Daly 1996, p 34; Reynolds 1999). 
Neoclassical economic theory is not applicable as the economy approaches its limits – 
the Earth’s carrying capacity (Daly 1996, p 37).
The notion that we can save the “growth forever” paradigm by 
dematerialising the economy, or “decoupling” it from resources, or 
substituting information for resources, is fantasy (Daly 1996, p 28). 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a measure of the total costs of a society rather than 
welfare (Daly 1996, p 104). GDP treats costs related to pollution the same way as costs 
related to sustainable food production, and does not distinguish between wealth 
creation and environmental costs (Daly 1996, p 40). GDP does not include changes in 
natural stocks and funds, such as depletion of geological stocks, or disruptions of 
environmental functions. Environmental pollution could increase demands for 
commodities and services and consequently lead to an increase in GDP (Daly 1996, p 
112).
Discounting is used in economic evaluation to compare the value of a future good 
against the value of a good now. The social-time-preference is a parameter that puts a 
value on this, where the cost of deferred consumption can be modelled.  If the discount 
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factor or time-preference factor equals 2 %, then you say that if consumption per capita 
were the same 36 years from now as it is today, you would value the consumption of 
your children and grandchildren half as much as you value your own consumption now. 
Assuming that future generations count very little, then investments with long-run pay-
offs, such as environmental protection, would not be favoured. Ramsey thought that 
time-preference was a human failing and argued that society, which intends to live for 
ever, should make the discount factor equal to zero (Solow 2000, p 83): “If you care 
little about future generations you will care little about climate change” (Stern 2007, p 
54).
Stern (2007) concludes that the time discounting should be small because it is only 
relevant to account for the exogenous possibility of extinction (Stern 2007, p 60). When 
societies are evaluating climate-change policies, the fundamental trade-off that society 
faces is between consumption today and consumption in the future. Nordhaus et al. 
(2000) argue that to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases today, society would have to 
reduce the output that can be used for consumption and investments and invest in 
climate reduction to reduce future damages and therefore increase future consumption. 
However, the time periods between emissions reductions and climatic impacts are 
extraordinarily long and uncertain, which makes this very difficult (Nordhaus and 
Boyer 2000, p 9). “We see little ‘real world’ evidence that the richest people or nations 
ever lose interest in getting richer” (Meadows, Randers et al. 2005, p 156). 
The economy cannot grow to an unlimited extent, and will have to adjust to the 
environmental and resource limits of the Earth. If society continues on the current path, 
where the rich get richer, and the poor poorer, inequality will increase both between 
nations and generations. Providing an acceptable welfare level for the entire population 
of the Earth would require a different way of thinking related to economy, environment 
and natural resources. Currently, the wealthy population increase their economies 
through the use of limited natural and environmental resources, leaving fewer resources 
for the rest of the population or future generations.  The world is still on an economic 
growth policy, where most nations pursue their own national, corporate, or individual 
self-interests. So far humanity has failed to achieve the goals of the Rio de Janeiro 
climate change summit (Meadows, Randers et al. 2005, p xiii), where general principles 
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on policies to avoid climate change and environmental degradation were established 
(UN 1992). 
The current economic thinking is based on a drive for economic growth in all nations to 
increase welfare. It is unlikely that a sustainable global economy can be achieved 
without a shift towards an economic thinking where economy is coupled with 
availability of natural resources.
2.7.2 Energy policy 
Analysing the data for reserves and resources presented earlier in this thesis, and 
assuming a continued economic growth of 2 %, it is found that the world supplies of 
fossil fuels will struggle to meet demand beyond 2025, as figure 20 illustrates. Unless 
the various economies are prepared to fill the gap through renewable energy sources or 
through major energy efficiency improvements, the world will experience a significant 
increase in energy prices.
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Figure 20: World primary energy supply and demand, assuming a 1.5 % yearly growth in energy 
demand and assuming that all reserves and resources as estimated today can be produced. 
As illustrated in figure 20 there is balance between global energy supply and energy 
demand to approximately 2025. However, the energy security situation for Asia, 
Europe and North America will become increasingly more difficult after 2015. The 
situation will probably be worse than described in figure 20, because the high growth 
rate of energy exporting regions such as the Middle East, the Caspian and Russia will 
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create increased domestic energy demand, leaving less energy resources to export to 
Asia, Europe and North America (Gately 2007) as illustrated in figure 21.
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Figure 21: The figure shows the gap between energy demand and domestic energy production, 
where the regions above zero have a net energy import requirement, while the regions below the 
line have a net export capacity. The Green line shows the global supply/demand balance. 
Renewable energy will bring benefits for Europe through improved energy security and 
reduced carbon intensity of energy production. However, renewable energy requires 
initial support from technological policies to achieve learning effects before they can 
take advantage of scale effects in production (Isoard and Soria 2001). Carbon tax or 
carbon trading, combined with energy efficiency regulations, might be an efficient tool 
to move the energy system towards renewable energy and zero-emission fossil fuels. 
For energy security reasons, increased domestic energy production can be achieved 
through increased energy prices or subsidies. Increased reliability of energy imports can 
be achieved by increased diversity in energy import, either through increasing the 
number of suppliers or increasing the number of transport routes. However, this seems 
to be increasingly more difficult due to increased domestic energy consumption in 
energy-exporting nations and increased geopolitical instability. 
Hopefully we will live to see that the words of Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum, 
who was the Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates from 1979 to 1990 and Emir 
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of Dubai, proved wrong: “My grandfather rode on a camel, my father rode in a car, I 
ride in a jet, my children will ride in cars, and my grandchildren will ride on camels” 
(Simmons 2008). 
2.7.3 Climate policy 
Climate policies will have significant influence on the development of the energy system, 
and the growth of renewable energy production in particular. Currently the world 
economy does not see sufficient investment in renewable energy resources and does not 
have the necessary mechanisms in place to achieve a significant reduction in carbon 
emissions (Deutch 2005). The Kyoto Protocol is a first agreement to start the process of 
reducing greenhouse-gas emissions with a target of a reduction of 5.2 % in emissions by 
2008–2012 relative to 1990 in Annex I countries (Pittock 2005, p 22). Most of the 
countries that have signed the Kyoto Protocol are not on a path to achieve their Kyoto 
commitments through domestic actions. However, many of the countries, such as 
Norway, intend to reach their target by purchasing emission permits from other 
signatories or by making abatement investments (CDM) in developing countries that do 
not have specified targets. The Kyoto Protocol, as it is today, will not create a significant 
decrease in the global greenhouse-gas emissions because countries like China and India 
do not have abatement commitments. The main emitter, the USA, has withdrawn from 
the protocol (Jaccard 2005, p 182). 
There are in principle two strategies towards climate change, adaptation or mitigation 
(IPCC 2007b; IPCC 2007c). Adaptation to environmental change is essentially to cope 
with the climate change and a sea-level rise that cannot be avoided now and in the near 
future, while mitigation would try to limit the extent of future climate change (Pittock 
2005, p 133). Wealthy, developed countries in general have more capacity to adapt, 
because they can afford the expense of climate change (Pittock 2005, p 144).  Mitigation, 
in contrast to adaptation, needs time to take effect due to the delays in the climate system 
and the time necessary to reduce emissions sufficiently to stabilise climate (Pittock 2005, 
p 151). The long delays in the climate system result in long intervals between when 
environmental policies are put in place and when the fruits of the policies become 
apparent. Climate changes that will occur in the next 30 years are already set in motion, 
while policies put in place over the next 30 years will not yield results until 30 years after 
that (Pittock 2005, p 54). Policies must motivate businesses and consumers to innovate 
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and invest in zero-emission technologies at the time of capital investment while avoiding 
shocks to the economic system, such as dramatic increase in energy prices or loss of 
competitive position with unregulated trading partners (Jaccard 2005, p 270). 
Implementation of CCS will add costs to coal and gas power production. A CO2 price 
of approximately $110 per ton of carbon would make coal power plants with CCS cost 
competitive with coal power plants without CCS. Use of CO2 for enhanced oil recovery 
seems to have limited significance for large-scale CO2 sequestration (Ansolabehere, 
Beer et al. 2007). CCS will increase the total demand for primary energy due to the 
reduced efficiency in power production. This increase in demand may have a larger 
impact on energy market prices than a CO2 tax due to the low elasticity in energy 
demand to price, increasing the total income to energy-producing nations on a short- 
term basis. CCS is necessary in coal fired power plants because it is “the only major 
fossil fuel source where big consumer nations still have large stores within their 
borders” (Fortson 2008; Schleich and Gruber 2008). 
Nordhaus (2007) argues that the conclusion in the Stern Review (2007), suggesting a 
carbon tax of around $300 per ton to achieve a global CO2 emission reduction of 
between 30 % and 70 % the next two decades, is about ten times higher than the level 
of carbon tax suggested by standard economic models. Nordhaus (2007) found that the 
difference almost entirely comes from the use of a discount rate close to zero. The use 
of a zero discount rate, as in the Stern Review (2007), means that all generations into 
the indefinite future are treated the same, whereas a positive discount rate means that 
the welfare of future generations is reduced or “discounted” compared with closer 
generations. This approach would not be consistent with current real interest rates, and 
would in Nordhaus (2007) opinion be too pessimistic an assumption. 
The risks of climate change can be substantially reduced if the world succeeds in 
stabilising CO2 concentration in the atmosphere between at 450 ppm and 550 ppm. 
Stabilisation of CO2 concentration requires annual emissions 80 % below current levels 
(Stern 2007, p xvi). An efficient policy requires credibility, flexibility and predictability 
to secure investments in long-lived capital stock such as power plants (Stern 2007, p 
370). International cooperation and action would require a global carbon price, created 
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through internationally harmonised taxation or intergovernmental emissions trading 
(Stern 2007, p 532). 
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) argue that global climate policies should weigh the costs of 
slowing climate change against the benefits of slower climate change. Nordhaus and 
Boyer (2000) argue that the Kyoto Protocol does not have this link. The impact of the 
Kyoto Protocol on global temperature will be small in the next century because “the 
rapidly growing emissions in developing countries are uncontrolled under the Kyoto 
Protocol” (Nordhaus and Boyer 2000, p 69). 
Gerlagh and Zwaan (2006) investigated the efficiency of different policies to achieve a 
stabilisation of atmospheric CO2 concentration at 450 ppm. Gerlagh and Zwaan (2006) 
found that at least half of the global energy supply needs to be renewable energy by the 
end of the century to achieve stabilisation of atmospheric CO2 concentration at 450 
ppm. Without CCS implementation, renewable energy would have to supply 80 % of 
the market. To achieve this objective, Gerlagh and Zwaan (2006) found that the most 
efficient policy would be a portfolio standard for CO2 emissions or a carbon tax where 
the tax revenues are reinvested into renewable energy production and CCS.
Global policies are gradually moving towards sustainability, although slowly, and it is 
interesting to note the political movement that has occurred in California: 
I believe in free trade, and I believe that it lifts everyone’s standard of 
living. But eventually we will look at those countries that produce goods 
without regard to the environment the same way as we look at countries that 
produce goods without regard to human rights. My guess is that within the 
next decade or so, if an economy ignores the damages that it’s doing to the 
environment, the civilized world will impose environmental tariffs, duties 
and other trade restrictions on those countries. This is a matter of fair trade. 
Nations cannot dump their products, and one day in the near future, they 
will not be allowed to dump their carbon or their greenhouse gases either. It 
gives them an unfair advantage.    
Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of California,
12 April 2007 (quoted in Nuttall and Manz 2008) 
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2.7.4 Innovation policies 
Established firms seek to leverage on their existing business structure, focussing on the 
marginal cost of new investments, while new entrants are spared the dilemma of 
choosing between full-cost and marginal-cost options. Existing companies fail to invest 
in technologies that new entrants find  profitable because they cannot compete against 
other investment opportunities on a marginal cost basis (Christensen, Kaufman et al. 
2008). Established companies tend to focus on short-term earnings per share and are 
reluctant to invest in innovations that do not pay off on a short term basis (Christensen, 
Kaufman et al. 2008). 
Discounting creates an anti-innovation bias as it assumes that the present health of the 
company or nation will persist indefinitely into the future if they do not invest in an 
innovation and secondly because future cash flows generated by disruptive investments 
are difficult to predict. Discounted cash flow is useful as long as the capabilities required 
for yesterday’s success are adequate for tomorrow’s as well (Christensen, Kaufman et al. 
2008).
More often than not, failure in innovation is rooted in not having asked an 
important question, rather than in having arrived at an incorrect answer
(Christensen, Kaufman et al. 2008). 
Stern (2007) found that a widespread shift to new or improved technology for power 
generation, transport and energy are needed to tackle climate change. This will require 
close collaboration between governments and industry to stimulate development of a 
broad portfolio of low-carbon technologies. Carbon pricing will, according to Stern 
(2007), be insufficient to reduce emissions on the scale and at the pace required. This is 
because the uncertainties and risks of climate change and the development and 
deployment of the technology are of such a scale and urgency that policies are required 
to support the development of low-carbon technology options. These technologies will 
probably be difficult to finance through the capital markets (Stern 2007, p 393).  
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Learning in new energy technologies is very important to develop a sustainable energy 
system. Carbon pricing will contribute to accelerated implementation of new energy 
technologies as illustrated in figure 22. 
Figure 22: Carbon pricing and technology learning curves (Stern 2007). 
Baumol (2003) found that technology learning after the original invention contributes far 
more to productivity improvement than the original breakthrough innovation. To 
develop efficient policies it is important to understand how the cost of new technologies 
develops as they approach scale economies and move down the technological learning 
curves. During this process, which accumulates experience through cumulative 
production volumes, a cost reduction of 60 to 90 % should be expected from the first 
pilot installations to the commercial product (Baumol 2003). In Denmark, a 70 % cost 
reduction on onshore wind turbines has been experienced during the first 20 years 
(Auken 2002).
Norwegian decision makers today find that the cost of floating offshore wind turbines is 
too high, relative to the expected long-term energy price, to justify an investment in the 
business for commercial companies (Randers, Arnstad et al. 2006, p 82-84). There are 
several key elements that influence the performance of an innovation system (EC 2002; 
Sagar and Zwaan 2006; Lund 2007; Stern 2007): 
- Carbon pricing to make the polluters face the full consequence of their actions 
through legislative and regulatory policies 
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- Technology policies to bring forward low-carbon and high-efficiency 
technologies from the R&D base 
- Removal of barriers to behavioural change to increase demand or market pull 
- Instruments to overcome infrastructure barriers. 
Owen (2006) found that the most efficient process of imposing the “polluter pays 
principle” would be to internalise as many of the externalities of power generation as 
possible. Estimated damage costs associated with externalities are very difficult to 
predict with precision, and would be a controversial policy option. Because externalities 
are a form of market failure, government intervention is justified in order to minimise 
environmental impacts on the community. This could be done by imposing an emission 
tax on consumption of a commodity that reflect the damage incurred by society (Owen 
2006). Owen (2006) concludes that if the estimated damage costs from combustion of 
fossil fuels had been internalised into the price of electricity, a number of renewable 
technologies would have been competitive. Owen (2006) recommends removal of both 
direct and indirect subsidies to fossil-fuel based power generation technologies and 
appropriate pricing of fossil fuels to reflect the environmental damage created by their 
combustion as policies for stimulating the development of renewable energy 
technologies.
Since innovation comes at a cost, technological solutions to the climate 
problem will not come about without policies in place to offer researchers 
incentives to pursue climate-friendly energy alternatives (Popp 2006). 
To achieve success in this process it is important to work together towards common 
goals and shared visions, where policy incentives are combined with political stability 
and continuity in the process of overcoming system failures in the different stages of 
technology development, as described in figure 23 (Foxon, Gross et al. 2005).
67
The need for political stability was also confirmed by Söderholm et al. (2007) who 
investigated the incentives for wind power in Sweden and concluded that the existing 
and planned policy instruments were strong enough to make wind power competitive. 
However, they found that the investment is strongly affected by lack of policy stability, 
public criticism at the local level, and the legal provisions governing the assessment of 
the environmental impact of wind turbines. Due to these obstacles, they conclude that a 
move offshore may be an efficient strategy for the development of wind turbines 
(Söderholm, Ek et al. 2007). 
In Germany, subsidies through R&D programmes and feed-in laws was central in 
providing the incentives for creating growth in renewable energy together with removal 
of uncertainty about the future of the feed-in tariffs. Redirection of science and 
technology policy towards renewable energy and institutional change is also required to 
generate markets for the new technology, where technology-specific coalitions need to 
be formed and new firms must be allowed to enter the market (Jacobsson and Lauber 
2006).
Auken (2002) concluded that the Danish success with wind energy is a result of a firm 
policy sustained over a long time period, as well as sufficient government support to 
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Figure 23: Technology s-curve, Technology Maturity and policy instruments, after Foxon (2005) 
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overcome the extra cost of the first installations. The basis for the successful Danish 
wind industry is the Danish domestic market which gave it the testing ground to organise 
both wind technology and manufacturing technology, creating a competitive 
international industry (Auken 2002).
Fischer and Newell (2003) found that with an ultimate goal of reducing CO2 emissions, 
policies to create incentives for fossil-fuel generators to reduce emissions intensity and 
for consumers to conserve energy perform much better than those that rely on incentives 
for renewable energy producers alone. Fischer and Newell (2003)  conclude that the 
price of emissions is the most efficient instrument in emission reductions, since it 
simultaneously gives incentives for fossil-fuel energy producers to reduce emissions 
intensity, for consumers to conserve, and for renewable energy producers to expand 
production.
2.7.5 Geopolitical stability 
The long-term security of energy supply to Europe and other energy-consuming nations 
depends on the attractiveness and accessibility of investments in the producing regions 
such as Russia, the Persian Gulf and Africa, as well as the capacity for transportation 
from these regions. These projects will only emerge if there is an adequate investment 
climate and geopolitical stability along the whole value chain. Geopolitical instability 
along these value chains will create insecurity with respect to energy supplies to Europe 
and enhance the value of Norwegian energy production. 
As a consequence of the geopolitical developments in the period to 2020, 
the probability of events affecting the security of energy supply, the 
exposure of the EU and the vulnerability of society to energy supply 
disruptions are likely to increase (Correlje and Linde 2006). 
The US military invasion of Iraq and the recent Russian military intervention in 
Georgia can be seen as actions designed to position these nations in the energy market 
(NRK 2008). The US invasion of Iraq has secured access to petroleum resources in one 
of the most petroleum-rich countries, but probably more importantly, it has the 
potential of creating geopolitical stability in a future transport corridor of petroleum 
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products. If the US is able to stabilise the region, an alternative transport route for oil 
from the Middle East to the Mediterranean can be established through Iraq and Turkey, 
reducing the risk of supply disruptions through the Hormuz strait. For Europe, this 
would also open up a gas import route from the Middle East, through Iraq and then 
through Turkey-Greece or Turkey-Ukraine. The majority of oil and gas supplies from 
the Caspian region today goes from Azerbaijan through Georgia-Turkey or Russia-
Ukraine. It is therefore essential for the US and Europe to establish close relations with 
Iraq, Turkey, Georgia and Ukraine, to secure energy supplies from the Caspian and 
Middle East regions (Kalicki and Goldwyn 2005, p 131-146). The war in Afghanistan 
effectively blocks a possible gas export route from the Caspian region through 
Afghanistan to India and China limiting the gas leakage to the east (Victor, Jaffe et al. 
2006, p 203).  Russia, on the other hand, is dependent on income from oil and gas 
exports to increase its economic and military strength, and to regain its position as one 
of the superpowers in the world. Russia would like to maintain its position as the 
dominant gas supplier to Europe based on gas supplies from the Barents Sea and 
Western Siberia. Russia has a strong interest in maintaining geopolitical instability in 
the south, to avoid competing gas from the Caspian and Middle East entering the 
European market. Russia also works to establish export routes from eastern Siberia to 
Asia (Victor, Jaffe et al. 2006, p 337), while Kazakhstan plans to establish gas pipelines 
from the Caspian Sea to China and India to serve the Asian market (Kalicki and 
Goldwyn 2005, p 158).
USA and Europe seem to be working towards a more reliable alternative oil and gas 
supply from the Middle East and the Caspian while trying to block the export of these 
resources to Asia. Russia, on the other hand, tries to block access to gas markets for gas 
export from the Middle East and Caspian regions to maintain and increase the market 
share of Russian gas in Europe. As energy resources become scarcer, governments 
should expect increasing geopolitical tension based on conflicts over resources. Energy 
available for export will also decline as the domestic demand increases as a 
consequence of increasing economic welfare in the energy exporting nations. 
70
71
3 Methodology 
This thesis tries to quantify future energy market developments based on a qualitative 
assessment of future developments in climate and energy policies. This chapter 
summarizes the methods of investigation used in this thesis. Scenario thinking, system 
dynamic modelling and valuation of options are powerful tools for making strategic 
decisions on the governmental and business level. These tools have been combined in 
this work to value the potential industries of offshore wind and carbon capture and 
storage for Norway. The research is based on scenario analysis (Schwartz 1998), 
system dynamic theory and modelling (Sterman 2000), strategic management (Porter 
1980) and innovation theories (Schumpeter 1934; Christensen 2004). The future 
European energy market have been analysed, and strategies to create Norwegian 
competitive advantages within renewable energy production targeted towards the 
European market have been investigated. 
The scenarios will be used as a background to establish possible outcomes of the future. 
The scenario methodology is based on the “trilemma” methodology described by 
Rodrik (1999) and used in several scenario development processes such as “The Shell 
Global Scenarios to 2025” (Shell 2005). The scenario analysis will focus on three main 
aspects: 
- Economic growth and development 
- Security of energy supply 
- Environmental impact of energy consumption 
Energy supplies are vital for continued economic growth while the environmental 
impacts of energy consumption could undermine long-term economic development 
through severe climate changes. The scenario analysis provides the basis for evaluating 
different strategies for developing a sustainable energy market.  
A system dynamic model has been developed and used to investigate the future 
European energy market, describing the main market drivers and how they influence 
the market dynamics. The system dynamic model will be used together with the 
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scenario analysis to describe the future competitive landscape and establish quantitative 
estimates with uncertainty for the long-term development of the European energy 
market for the different scenarios.  
Based on the scenario analysis, the strengths and weaknesses of Norway with respect to 
industrial development have been analysed. Incentives for developing a sustainable 
energy business in Norway has been investigated based on the literature on strategy and 
innovation (Porter 1990; Hamel and Prahalad 1994; Christensen 2004). Development of 
a Norwegian offshore wind power industry or an industry based on CO2 capture and 
storage have been analysed. Norway has competitive advantages and competence 
within these areas and has the potential to become a leading industry player. Offshore 
wind power and CO2 capture and storage could be developed to secure supplies of zero 
emission energy to Norway and Europe (Randers, Arnstad et al. 2006; ENOVA 2007).
3.1 Scenario analysis 
The purpose of scenario analysis is to develop an understanding of possible outcomes for 
tomorrow, how the future might look like, and what to expect. In the early 1970s the oil 
industry was affected by a major disruption in the oil supply – the oil crisis, and 
consequently the Western economies entered a recession. It was a major discontinuity 
from the trends of the 1960s that could not be foreseen because the methods of economic 
analysis were not designed to look for them (May 1996, p 162). The scenario method 
begins from a recognition of the unpredictability of the future, but acknowledges that 
decisions in the present will have future implications (May 1996, p 162). Peter Schwartz 
(1998) is clear about the purpose and limitation of scenarios: 
Scenarios are stories about the way the world might turn out tomorrow, 
stories that can help us recognize and adapt to changing aspects of our 
present environment (…) Scenarios are not predictions. It is simply not 
possible to predict the future with certainty (Schwartz 1998, p 3-6). 
Decision makers, such as politicians and corporate managers, are always making 
decisions that shape the future and these decisions are made based on expectations or 
forecasts of how the world will develop. Scenarios should be developed to challenge the 
illusion of certainty to improve the understanding of risks and realities. Scenarios cannot 
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give an accurate picture of the future, but can help decision makers to make better 
decisions about the future (Schwartz 1998, p 6-9; Jaccard 2005, p 26). 
There are numerous techniques and methods for developing future thinking, ranging 
from extrapolation through scenarios and Delphi methodology to politics (May 1996, p 
112). Most methods are based on gathering of information and opinions from different 
sources and putting this together in a consistent way. One of several methods used to 
develop scenarios for the future is that developed by Polak (1973), which examines 
optimism and pessimism by differentiating between essence optimism/pessimism and 
influence optimism/pessimism. The first point of view sees history as a book that has 
already been written; the second sees history as a process that humans can or cannot 
manipulate (May 1996, p 44).  
A scenario effort should begin by looking inward, examining your own mind-set, and 
how this mind-set influences your judgements about the future. This will open up some 
barriers, and help see the right questions to ask about a decision (Schwartz 1998, p 50). 
The perspectives of the majority of the world’s people are concerned with matters that 
affect only family or friends over a short period of time. Very few people have a global 
perspective that extends far into the future (May 1996, p 7). This follows the pattern of 
Maslow’s (1952) hierarchy of human needs, which holds that once basic survival and 
security needs are satisfied it becomes possible for the individual to develop socially and 
personally. Thinking longer term is part of this (May 1996, p 8). Planning is a process of 
human forethought and action based upon that thought. It is and must be future oriented 
and the trick is to see the future before it arrives (May 1996, p 31). 
Modern Western societies are often criticised because they have no vision; no clear idea 
of where they want to go or what kind of society they want to become. As Polak (1973) 
has argued, societies without vision inevitably decline, because they lose momentum. 
Visions, dreams, images of a desirable future are the necessary driving forces that urge 
people to change the situation (May 1996, p 88). Building scenarios starts by looking for 
driving forces, the forces that influence the outcome of events. Driving forces are the 
elements that determine the outcome of the scenario, and help you decide which factors 
will be significant and which factors will not. When the driving forces are identified, you 
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must uncover the “predetermined elements” and the “critical uncertainties” (Schwartz 
1998, p 101-108). Scenarios explore two or three alternatives, based on the possible 
behaviour of the driving forces. People cannot cope with more than two or three 
alternative scenarios, and two scenarios may not capture reality, so three scenarios are 
often enough. At least one alternative scenario should frighten the decision makers 
enough to think – but not so much that they shut down  (Schwartz 1998, p 135-140). 
The more complex and large a business, the more complex and large the 
scope of the scenarios. Thus, scenarios have to be simple, dramatic, and 
bold – to cut through the complexity and aim directly at the heart of an 
individual decision (Schwartz 1998, p 193). 
Another methodology for developing scenarios is based on the political trilemma of the 
world economy, as Rodrik (1999) describes it, arguing that international economic 
integration, the nation-state, and mass politics cannot co-exist in the long term 
perspective. The world has to pick two out of three objectives (Rodrik 1999). The 
standard trilemma is based on the identification of three main objectives of the society 
with associated driving forces – where the hypothesis is that the world in the long run can 
achieve at most two of these three objectives. Rodrik developed his trilemma by claiming 
that if the world wants true international economic integration, governments would have 
to go either with the nation-state, in which case the domain of national politics will have 
to be significantly restricted, or else with mass politics, in which case society will have to 
give up the nation-state in favour of global federalism (Rodrik 1999). The corners of the 
trilemma triangle are each of the different objectives with its main driving forces, where 
the scenarios are developed along the sides of the triangle. The basis for the method is a 
philosophy based on the assumption that “two wins – one loses” (Shell 2005). Shell’s 
global scenarios to 2025 have used Rodrik’s (1999) methodology to explore the three 
forces of market incentives, communities, and social coercion or regulation by the state. 
The three forces drive towards different objectives; efficiency, social cohesion and 
justice, and security. Shell has developed its new scenarios in the areas of the trilemma 
triangle that capture the most plausible trade-offs between these diverse, complex 
objectives, the “two wins – one loses” area at the sides of the triangle where forces 
combine to achieve two objectives (Shell 2005). 
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The scenarios in this study have been developed using the thinking behind the trilemma 
triangle, combined with the concepts described by Peter Schwartz (1998). This way of 
building scenarios could provide a balanced picture of the future development of the 
global energy market. Although this is just a methodology, several methods can provide 
a good starting point for developing scenarios. The method is not as important as the 
description of the scenarios.
Experiences today are the result of human actions in the past and actions today create the 
future for the following generations (May 1996, p 76). To believe that we can influence 
the future we must assume that we can influence the course of events by our actions 
(May 1996, p 157).
Scenario thinking and modelling by use of system dynamics can give important input 
on how the society may evolve, and form an important input to the external strategic 
analysis. However, it might be more important to create visions for the future, to create 
a picture of how the society should be.
3.2 Strategic analysis 
Essentially, developing a competitive strategy is developing a broad formula 
for how a business is going to compete, what its goal should be, and what 
policies will be needed to carry out those goals (Porter 1980, p xvi). 
Strategic analysis and management is essentially used to understand and cope with 
competition. Competition goes beyond established industry rivals and should include 
four other competitive forces as well; customers, suppliers, potential entrants, and 
substitute products. The rivalry that results from all five forces defines an industry’s 
structure and the competitive landscape within an industry (Porter 2008).
76
Figure 24: Porter’s five forces for industry competition 
If the competitive forces are intense, almost no company earns attractive returns on 
investment. If the forces are benign, many companies are profitable. The industry 
structure is the driver of  competition and profitability, not whether an industry produces 
a product or service, is emerging or mature, high tech or low tech, regulated or 
unregulated. In formulation of a strategy, the strongest competitive force or forces will 
determine the profitability of an industry and should receive the most attention (Porter 
2008).
The threat of entry in an industry depends on the height of entry barriers. If entry barriers 
are low, then the threat of entry is high and industry profitability is moderated. Powerful 
suppliers can maintain higher prices, and keep more of the value for themselves and 
eventually squeeze profitability out of an industry that is unable to pass on cost increases 
in its own prices. Powerful customers can capture more value by forcing prices down, 
demanding better quality or more service and generally playing industry participants off 
against one another at the expense of industry profitability. Buyers are powerful if they 
have negotiating leverage to pressure price reductions. Substitutes deliver the same 
functionality as an industry’s product by a different means, and it is essential to identify 
changes in other industries that may make them attractive substitutes (Porter 2008): 
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Understanding the forces that shape industry competition is the starting 
point for developing strategy....  Strategy can be viewed as building 
defences against the competitive forces or finding a position in the industry 
where the forces are weakest (Porter 2008). 
Strategy is not just a plan to position a firm or industry in its external landscape; it also 
defines what a firm hopes to be. The purpose of the organisation should be at the heart of 
strategy and should give direction to every part of the organisation (Montgomery 2008). 
John Browne, the former CEO of British Petroleum, put it this way:  
A business has to have a clear purpose. If the purpose is not crystal clear, 
people in the business will not understand what kind of knowledge is critical 
and what they have to learn in order to improve performance (…) What do 
we mean by purpose? Our purpose is who we are and what makes us 
distinctive. It’s what we as a company exist to achieve, and what we’re 
willing and not willing to do to achieve it (Montgomery 2008).  
Competitive advantage is essential to strategy, but it is not the ultimate goal. Strategies 
should identify changes inside or outside the company that either threaten its position or 
present new opportunity for adding value (Montgomery 2008). Industry changes bring 
the opportunity to spot and claim promising new strategic positions. Companies have the 
ability to shape industry structure and lead their industry towards new ways of competing 
that alter the five forces for the better. The industry participants may benefit in the 
process, but the innovator of the structural change can benefit most if it can shift 
competition in directions where it can excel. The starting point of the strategic analysis is 
to determine which force or forces are currently constraining industry profitability and 
address them (Porter 2008). 
Developing a sustainable energy system into a competitive business will take several 
decades and will require perseverance, political leadership and financial commitment. 
Porter (1990) concluded that the role of the government is to encourage and push 
companies to raise their aspirations and move to higher levels of competitive 
performance. Porter (1990) found that it often takes more than a decade for an industry 
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to create competitive advantages. Policies that would make a difference in creating 
competitive advantages are slow and require too much patience for politicians. 
According to Porter (1990) governments should follow some basic principles to create 
national competitiveness; encourage change, promote domestic rivalry, and stimulate 
innovations. National competitiveness depends on the capacity of the nation’s industry 
to innovate and upgrade. Companies gain advantage against the world’s best competitors 
because of pressure and challenge and will benefit from having strong domestic rivals, 
aggressive home-based suppliers, and demanding local customers. Nations succeed 
because their home environment is the most forward looking, dynamic and challenging 
(Porter 1990). 
The presence of a network for the entrepreneur is very important in conceptualising an 
entrepreneurial idea. This can be through a personal network, created through personal 
experience, or it can be a local network in the form of a local cluster of businesses 
(Porter 1990). This local network requires a minimum number of businesses that are 
doing business within the same business segment, so the entrepreneurs can learn while 
competing with each other (Landström 2005, p 82).   
Before a company can develop entrepreneurial opportunities into future competitive 
advantages it often has to unlearn much of its past. Competition for the future is 
competition for opportunity share rather than market share, through identification of 
opportunities that companies are uniquely positioned to exploit given their portfolio of 
competencies. Leadership in fundamentally new industries is seldom built in anything 
less than ten or fifteen years, suggesting that perseverance may be just as important as 
speed in the battle for the future (Hamel and Prahalad 1994, p 25-37). The race to the 
future occurs in three distinct overlapping stages (Hamel and Prahalad 1994, p 50): 
- Competition for industry foresight, becoming the intellectual leader in terms of 
influence over the direction and shape of industry transformation 
- Competition to shape the future structure of the industry to one’s own advantage 
- Competition for market position and market share  
Creating the future is more challenging than catching up as you have to create your own 
road map. You must unlearn much of the past, create stretch goals that challenge the 
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organisation to accomplish the impossible, and identify and develop the core 
competences required to shape the structure of future industries. To get to the future first, 
you have to imagine it and create it. Getting to the future first gives the opportunity to 
establish the rules by which other companies have to compete (Hamel and Prahalad 
1994).
The broadest level of a strategy formulation involves an evaluation of the four corners in 
figure 25 and to determine the limits of what an organisation can accomplish (Porter 
1980, p xviii). 
Figure 25: Context in which competitive strategy is formulated (Porter 1980). 
Porter (1994) distinguishes between business unit (or competitive) strategy and 
corporate (or companywide) strategy. Competitive strategy concerns how to create 
competitive advantage in the businesses in which it competes while corporate strategy 
concerns two different questions: what businesses the corporation should be in and how 
the corporate office should manage the array of business units. Corporate strategy 
makes the corporate whole add up to more than the sum of its business unit parts 
(Porter 1994). National strategies should focus on what industries and businesses the 
nation should engage in on a long-term perspective. 
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Change is an opportunity to shape the future structure of the industry to one’s own 
advantage, or to create competitive advantages in a new industry. The changes in 
energy and climate, and related policies, will probably create an opportunity within 
zero emission energy production. Existing strategy theories are mainly based on 
corporate strategies, and are not completely suitable for developing national strategies. 
However, there is a lot of experience from the history of industrial development in 
several nations, and in particular in the development of the Norwegian oil and gas 
industry.
3.3 System dynamic modelling 
Most economic models assume a system that quickly converges to equilibrium. 
However, complex systems are in disequilibrium and evolve due to interactions in the 
dynamic system over time caused by feedback processes, nonlinearity, delays and path 
dependency. System dynamic thinking and modelling are tools to understand the 
structure and dynamics of complex systems, which is difficult to capture by use of 
traditional modelling tools (Sterman 2000, p vii and 21-23). The interactions between 
climate change, energy security and economic growth are a complex dynamic system, 
and system dynamic modelling is a tool that is suited to model this system. System 
dynamic modelling has been used in several integrated studies of global environment, 
economy and energy. System dynamic models have been developed for similar 
purposes such as World-3 which was used to investigate the relationship between 
sustainability and growth in “Limits to Growth” (Meadows, Randers et al. 2005), the 
integrated climate and economy model FREE developed by Fiddaman (1997) to study 
environmental and economic policies, and finally the EICOMP model which was 
developed to investigate how to achieve a transition towards large scale use of 
hydrogen (Gether 2004).  
A model that tries to understand the future behaviour of social systems should be 
balanced. The degree of detail should be balanced between different parts of the model, 
with the same level of detail in all parts. Incorporating all details and distinctions into a 
model would not necessarily make a better model (Meadows, Randers et al. 2005, p 
135-136): “A model is a simplified representation of reality. If it were a perfect replica, 
it would not be useful” (Meadows, Randers et al. 2005, p 130). 
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Complexity is underestimated by most analysts. However, even if complexity is real 
and an important motivation to use system dynamics, simplifying complexity is very 
important (Moxnes 2000). Dynamics arise from the interaction of two general types of 
feedback loops; positive or self-reinforcing and negative or self-correcting loops. 
System dynamics modelling tries to discover and represent these feedback processes, 
the stock and flow structures, time delays, and non-linearity’s of a system (Sterman 
2000, p 12). Dynamic complexity arises from the interactions in the system over time 
where  time delays between taking a decision and its effects create instability in 
dynamic systems (Sterman 2000, p 21-23). Most people tend to significantly 
underestimate exponential growth or decline because they tend to extrapolate linearly 
rather than exponentially (Sterman 2000, p 29).  
Learning is an important feedback process, which can be divided into a single-loop 
learning process, where people learn to reach goals in the context of existing mental 
models, and double-loop learning, where mental models of the system are reframed and 
changed (Argyris 1990). The limited information available must be used to align the 
state of the system with the goal and to revise mental models and redesign the system 
as illustrated in figure 26 below (Sterman 2000, p 25).  Interaction between the 
modeling effort and the real system results in re-design and new insight about the 
problem. Real-life strategies, structures and decision rules make the basis for simulation 
models that can be used to test the virtual world of the model. The tests will in turn 
result in further insight and improved formal and mental models. This learning cycle is 
inherent in every modeling process.  
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Figure 26: Effective modelling involves constant iteration between experiments and learning in the 
virtual world and experiments and learning in the real world (Sterman 2000, p 88). 
The five principal activities in the modeling process are (Sterman 2000, p 87):  
1. problem articulation  
2. formulation of dynamic hypothesis  
3. formulation of simulation model  
4. testing
5. Policy design and evaluation. 
Reality is infinitely complex. Addressing and articulating a specific problem in the 
system is therefore a prerequisite for a successful model, and should simplify rather 
than seeking an absolute representation of any social or business system.  The time 
horizon should extend as far back as needed to capture the reason for the problem and 
far enough into the future to capture the delayed and indirect effects of potential 
policies (Sterman 2000, p 89-90).  
System behavior arises from its structure. System structure is comprised of feedback 
loops, stocks and flows, interactions between the agents and the decision processes 
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imposed on the system. Behavior can be broken down into fundamental modes, where 
complex behavior arises from the combination of these fundamental modes. The three 
fundamental modes are; (1) exponential growth, (2) goal seeking and (3) oscillation 
(Sterman 2000, p 107).  
(1) Exponential growth and decline 
Self-reinforcing feedback, or positive feedback, results in exponential growth, it 
amplifies deviations and reinforces change. For pure exponential growth, the doubling 
time is constant (Sterman 2000, p 108-111).
Figure 27: Exponential growth system 
(2) Goal seeking 
Balancing feedback, or negative feedback, seeks equilibrium. It does so by initiating 
corrective action that brings the system back in line with the goal every time a 
disturbance brings the system state away from the goal. Every negative feedback loop 
must therefore have a goal against which the current state of the system is compared. If 
the system state deviates much from the goal, the system will generate large corrective 
responses. Like exponential growth, goal seeking results in an exponential behavior, 
but in the opposite direction. If the corrective action against any gap between the goal 
and actual system state is proportional, then the system experiences an exponential 
decay (Sterman 2000, p 111-113). 
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Figure 28: Goal seeking system 
(3) Oscillation 
If a system is dominated by a balancing feedback loop, and significant time delays exist 
somewhere in the loop, the system will continue to generate corrective responses even 
after it reaches its desired system state, creating oscillations (Sterman 2000, p 114-117).  
Figure 29: Oscillation in a system 
The fundamental models above can interact to create other important behaviors such as; 
S-shaped growth, S-shaped growth with overshoot, and overshoot and collapse. 
(1) S-shaped growth 
No real system can sustain unlimited exponential growth and it has to decline because 
of constraints in the system. The behavior of such systems over time will form an s-
shaped response. To generate s-shaped growth, no significant time delays can exist in 
the negative feedback loops and the constraints must be constant (Sterman 2000, p 118-
121).
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Figure 30: S-shaped growth – exponential growth combined with a goal seeking behaviour 
(2) S-shaped growth with overshoot 
The assumption that no significant time delays exist in the negative feedback loops 
does often not hold. Significant time delays results in s-shaped growth with overshoot 
(Sterman 2000, p 121-122).  
Figure 31: S-shaped growth with overshoot 
(3) Overshoot and collapse 
Constraints are not necessarily constant and may interact with the system. If resources 
are overloaded, they may collapse and the system will fold together with them. Non-
renewable resources such as fossil fuel will finally be depleted and if the system is still 
dependent on fossil fuel it will fold (Sterman 2000, p 123-127). 
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Figure 32: Overshoot and collapse 
Path dependence and lock-in are important effects in the society which can be modeled 
by use of system dynamics. Path dependence in a system requires that positive 
feedback loops dominate and that the initial state is an unstable equilibrium where one 
or more equally attractive paths lead away from the unstable equilibrium. Depending on 
random shocks in the system, the path is determined and the system finds a more stable 
equilibrium position. Because of the self-reinforcing feedback loops, the change in the 
arbitrary direction is reinforced more and more. Sooner or later, the energy required to 
move the system to another path becomes too great and the system becomes locked in, 
the equilibrium is self-reinforcing (Sterman 2000, p 349-353). Although it might seem 
as systems that have lock-in will remain in the ultimate state for ever, the lock-in is 
dependent on the environment remaining constant. If the prerequisites for the lock-in 
are changed, the lock-in will cease to exist. For example, if the technology becomes 
obsolete due to a major crisis, like an economic depression, the system state is 
weakened and the system will be able to follow other trajectories because the energy 
required to move the system in a new direction is considerably reduced (Sterman 2000, 
p 390). 
Model testing should be designed to uncover errors to understand the model’s 
limitations, improve it, and ultimately use the best available formal or mental model to 
assist in important decisions. No model can be verified or validated because all models 
are wrong. Our choice is only which model to use (Sterman 2000, p 846).  
System dynamic modelling is an important tool to understand all the different 
feedbacks, but using modelling requires that the modeller sets boundaries and simplify 
the world. The modelling process gives important learning about the importance of the 
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most important feedback mechanisms. The strength of system dynamics compared with 
traditional models is the dynamic approach where changes in the system are mainly 
driven by disequilibrium, compared with the traditional models where equilibrium is 
reached immediately. This is important, primarily because it takes rather a long time to 
reach stability when a major instability occurs. If it is required to change the entire 
infrastructure, as a major disequilibrium in supply and demand of fossil fuels could 
cause, it may take as long as 30 years.  
3.4 Valuation, risk and uncertainty modelling 
Valuation of opportunities, including risk assessment, is essential for making decisions 
with respect to investment in new opportunities. Traditional valuation is based on pure 
economic valuation, by use of Net Present Value (NPV), internal rate of return (IRR) or 
payback time. These methods are useful when a company is evaluating several 
investment opportunities, for instance, two or more project concepts. However, it might 
not be as useful when the company or society is making strategic investment decisions, 
such as R&D investments in a specific technology development programme. In such a 
case, real option theory combined with game theory could be more useful (Smit and 
Trigeorgis 2004). In addition, non-economic values or objectives could also be 
important decision criteria, such as environmental impact, and inclusion of non-
economic objectives opens up a larger range of decision alternatives than pure 
economic objectives (Keeney 1992). These non-economic values have increasing 
importance in decision making caused by an increasing focus on corporate social 
responsibility, but so far, very few decisions made by companies can be traced back to 
non-economic values alone (Cramer 2006). Maslow’s (1952) hierarchy of need clearly 
describes how basic needs must be satisfied before a person can consider higher needs. 
The same hierarchy applies for businesses, where financial viability is a basic need that 
has to be fulfilled before the organisation can consider such things as social 
responsibility or long-term strategic development. 
The standard method for evaluation of project economy is to calculate the Net Present 
Value (NPV), and evaluate different project alternatives against each other based on 
NPV. Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and pay-back time are sometimes used as 
additional information in the decision process because they can give supplementary 
information to the decision maker about the timing of the future cash flow (Smit and 
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Trigeorgis 2004, p 11). The NPV method implicitly defines an investment decision as a 
“now or never” proposition and does not properly take into account the value of a wait-
and-see strategy to make decisions as the value of the project evolves and uncertainty is 
revealed through R&D or market development (Smit and Trigeorgis 2004, p 11). 
The value of a strategic investment opportunity can be calculated as the sum of the 
project NPV and the option value, i.e., the value of getting more information. The risks 
associated with the different investment options are different, indicating that a risk-
adjusted discount rate should be different for the different options. Cash flows should 
first be discounted for the time value of money and then discounted for risk. Investment 
projects should be discounted for both time and risk while private risk, such as putting 
the money in a savings account, should be discounted for time only (Mun 2006, p 91). 
Discounting of a project should also depend on the project owner, as the value of 
money is fundamentally different in a commercial company, a public project or a 
private investment.  
Previous investments and competencies create path dependencies and constrain the 
number of future investment opportunities. Innovations in an industry depend on the 
technological opportunities along future paths and are not exogenous to the industry, 
and will impact future growth option value (Smit and Trigeorgis 2004, p 51).  
An option gives the holder the right, but not the obligation, to buy or develop an asset 
such as an oil field, a land area or a wind resource (Smit and Trigeorgis 2004, p 98). 
Real option valuation can be a helpful tool to simplify strategic investment decisions, 
such as (Mun 2006, p 93): 
- Abandon project 
- Wait and see 
- Delay
- Expand
- Increase R&D effort 
The project sequences can be seen as a set of options, and can be described by use of 
decision trees, where different types of risks are resolved at the different stages. The 
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‘risks’ could be uncertainties in factors such as costs, prices and production volumes. 
Working through the different scenarios, estimating the values and uncertainties, one 
would eventually end up with a good picture of the different options and the value of 
these options (Smit and Trigeorgis 2004, p 136-149). An example of a decision tree for 
an offshore drilling project is given below.
Figure 33: Decision tree for an oil development project (Smit and Trigeorgis 2004, p 137)  
Each of the branches in the tree has an associated value and probability, and by starting 
with the values at the right-hand side of the figure, it is possible to work through the 
diagram, and essentially to estimate the value of the project at the left-hand side.
Uncertainty can be estimated by use of Monte Carlo simulation, an analytical tool 
which generates numerous simulations based on a probability distribution of uncertain 
variables. The probability distributions of the different variables are determined based 
on both objective and subjective evaluations of the uncertainty of the variable. 
Examples are uncertainty in oil resources, market growth, and economic growth. This 
can be done using Excel or other risk-simulation tools, such as the risk modelling 
application in the PowerSim software. Uncertainty and risk are not the same; 
uncertainties are resolved through time, while risk is the outcome of uncertainty (Mun 
2006, p 140). 
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Valuation of these opportunities could be done by using simple NPV or IRR analysis, 
or more sophisticated optimisations based on real option theory. To simplify the 
analysis, a simple decision tree with different opportunities has been developed, and 
values of the different scenarios have been calculated. Due to the complexity of the 
problem, such estimates have to be based on simplifications and assumptions, and will 
therefore not necessarily represent the absolute value of the opportunity but will give a 
good indication of the potential of the opportunity for relative value creation. 
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4 Analysing the future energy market 
The challenge for the future welfare in Europe and Norway seems obvious. How can a 
significant increase in sustainable energy production to secure Norwegian and 
European energy supplies be achieved? The first step could be to investigate how the 
future demand, supply and price of energy might develop in different scenarios and 
different policy regimes. In this thesis, system dynamic modelling and scenario analysis 
has been used as methods to estimate future European energy prices with uncertainty. 
Based on the scenario analysis, several strategic directions that Norway could follow to 
increase national value creation have been evaluated.
4.1 System dynamic modelling approach – the CE2 model 
The following section will give a brief description of the CE2-model developed in this 
study without drowning in details. The CE2-model is a regionalised model that couples 
climate, energy and economy. The CE2-model is based on the theories and analysis 
from chapter 2. The CE2-model has been developed using PowerSim Studio7 
developed by PowerSim AS (www.powersim.com). The CE2-model is available at 
www.pikarstad.com.  
The journey is the destination in integrated modelling (Fiddaman 1997, p 190). 
The modelling process is as described by Fiddaman above, more important than the 
final model. The process of modelling leads to important insights in the main feedback 
processes of the system and how system components interact over time.   
Several models are developed for the energy system for different purposes. Most of 
these models are based on linear programming and economic equilibrium. Institutions 
such as IEA and IPCC use MARKAL and TIMER as the basis for their analysis of the 
future energy market (Gether 2004, p 119-126; ETSAP 2008) while MESSAGE 
(Schrattenholzer, Miketa et al. 2004) was used by IIASA to predict future energy 
scenarios. Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) developed the DICE and RICE models, which 
are equilibrium models for global and regional economic development given different 
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policy options. The system dynamic thinking and modelling in this work is mainly 
based on three models: 
• WORLD3 (Meadows, Randers et al. 2005) 
• FREE (Fiddaman 1997) 
• EICOMP (Gether 2004). 
Some variables and assumptions in the models are difficult to validate or estimate due 
to limited public data and are subject to large uncertainties. Given the uncertainties 
related to future social, economic, political, and institutional changes, it is impossible to 
provide accurate forecasts (Nordhaus and Boyer 2000, p 53). However, even if the 
models cannot provide good forecasts due to these uncertainties they force us to reveal 
assumptions about the real world (Toth 1995 quoted in ; Fiddaman 1997, p 13). 
We use the computer for its primary purpose – not to predict what will result 
from current policies, but to ask what could happen if we make various 
changes (Meadows, Randers et al. 2005, p 10). 
In this thesis, the primary market is the European energy market. Energy production 
capacity in Norway exceeding Norwegian energy consumption will contribute to 
European energy security as long as there is sufficient export capacity. Improved 
European energy security will require increased domestic energy production, energy 
efficiency improvements and geopolitical stability in the major energy producing 
regions. Avoiding severe impacts of climate changes will require a set of energy and 
climate policies, including carbon pricing, regulation of carbon emissions, and energy 
efficiency targets to reduce both end-user consumption and energy losses in the energy 
value chain.
The CE2-model is initialised with data from 1960 to capture and model the historical 
behaviour up until 2000. The CE2-model, with the history-matched parameters, is then 
initialised and restarted in year 2000 and predictions of future developments are run 
until 2100. The CE2-model is unlikely to predict with certainty 100 years into the 
future, because technological breakthroughs will become available within this period 
that completely alters the predictions. Wars and natural catastrophes may also lead to a 
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change in the path of the energy system in this period. However, the CE2-model may 
give some indications of the future developments given the assumptions and beliefs in 
the model. 
The art of model building is knowing what to cut out (Sterman 2000, p 89). 
The energy market and the climate issue are global challenges. The problems of limited 
fossil energy resources and the geopolitical issues related to an increasing concentration 
of petroleum resources in the Middle East and North Africa will influence the entire 
fossil energy security situation. This is expected to have significant impact on the 
availability of fossil fuel, supply-demand balance and energy prices in all markets. The 
dominant economies in the next 50 years will be located in Asia and the Pacific. The 
growth in these economies, and the associated growth in energy demand, will have a 
significant impact on energy systems, energy security and prices in the long term. 
Ignoring these economies and their requirements for energy also ignore the main 
drivers for energy demand growth. Understanding future developments in the European 
energy markets will require a global view. 
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The main boundaries of the CE2-model can be described by the following table: 
Endogenous Parameter Exogenous Parameter Excluded Parameter 
Population growth rate Labour force fraction Bio fuels 
Labour force Interest rate Hydrogen 
Capital investment Value share of capital Sector energy demands 
Depreciation due to climate 
change
Factor productivity Non-commercial energy  
use
Energy efficiency index Capital lifetime  
Operating capital Energy labour force  
Energy efficiency improvement 
rate
Capital cost due to temperature 
change
Energy demand Capital cost due to sea level rise  
Energy Price Energy resources  
CO2 flux out of atmosphere CO2 tax introduction  
CO2 concentration CO2 market introduction  
Temperature change CO2 emission rights  
Sea level rise CCS introduction  
CO2 emissions   
Energy capital   
Energy production   
Energy import   
CO2 price   
Learning curves in energy sector   
Table 6: Key parameters in the CE2-model 
The emphasis in this thesis is the long term energy supply. It is assumed that there is 
long-term substitutability between all energy sources and carriers, based on end-user 
costs and energy availability. Historically, this has not been the case, particularly in the 
transport sector, but this is likely to change soon as a consequence of new battery 
technologies (IEA 2008a). 
The subsystem diagram below illustrates the architecture of the CE2-model. The CE2-
model is divided into five regions; Norway, EU, Asia-Pacific, North-America and Rest-
of-world. Norway is small compared with the other regions, and could be modelled as a 
part of the European (EU) region, but has been treated as a separate region due to the 
focus of this work. The modelled development in the European energy market is the 
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basis for the valuation in the next chapters. However, it could be useful to split Rest-of-
world into several regions, with Russia, the Middle East and North Africa of particular 
interest due to their energy resources and geopolitical position. 
Figure 34: Main sub-structure of the CE2-model 
The combined effect of path dependence and lock-ins, caused by long lead times, is a 
major challenge related to creating shifts in the energy system. This is mainly a 
consequence of previous investments in production capital and infrastructure with a 
rather long lifetime, typically 25 to 50 years. These facilities represent sunk cost and 
are unlikely to be abandoned unless there are dramatic changes in the world, such as 
war and catastrophic events that destroy the capital and open the way for new types of 
energy capital. Path dependence is caused by dominating positive feedback processes in 
the system working as growth engines, which creates lock-ins because it is difficult to 
break out of these positive feedback processes (Sterman 2000, p 364-379). The 
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feedback structure of the model determines its dynamics, and efficient policies would 
have to change the dominant feedback loops of the model, to shift from one dominant 
feedback loop to another (Sterman 2000, p 104).  
The main stock and flow structure of the CE2-model are illustrated in figure 35 below.
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Figure 35: Main Stock and Flow structure of the CE2-model (simplified illustration) 
4.1.1 The simulation model 
To simplify, it is assumed that an economy in principle produces two types of output; 
goods and energy. The total output is equal to the sum of production output and energy 
output. The inputs to production of both goods and energy are capital, labour and 
energy. The capital and energy input have to be taken from the total output. The output 
of goods can be used for three purposes; investment in capital for goods production, 
investment in capital for energy production, and/or consumption.  
4.1.1.1 Economic development 
The economic model used in this thesis is based on Fiddaman (1997), and the outline of 
the main structure of the capital accumulation in the economic sub model of the CE2-
model is as described in figure 36. The economic sub model used in the CE2-model is a 
standard Cobb-Douglas equation, with normalised parameters to the start of the 
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simulation (Solow 2000). Capital is accumulated based on a standard model approach, 
where capital investment flows into the capital stock and where capital depreciates 
based on the lifetime of the capital stock (Fiddaman 1997; Gether 2004).  
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Figure 36: Capital accumulation in goods production 
Capital lifetime in this model is determined by two factors; the “initial capital lifetime” 
and “depreciation due to climate change”. Capital cost is the sum of the interest rate 
and depreciation rate.
Factor productivity is calculated based on an exogenous constant annual improvement 
rate. However, average factor productivity is calculated as a co-flow to capital 
accumulation which incorporates the fact that technological improvements are 
embodied in new capital investments resulting in zero productivity improvement if 
there are no investments in new capital. 
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4.1.1.2 Population growth 
Fiddaman (1997) recommend that key subsystems like population should be modelled 
endogenously, to gain insights that are not available from the exogenous forecasts used 
in most models. For population growth, WORLD3 describes these endogenous 
feedbacks and includes how the population develops as a function of welfare, food 
availability, urbanisation and pollution (Meadows, Randers et al. 2005). The WORLD3 
model gives a better response to population changes caused by welfare changes than 
most of the other models applied in this type of modelling. The population growth sub 
model in the CE2-model has been calibrated to current data for expected lifetime and 
fertility (WorldBank 2006). 
4.1.1.3 Energy demand 
Energy requirements for the economy are embodied in the capital stock (Sterman 1981; 
Sterman 2000). The rates of installation and discard of energy requirements are co-
flows with capital investment and discards where energy efficiency improvements in 
new capital reduce the average energy requirements of the capital stock. 
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Figure 37: Energy Efficiency Improvement model (EEI) 
The different energy sources and carriers are not highly substitutable in the short run 
(Fiddaman 1997, p 84-87). Both Fiddaman (1997) and Gether (2004) modelled the 
demand for different energy sources based on changes in capital stocks for each energy 
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carrier. Gether (2004) modelled the demand side from households, transport and 
industry in detail to identify change in demand for different energy carriers. Since the 
lifetime of the energy-consuming goods is quite similar to the lifetime of the energy 
production and distribution infrastructure, the change towards a sustainable energy 
system is likely to be equally limited by the energy capital replacement rate as by the 
end-user capital replacement rate. It is likely that the energy infrastructure will be 
increasingly electrified, as will transportation, and in the long run a high degree of 
substitution between energy sources and carriers is expected. Energy demand is 
therefore linked to the production capital, which defines end-user energy consumption. 
Energy demand is equal to energy requirement reduced by a factor calculated as the 
marginal value of energy divided by energy price. If energy price is lower than the 
marginal value of energy, then energy demand equals energy requirement, while an 
energy price above the marginal value of energy will reduce the energy demand 
accordingly. 
4.1.1.4 Operating capital 
Operating capital is defined as the capital available to produce output as described in 
chapter 2.2.2. Operating capital is determined by the share of energy requirement 
delivered to produce output, where the energy value share defines how important 
energy supplies are in the relationship between operating capital and physical capital. 
Fiddaman (1997) use an energy value share of a capital-energy-aggregate of 0.185. 
Assuming that the marginal value of energy is approximately equal to energy price 
would require a higher value share of energy to reproduce recent historical energy 
consumption. In the CE2-model an energy-to-capital elasticity of 0.36 has been used. 
The value reflect the marginal value of energy in operating capital as experienced in 
recent years indicating that an energy costs up to 10 % of the aggregated production 
cost is acceptable for society. 
4.1.1.5 Energy supplies 
For all types of energy production, the general production function as described chapter 
2 has been used as a basis for developing the set of equations necessary to model the 
energy system. For the energy production system it is assumed that labour requirements 
are constant relative to capital. This assumption is fairly accurate on the time 
perspective of this work. Capital accumulation for fuel production, energy production, 
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and energy distribution is based on the same principal model as that described for 
goods production. 
The behaviour of the energy system is influenced by the evolution of technology, where 
small, early decisions might have great impact due to positive feedbacks that create 
path dependence and lock-ins (Fiddaman 1997, p 195). In the CE2-model, it is assumed 
that costs decline as industries gain experience. These learning curves describe the 
technological progress as a function of accumulating experience with the production 
and the use of a technology assuming 20 % productivity improvement for each 
doubling of cumulative investments (Löschel 2002).  
While technology improvements will have a cost-reducing effect on scale economies, 
depletion and saturation will increase costs in the energy sector (Fiddaman 1997; 
Gether 2004). As energy resources become scarcer a significant cost increase will be 
experienced because an increasing amount of capital and labour will be required to 
produce each unit of energy supply.
The CE2-model includes four different renewable energy sources; hydro power, 
onshore wind, offshore wind and solar power. The commercial potential of these 
energy sources will depend on three major factors; energy price including CO2 tax,
subsidies and learning curves. The CE2-model is calibrated to current unit costs and 
production capacity.
Fossil-fuel production is in principle modelled the same way as renewable energy 
production, where learning curves and capital accumulation represent the main factors 
for production capacity. A more complete system dynamic model of the petroleum life 
cycle has been developed by Davidsen et al (1990). Their model is capable of 
modelling the behaviour of the US demand and supply of crude oil through the history 
of petroleum production and represents a good basis for understanding how petroleum 
resources are brought to the market through exploration, development and production. 
On the other hand, Tao and Li (2007) used a very simple system dynamic model to 
investigate the future peak in China’s oil production, and demonstrated how simple 
analysis of specific and important issues can be done by use of system dynamics.  
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The CE2-model includes four different fuels; oil, gas, coal and nuclear. In addition to 
fuel production capacity, the model includes import and export capacity of fuels, and a 
separate model for transforming primary energy into end-user consumable energy such 
as electricity. For simplification, it is assumed that half of the gas and coal consumption 
are used in power generation. The fuels are then delivered to the power generation 
facility, where capacity is determined by capital and learning curves, to generate end- 
user energy, normally in the form of electricity. Power generation has an energy loss of 
50 % to 70 % which is removed from the stream while the remaining energy flow is 
delivered to the consumer (Gether 2004).  
4.1.1.6 Carbon capture and storage 
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is based on the same basic model as energy 
production, where capital accumulation and learning curves determine the production 
capacity. Marginal production value is determined by the production capacity and the 
price of CO2. The willingness to invest in CCS is determined by the relationship 
between the marginal value and capital cost, which eventually determines the capacity 
for CO2 removal and utilisation. 
4.1.1.7 Pricing and allocation of capital, labour, energy and carbon 
Capital and labour are allocated to energy investments first, and then to investments in 
goods production. The remaining capital goods from production is allocated for 
consumption. If there are surplus of goods or energy, it can be exported to other 
regions, provided that there is available export capacity. The pricing of energy and CO2
emissions are calculated based on a simple price model described by Sterman (2000, p 
541). The same basic model is used for CO2 pricing, where supplies are replaced by 
emission rights and demand by actual emissions. The price of power generation and 
import-export is determined by use of a constant mark-up or tariff of 15 %. 
4.1.1.8 CO2 emissions 
CO2 emissions from energy are calculated based on fuel consumption and fuel loss 
within a country or region, multiplied with the CO2 content per fuel unit. Non-fuel 
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greenhouse-gas emissions are expected to grow by a function equal to the square root 
of the relative growth in economic output. Any utilised CCS capacity is subtracted from 
the total emissions, to calculate the volume of greenhouse gases emitted to the 
atmosphere. 
4.1.1.9 Carbon cycle 
The natural carbon cycle is a complicated process that involves the accumulation of 
carbon in the atmosphere, the biosphere and the ocean. This process has been modelled 
in a simple model in DICE (Nordhaus and Boyer 2000) and as a more realistic model, 
reflecting the actual processes, in FREE (Fiddaman 1997, p 115). In the CE2-model, a 
simplified model based on FREE has been used as the basis for the scenarios. The CE2-
model has two base elements; CO2 flux from the atmosphere to the ocean/biosphere to 
re-establish equilibrium between atmosphere and ocean, and CO2 flux from ocean to 
atmosphere due to warming of the ocean. The CE2-model reproduces historical CO2
concentrations quite well, and reproduces the future behaviour of FREE and IPCC 
(Fiddaman 1997; IPCC 2007a, p 803) .  
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Figure 38: Carbon Cycle in the model 
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4.1.1.10 Climate change 
Climate change in this context would be an estimate of atmosphere and ocean 
temperature based on the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere. The simple approach 
would be to use the simple model proposed by IPCC (2007a) to estimate atmospheric 
temperature. The climate change model used in the CE2-model is based on the IPCC 
model (2007a) but includes in addition ocean temperature as modelled by Fiddaman 
(1997, p 122). The intention is to be able to include the important flux of CO2 from 
ocean to atmosphere caused by increasing ocean temperature in the carbon cycle. The 
rate of ocean warming can be determined by the heat capacity of the atmosphere and 
the ocean and the temperature difference, indicating a heat mixing time between 
atmosphere and ocean of approximately 250 years. 
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Figure 39: Temperature Change model 
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4.1.1.11 Climate impact 
The main principle for climate impact used by Fiddaman (1997) has been incorporated 
into this work. This principle assumes that the climate impact is a function of the 
difference between the actual temperature and the temperature to which society has 
adapted (Fiddaman 1997, p 124-127). An adaptation time of 100 years has been 
assumed. This is probably too long, based on two arguments. First, in a situation with 
severe climate change, there will be no options other than to adapt as soon as possible, 
which would mean as soon as the society is capable of replacing damaged capital goods 
and restoring productivity. Second, because all capital goods are replaced within a 
certain timeframe, usually 40 to 50 years, it is in principle possible to adapt to all 
changes within this timeframe.  
The climate impact is calculated as an increase in capital depreciation rate, which is 
based on the argument that climate change accelerates destruction of capital goods, and 
agricultural areas. This means that an increased portion of the production output has to 
be used for replacing damaged capital due to climate change. This will also increase the 
total capital cost of energy and goods producing capital. The depreciation rates are 
calculated based on Nordhaus’s (2000) estimate of productivity loss.  
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Figure 40: Climate Impact model 
The CE2-model calculates two effects, depreciation due to sea level rise and 
depreciation due to temperature change, and the different regions experience different 
impacts from these two effects. The actual numbers used in the model are taken from 
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) and IPCC (2007b, p 787). The impact of climate change on 
food production was originally included, but has been removed as it seems to have 
relatively low impact at temperature changes below 3–5 oC (IPCC 2007b, p 787). 
4.1.2 Data sources 
World Development Indicators (2006) by the UN have been used for the historical 
development of economic output and population, while BP data (2007) has been used 
for historical energy production and consumption. Resource potentials are estimated 
based on several sources, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
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4.1.3 Model testing 
Model testing is necessary to ensure that the model reproduces the behaviour 
adequately to understand the problem to be solved. The main purpose of the testing is 
to uncover errors, understand the limitations of the model and improve important areas 
to include the major feedback mechanisms. To do so, the model should be robust under 
extreme conditions, it should reproduce the historical behaviour fairly well and 
sensitivities should be used to understand different boundary conditions of the model 
(Sterman 2000, p 846).  
4.1.3.1 Historical behaviour 
The CE2-model is adjusted to fit history from 1960 to 2000, using World Bank 
Development Indicators (2006) and BP data (2007) for energy production and 
consumption, and the CE2-model is capable of modelling the major trends during this 
historical period. Due to the major impact of energy policy and geopolitical stability on 
energy investments and production, which lead to an uneconomic behaviour in the real 
world, reproduction of history is difficult on a regional level. The purpose of modelling 
has not been to predict the future, or model the exact behaviour into the future, but to 
understand how different policies might influence the energy system, and how society 
could respond to such changes. The modelling process has given insight into the 
complicated feedback processes between economic growth, energy supplies and 
environmental impact of energy consumption. The simulation runs for the historic 
period 1960–2000 are illustrated in the figures below: 
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Figure 41: Regional and World GDP per capita 
There is quite good fit between measured and modelled GDP per capita and differences 
are mainly caused by developments in energy prices and technological progress. 
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Figure 42: Global CO2 emissions 
The global CO2 emissions are at the same level but oscillate more than the historical 
data. This is related to the political influence in the real world on fuel production 
capacity in the Middle East and Russia. There are discrepancies on the regional level, 
probably caused by reporting issues, the balance between different energy sources, and 
energy efficiency in the entire value chain. For Europe and Norway, there seems to be a 
rather good fit. 
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Figure 43: World Primary Energy Use 
The CE2-model reproduces the world primary energy use, and the regional energy 
consumption, production and import/export quite well. Oscillations are mainly caused 
by policy influenced energy investments and modelled prices in Rest-of-the-World. 
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Figure 44: Modelled Oil Prices 
The high price levels in the 1970s and 1980s are caused by political events and do not 
represent a balanced price reflecting the marginal cost levels. However, the lower 
historical prices might reflect marginal costs. The modelled low oil prices in Rest-of-
the-world are due to the fact that production capacity in this region is controlled by 
export prices, and the regional markets are heavily subsidised. Decisions to invest in 
this region are controlled by the export price in the market and national policies.  
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Figure 45: Modelled energy supply and demand 
The CE2-model balances demand and supply in different regions quite well as 
illustrated in figure 45 above, except for the oscillation in the Rest-of-the-world region. 
A perfect history match is difficult to achieve when the model are dominated by 
endogenous variables as here. A model that correspond to history is not necessarily 
more useful for predictions than a model with poorer history match (Sterman 2000, p 
878-879). A good history match is only relevant if the main drivers and feedback 
mechanisms of the history is relevant for the future behaviour of the system. In the case 
of the energy system, it is likely that the feedback mechanisms in the future will be 
different from the historic mechanisms, leading to the conclusion that history may be 
less relevant for the modelling of the future energy system. 
4.1.3.2 Future energy prices 
Many agencies, such as IEA (2007), assume a constant oil price for the foreseeable 
future. This assumption is unlikely. This will lead to supply abruptions in the model as 
this price does not meet future marginal costs. The price model used in this thesis is 
based on a supply/demand balance which adjusts continuously to balance supply and 
demand. The CE2-model results in the prices as illustrated in figure 46 below in a 
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simulation with the base assumptions of climate impact and fossil energy resources. 
The reference simulation assumes no climate mitigation efforts such as carbon tax and 
emission regulations. 
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Figure 46: Modelled future energy prices 
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Figure 47: Modelled energy supply and demand 
As the CE2-model indicates, there will be a significant price increase as increasing 
scarcity of fossil energy resources are experienced, in this case around 2050. This price 
increase will result in decreased energy demand and a period with insufficient energy 
supplies caused by the long lead time to establish sufficient volume of new energy 
production. There will be reductions in goods production of up to 20 % caused by 
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energy prices above marginal energy value. The high energy price levels leads to 
energy efficiency measures, increased renewable energy production and learning 
effects in renewable energy production that contribute to decreased energy prices in the 
long run. The world end-user energy supplies are illustrated in figure 48 below. It is 
important to notice that society would need 20 to 30 years to re-establish sufficient 
energy production from renewable energy sources to continue the economic growth 
after peak petroleum. North America, Europe and Asia-Pacific will experience a 
decrease in goods consumption during this transition period from fossil-based energy to 
renewable energy sources caused by high energy prices. Asia-Pacific is very vulnerable 
to this energy supply disruption, because the per-capita purchasing power remains quite 
low and an increasing share of a rather low per capita output would have to be used to 
import energy. A tighter fossil energy resource situation will lead to increasing energy 
prices earlier, leading to accelerated energy efficiency improvement and renewable 
energy production. Sensitivities on fossil-fuel resources indicate that the production 
output will decline as “peak petroleum” is approached. “Peak petroleum” will cause a 
shock in the economy due to insufficient supplies, and last for two decades before the 
economy regains its productivity based on improved energy efficiency and renewable 
energy production. The negative impact of “peak petroleum” can be reduced 
significantly by appropriate planning that aims to diversify energy supplies in type and 
geography.
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Figure 48: Global renewable energy and total energy end use. 
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Figure 49: GDP per capita with and without energy.  
The final observation is that the energy share of world output is predicted to increase 
threefold around 2050, from around 5 % of output to 15 %. 
4.1.3.3 Reference case with uncertainty in energy and climate 
Modelling future energy markets is a highly uncertain exercise, where many elements 
are difficult to validate or estimate.   
It is probably impossible to provide accurate long-run projections given 
the rapid rate of social, economic, political, and institutional changes 
(Nordhaus and Boyer 2000, p 53). 
The total uncertainty in the reference case is based on a situation where there are no 
policies to avoid CO2 emissions. This reference case represents a simulation that 
displays the total uncertainty related to energy resources, future climate change and 
future energy requirements as described in the previous sections. 
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The uncertainty in energy supplies is mainly influenced by four factors; the fossil 
energy resources available, the rate of energy investments, energy learning curves and 
geopolitical stability. The uncertainty in energy resources used here is as described in 
Chapter 2. The learning curves are assumed to have an expected level of 20 % 
improvement for each doubling of capacity with a low estimate of 10 % and a high 
estimate of 30 %.  
Uncertainty in the climate system is mainly related to three factors; the carbon cycle, 
climate change due to increasing CO2 concentration and the impact of climate change. 
The uncertainty in the carbon cycle is mainly related to the changes in the equilibrium 
between atmosphere and ocean which potentially could slow down the net flux of CO2
to the ocean as the ocean warms. The uncertainties related to climate change caused by 
increasing CO2 concentration are described in Chapter 2, and are based on IPCC 
(2007a) estimates. The impact of climate change is based on estimates from IPCC 
(2007a) and Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). All parameters are modelled as a normal 
distribution.
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Figure 50: Global energy related CO2 emissions from the model compared with IPCC and IEA 
estimates (IPCC 2007a; IEA 2008b, p 402). 
As illustrated in figure 50, the simulated energy-related CO2 emissions will increase in 
the next two decades. Then this will gradually decrease as a consequence of limited 
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availability of fossil-fuel resources leading to a CO2 concentration at between 600 and 
750 ppm in 2100, with a temperature at 2.8oC above pre-industrial temperature. The 
high and low estimates are 3.8oC and 1.8oC respectively, as shown in figure 51. The 
latest resource estimates from IEA (2008b, p 402) would lead to slightly higher levels 
of emissions and climate change than those presented here assuming that humankind 
will consume all available fossil fuels without applying CCS. Reproducing the 
emissions scenario presented by IPCC (2007a, p 803) requires resource estimates three 
times higher than those used in this thesis.  
Global warming may be acceptable and preferable compared to the socio-
economic consequences of not exploiting fossil fuels to their full technical 
potential (Nel and Cooper 2008). 
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Figure 51: CO2 concentration and atmospheric temperature  
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The associated climate cost in Europe is estimated to be between 1 % and 10 % of GDP 
at the end of the century with an average of 4.2 %, but still increasing as illustrated in 
figure 52. The sea level is expected to rise by approximately 0.6 metres, but with an 
initiated increase towards an equilibrium level of 6 to 7 metres in sea-level. The 
atmospheric warming due to increased CO2 concentration will contribute to a 
substantial heating of the oceans, resulting in a major CO2 flux from the oceans to the 
atmosphere, which might cause more heating of the atmosphere in the long term than 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions. It is likely that a temperature increase above the P50 
estimate will cause a severe negative impact on food production in the next century 
unless technological progress contributes to a major shift in productivity of food 
productivity and water security. 
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Figure 52: Climate cost in Europe in as % of GDP 
As figure 53 below illustrate, the major effect of these uncertainties on per capita GDP 
is approximately +/-10 %. The peak in fossil-fuel supplies will lead to stagnation in 
European growth for several decades. The simulations in this study show that the 
European energy market gradually moves from oil and coal towards natural gas up until 
2040. Around year 2040 a shift towards renewable and coal are seen as a response to 
peak petroleum with an associated rise in energy prices. Oil consumption decreases 
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gradually from around 2020. Energy prices are expected to increase substantially from 
around 2035, and stabilise around $ 0.4/KWh, which is approximately 5–10 times 
higher than current European energy prices. The impact of energy resources on 
production output is close to neutral compared to a case with unlimited fossil-fuel 
resources, but the fraction of energy costs to total consumption increases substantially 
and leaves less to goods consumption. As renewable energy sources replace the fossil 
fuels, the economy seems to recover and at the end of the twenty-first century the 
economy is at the same level as in a simulation with unlimited fossil fuels. 
Europe - GDP per capita exclusive energy
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
$/p
er
so
n
/y
ea
r
10%(Europe) 50%(Europe) 90%(Europe)
Europe - Energy Price forecast
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
$/K
W
h
10%(Europe) 50%(Europe) 90%(Europe)
Europe - Renewable Energy Supplies
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
TW
h/
ye
ar
10%(Europe) 50%(Europe) 90%(Europe)
Europe - Fossil Fuel Supplies
-2000
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
TW
h/
yr
10%(Europe,Oil Fuel) 10%(Europe,Gas Fuel) 10%(Europe,Coal Fuel)
50%(Europe,Oil Fuel) 50%(Europe,Gas Fuel) 50%(Europe,Coal Fuel)
90%(Europe,Oil Fuel) 90%(Europe,Gas Fuel) 90%(Europe,Coal Fuel)
Figure 53: Total uncertainty in energy and climate 
As in the FREE model by Fiddaman (1997), the CE2-model treats all generations 
equally (Fiddaman 1997, p 175). Future generations are likely to become much richer 
than current generations, and the impact of energy security and climate change on their 
welfare seems relatively unimportant, except for the developing world and the Asia-
Pacific region where high energy import costs combined with low per capita purchasing 
power will reduce per capita goods consumption substantially in the first couple of 
decades after peak petroleum. For the developed world, the consequence is mainly a 
marginal reduction in per capita goods consumption due to an increased cost of energy 
consumption. However, the consequences of climate change on the environment in 
general are likely to be challenging for many European citizens.   
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The peak in global oil production is as illustrated in figure 54 expected to occur 
between 2010 and 2025, and in global gas production between 2035 and 2045. The 
shift in energy prices does not occur until gas production starts to decline, indicating an 
efficient substitution between oil and gas as the peak in oil production occurs. 
World Energy Production
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
TW
h/
ye
ar
10%(Oil Fuel) 10%(Gas Fuel) 10%(Coal Fuel)
50%(Oil Fuel) 50%(Gas Fuel) 50%(Coal Fuel)
90%(Oil Fuel) 90%(Gas Fuel) 90%(Coal Fuel)
10% (renewable) 50% (renewable) 90% (renewable)
Figure 54: Modelled world energy production. Please note that this is primary energy, and that the 
energy losses of fossil energy supplies are 50–70 % while it is 10–20 % for renewable energy. 
Without any climate policies, this study find that fossil-fuel energy will remain the 
dominant energy source for the next 30–50 years leading to an increase in atmospheric 
temperature of 1.8oC to 3.8oC towards the end of this century. This is likely to cause 
serious consequences for the society in future years, with substantial increases in sea 
level and decreased food productivity. If coal resources are larger than this work 
indicates, climate change will be worse than predicted here and will create severe long- 
term consequences due to climate change. In this century, a major challenge is the 
impact of a peak in fossil energy supplies, and the following disruption in energy 
supplies until sufficient renewable supplies are established. To avoid these 
consequences, which are predicted to last for a couple of decades, the world should 
118
develop energy and climate policies in order to have sufficient renewable production 
capacity available by 2025 when this situation might occur.  
4.2 Scenario analysis 
The scenarios in this thesis describe hypotheses or speculations about different paths that 
society can take towards the future – sustainable and non-sustainable. The scenario 
methodology is based on Rodrik (1999) and Shell (2005), and defines three objectives 
with associated driving forces located at the corners of a triangle: 
Driving Force Objective 
Economic welfare An open global economy 
Environmental concern Stabilisation of climate 
Energy security Sufficient and affordable energy supplies 
Table 7: Driving forces in scenario development 
Figure 55: Trilemma triangle for scenario development 
Environmental Concern
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This will imply that if nations prioritise economic welfare or efficiency – nations will 
have to choose between environment and reliable energy supply. The most cost effective 
and reliable energy supply today, and in the near to medium future is fossil- based 
energy. There are few alternative energy sources that can compete against these fossil-
based energy sources on a significant scale, especially in the transportation sector before 
2030, unless governments decide to promote other energy sources through tax regimes 
and through support of research and development of these energy sources. Economic 
efficiency or an open market economy might provide energy security through the price 
mechanism based on a balance between supply and demand in the medium to long term. 
However, the open market economy based on free trade principles will lead to an energy 
crisis for several decades as a situation where the supply of fossil energy cannot meet 
demand are approached, resulting in the development of alternative energy sources. 
Because of the high availability of cheap oil, gas and coal, an open market will not 
stabilise the climate. Securing the environment in an open market will require shortages 
of fossil-fuel energy supply, or energy insecurity, with resulting high prices due to 
physical limitations or geopolitical issues.  
If society prioritises to stabilise the climate, it will have to choose between economic 
growth and low-cost energy.  Stabilising the climate will require a reduction in material 
consumption and emissions from the use of fossil energy sources which is unlikely in an 
open market that will provide cheap oil, gas and coal to the consumers far into the future. 
To achieve a stable climate, nations have to develop alternative energy sources and 
establish these in the market while at the same time restricting the physical flow of 
natural resources such as oil, gas and coal by government regulation.  
The three basic scenarios that are described in this work are: 
• Nationalisation
• Global Cooperation 
• Business as Usual  
The assumptions in the “Business as Usual” scenario is to a large degree similar to IEA’s 
projections in  “World Energy Outlook 2008” (2008b). The main difference between the 
“Business as Usual” scenario presented here and earlier works (Shell 2005; CERA 2006; 
IEA 2008b) is a more pessimistic view of the speed of capacity increase in the oil and gas 
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rich regions such as the Middle East, and a more optimistic view on climate policies in 
Europe. The “Global Cooperation” scenario describes a development where the world 
emphasises community values and efficiency where the market provides solutions to the 
energy security within environmental constraints. In “Nationalisation”, energy security 
and community values are emphasised at the expense of economic efficiency.  
Scenarios are mainly used to imagine different ways the world could develop, and help 
the user to ask better questions on important issues (Schwartz 1998, p 203). 
4.2.1 Policy design and uncertainty 
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) used a carbon tax of zero in all regions to define the 
reference case of their model to project what might happen if no government action is 
taken to slow global warming. In the baseline case, emissions are determined by an 
unregulated market (Nordhaus and Boyer 2000, p 25). The “Business as Usual” 
scenario as developed here is based on the same principle, but assumes a carbon tax in 
Europe to stabilise European CO2 emissions, which is reinvested to subsidise 
investments in new renewable energy and CCS. 
A Pareto-optimal  climate change policy can be modelled by setting the carbon tax in 
each region equal to the economic impact of one unit of emissions today on the present 
value of consumption (Nordhaus and Boyer 2000, p 25). The weighted cost of carbon 
emissions using the P50 estimate of carbon costs from the CE2-model gives an 
undiscounted carbon cost of $ 129 per ton in Europe by year 2100. However, 
sensitivities where the simulations are extended to year 2300 indicate an exponential 
growth in climate costs beyond year 2100. Sustainability principles should in principle 
apply when it comes to CO2 emissions, where growth should be based on a principle of 
not reducing the welfare of future generations. This will imply a zero discount rate. The 
implication is that a price of CO2 below $ 129 per ton in Europe is likely to generate a 
positive value for society in the long run. This is equivalent to a climate cost of 
approximately $40 per barrel of oil. 
In principle, a global environmental policy could follow either an evolutionary path or a 
challenge and response path. Evolution could lead to an eco-disaster simply by 
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producing more of the same, while a challenge and response path could lead to an eco-
boom (Schwartz 1998, p 157-158). Sensitivities using several different carbon tax and 
carbon market options confirm that the most efficient approach in terms of reducing 
carbon dioxide emissions is to use a carbon cost, based on a tax or market price, and 
reinvest the revenues as subsidies for CCS or renewable energy as found by Gerlagh et 
al. (2006). Such a policy would lead to extensive investments in CCS and accelerated 
investments in renewable energy. In the scenarios developed here, this principle has 
been used in regions with an active climate policy. This thesis has not investigated 
different climate change policies in Europe or the world, but has emphasised the impact 
of such policies on the energy market and on business opportunities of following such 
policies for Norway. There are several policy options available to secure energy 
supplies and reduce climate impact, such as carbon tax, carbon market, legislation, 
emission standards, subsidies and government purchases. Unfortunately, tradeoffs 
between energy security, economy and the environment “have strong potential to be 
resolved by accepting increased environmental damage in order to avoid economic or 
security risks” (Farrell and Brandt 2006). 
In principle, there are three climate policies in these scenarios; no climate policy, 
national climate policies in Norway and Europe and a global climate policy. Modelled 
sensitivities using the carbon price model and emission allowances show that energy 
prices will increase gradually as emission allowances are tightened, and decrease when 
the price is sufficiently high to create responses to the carbon price. Using the actual 
climate costs at the time the impact occurs could be a policy which is easier to argue 
for, but unfortunately such policies will have effect too late to reduce emissions 
significantly.
4.2.2 Business as usual 
The “Business as Usual” scenario assumes a carbon tax of $ 90/ton in Norway and 
Europe. The tax revenues are reinvested as subsidies for the production of renewable 
energy and carbon capture and storage. The carbon tax regime gives initial subsidies of 
up to $ 0.6/KWh for renewable energy and $ 1500/ton for CCS capacity which declines 
as the emissions decline. Modelled sensitivities with higher carbon tax give low 
marginal decreases in emissions as illustrated in figure 56 below.
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Figure 56: CO2 removal vs CO2 cost in Europe (Business As Usual) 
The “Business as Usual” scenario assumes that CCS is available from 2015 as a 
commercial technology. The CCS capacity in Norway builds up to a peak capacity of 
approximately 40 million tons per year in 2030. Investments in CCS start in 2015 when 
the technology is available and reduces the Norwegian emissions to approximately 15 
million tons per year. Due to the general CO2 tax, and the breakthrough of plug-in 
hybrids, new vehicles are based on plug-in hybrid technology, which leads to a 
significant change in the transport fuel infrastructure from fossil-fuel filling stations to 
fossil-fuel-burning power stations. This capacity build-up will require investments of 
approximately $ 2 billion/year. The CO2 level stabilises at 600 ppm, but will rise again 
during the next centuries due to ocean warming. This low CO2 concentration, compared 
with the IPCC estimates (IPCC 2007a), is mainly caused by lower emissions from 
fossil fuels due to the limited resource base.  
The inability to expand production capacity significantly in the oil rich regions of the 
world, as observed lately in OPEC nations, is assumed to continue. In the scenario, it is 
assumed that the fuel production capacity in North Africa, Russia and the Middle East 
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can at maximum double within 25 years. Investments in renewable energy in Norway 
are based on European prices, and it is assumed that the electricity export capacity from 
Norway to Europe is expanded based on the revenues caused by price difference 
between Norway and Europe.
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Figure 57: Output per capita with and without energy. 
This leads to a significant expansion of electricity import/export capacity between 
Norway and Europe to 150 TWh per year. A large fraction of Norwegian resources are 
prioritised towards both fossil-fuel production and renewable energy production due to 
the high energy prices in the European market in this scenario. This leads to reduced 
investment in goods production, leaving Norway in a vulnerable position if energy 
demand and prices decreases. When the total Norwegian potential for onshore 
renewable energy are fully developed Europe has, in this scenario, become self 
sufficient due to a substantial development of offshore wind energy based on 
significant European renewable energy subsidies caused by reinvesting CO2 taxes. The 
Norwegian energy-based value creation diminishes towards the end of the twenty-first 
century as illustrated in the figure 57 above because of the poor competitive position in 
renewable energy production. 
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In the “business as usual” scenario, recycling of carbon tax to renewable energy 
productions leads to increased investment and capacity expansion within hydro power 
and onshore wind in Norway, due to its cost advantages compared with offshore wind. 
Offshore wind in Norway remains uncompetitive compared with European projects, 
and does not make its way to the market. 
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Figure 58: Renewable energy production capacity in Norway and Europe. 
In the “Business as Usual” scenario, energy prices increase significantly in Europe 
towards 2040 and stabilise between $ 0.3 and $ 0.6/KWh for several decades, before 
declining significantly as European renewable energy sources, such as solar power and 
offshore wind, achieve significant cost reductions due to learning effects. In the second 
half of the century, renewable energy sources become dominant in the global energy 
market as a consequence of reduced costs and fossil fuel scarcity. Compared with 
Europe, coal remains an important energy source in North America, Asia-Pacific and 
Rest-of-world due to its importance for energy security and the lack of commercial 
viability for renewable energy caused by limited subsidies in these regions. 
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Figure 59: Global primary energy supplies in the Business as Usual scenario 
It is likely that the increasing economic burden of energy caused by its reduced 
availability will lead the major players in the world to place a high emphasis on energy 
security and efficiency. The battle for energy resources between Asia and the western 
world will lead to growing rivalry and conflict between China and the US because 
energy security is considered fundamental to national security. Many nations will 
struggle to establish diversification of energy supply, in terms of geographical spread 
and energy mix, because geopolitical instability will make it difficult to invest the 
required amounts to secure oil and gas supply. The damages due to climate change 
result in costs of between 1 % and 7 % with a P50 estimate of 3 % of GDP in Europe. 
4.2.3 Nationalisation 
The “Nationalisation” scenario is driven by the environmental impact of local pollution 
and local damages. As with “Business as Usual”, a CO2 tax of $ 90 per ton is 
established in Europe and Norway in 2009 with the revenues recycled back to 
renewable energy and CCS. With increasing energy prices, the nations with the least 
purchasing power will lose in the competition for oil and gas supplies, and will turn to 
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cheap coal without CCS to secure short-term growth. However, in this scenario, a CO2
tax of $ 45 per ton is established in the Asia-Pacific region in 2030 due to increasing 
recognition of future climate change and an increased purchasing power which allows 
for higher spending on energy services. Due to an increasing awareness of the energy 
security challenge, there is no new investment in energy export infrastructure after 2015 
because domestic energy resources are seen as a national strategic resource for further 
growth. Nations establish higher economic barriers to limit exposure to external threats. 
Conventional state-to-state relations are reinforced in the energy market and states push 
their own national agenda at the expense of international cooperation to secure energy 
supplies. Full liberalisation of energy markets is questioned by governments that try to 
secure long-term energy imports and secure energy diversity through support for 
development of domestic renewable energy sources. China in particular capitalises on 
its domestic market.  
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Figure 60: World energy production in the Nationalisation scenario 
In the “Nationalisation” scenario, the cumulative CO2 emissions are reduced by 273 and 
204 billion tons compared with the “Reference case” and the “Business as Usual” 
scenario respectively, with the majority of the reduction being due to carbon capture and 
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storage. This reduction in CO2 emissions results in a reduction in the European climate 
cost of approximately 1 % of GDP in 2100 compared with the “Business as Usual” 
scenario with a P50 estimate of 2 %. 
4.2.4 Global cooperation 
The “Global cooperation” scenario assumes that a global CO2 tax is established in 2015, 
and that CO2 tax revenues are used to subsidise renewable energy and CCS. The 
scenario also assumes a high degree of technology transfer, where all regions of the 
world can utilise new achievements in energy technology due to learning in other 
regions. The consequence of the global CO2 tax with recycling is a reduction of energy-
related CO2 emissions by 40 % in the period 2000 to 2100. The policies in this scenario 
are established as a response to the climate threat and an expected energy crisis. This is 
caused by a strong growth in demand for oil combined with lack of necessary 
investment in oil and gas import capacity due to the geopolitical uncertainty, resulting 
in high prices and fear of an oil peak. The market will respond to these policies and 
challenges by technological advances and structural changes in the energy and 
transportation sectors with significant public and private investment in alternative fuels, 
CCS and improved transportation technologies. To provide a better global environment, 
there is a strong regulatory co-operation between states which has strengthened 
cooperation within international forums and institutions. Coal technologies combined 
with carbon sequestration and deposition allow coal to remain a primary energy source 
in this scenario.  
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Figure 61: World energy production in the Global Cooperation scenario 
4.2.5 Observations from the scenarios 
Using the precautionary principle, decisions related to climate policies are in principle 
based on the downside expectations. The world is vulnerable to scarcity of fossil fuels 
and climate impact. In the reference case, reductions of 4.8 % and 2.6 % in 
accumulated GDP are estimated due to climate change in Europe and the world 
respectively. The scenarios demonstrate that a climate policy as modelled in this thesis 
will benefit most of the world in terms of reduced climate costs and increased long-
term energy security due to accelerated development of renewable energy. The 
scenarios show substantial growth in renewable energy production and particularly 
offshore wind production in Europe. In the scenarios as modelled here, the potential for 
Norwegian wind power remains undeveloped because Norway does not utilise the 
opportunity to deliver electricity to Europe from Norwegian-based offshore wind power 
generation.
Scenario Total CO2
emissions 
(Billion
Tons) 
Energy- 
related CO2
emissions 
(Billion
Reduction
compared 
with
reference 
Reductions due to CCS 
(Billion Tons) 
CO2
concentration
@2100 
(ppm) 
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Tons) case 
    Norway EU Asia 
Pacific 
North
America 
ROW  
Reference Case 4434 2293       675 
Business As Usual 4247 2143 187 1 42    673 
Nationalisation 4062 1949 372 1 44 220   661 
Global cooperation 3270 1138 1164 1.3 67 367 253 174 577 
Table 8: CO2 emissions for different scenarios 
The scenarios indicate that nations with substantial coal resources will, in the case of a 
CO2 tax, utilise these resources in combination with CCS, while the remaining nations 
will expand their renewable capacity. The lift in CCS capacity in Europe and Asia-
Pacific from the “Nationalisation” to “Global cooperation” scenario is mainly caused 
by faster learning and technology transfer between nations. The major growth in 
renewable energy production is basically as solar power in “Rest of World” and Asia- 
Pacific and as offshore wind in Europe. Figure 62 shows the developments in world 
renewable energy production capacity in the “Global cooperation” scenario. 
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Figure 62: Renewable energy supplies in the Global Cooperation scenario 
The CE2-model shows that the most efficient way to reduce emissions is by use of a 
CO2 tax that is used to subsidise renewable energy and CCS. The CE2-model indicates 
that reinvesting this tax can make CCS viable at a relatively low tax, while a higher 
CO2 tax will realise energy efficiency measures and more renewable energy, as 
illustrated in figure 63. Modelling of a CO2 market and internalisation of CO2 costs
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seems to be unpredictable and difficult to manage. The effect of such measures seems 
to be too late in time to have any significant impact on emissions.  
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Figure 63: Effect of CO2 tax on energy-related emissions in the Global Cooperation scenario 
Energy prices are lower in “Global Cooperation” compared to the other scenarios due 
to a high degree of technology transfer leading to faster reductions in the costs of 
renewable energy and CCS. The carbon tax of $ 90/ton is equivalent to a cost of $ 
18/MWh of fossil-based electricity, which is a relatively small fraction of future energy 
prices. The scenario analysis indicates that environmental policies outside of Europe 
will have a minor impact on the European energy market. 
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Figure 64: Development in European energy prices in different scenarios 
Climate policies lead to accelerated implementation of renewable energy, and deferral 
of coal consumption, as illustrated in figure 65. The sensitivities show that efficient 
climate policies or renewable energy policies will reduce the economic shock of peak 
petroleum, and give a smoother transition towards a more sustainable energy system. 
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Figure 65: World primary energy supplies in different scenarios 
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The scenarios indicate that a policy based on the reinvestment of CO2 tax is the most 
efficient policy to mitigate climate change and to reduce the impact of peak petroleum. 
They also indicate that an efficient climate mitigation policy should be global to be 
effective. The European energy market is only marginally influenced by climate 
policies in other regions because energy price increases caused by energy scarcity will 
dominate the energy market. Although the net value for the world of a climate 
mitigation policy is positive, it is likely to have a negative impact on Norwegian value 
creation in all scenarios as described above because the value of oil and gas decreases 
and Norway remain uncompetitive in renewable energy production. All scenarios show 
a significant increase in the renewable share of total energy consumption in Europe as 
illustrated in figure 66. 
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Figure 66: Renewable share of primary energy supplies in Norway and Europe for different 
scenarios. 
4.3 Norwegian strategic position 
The challenge for Norway seems to be that climate change policies will lead to reduced 
Norwegian value creation from fossil based energy production. On the other hand, 
climate policies and the European energy security situation create opportunities within 
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renewable energy production and CCS. Norway may increase value creation by finding 
ways to move down the learning curve faster than its competitors in these industries. 
The market for renewable energy will be growing in the world, in particular for solar 
energy and in Europe for wind energy. However, as illustrated in the globalisation 
scenario, carbon capture and storage is expected to be the dominant source of emission 
reductions in the 21’Th century in nations with abundant coal resources such as China 
and North America. The Norwegian challenge is to improve Norwegian value creation 
in a climate mitigation policy scenario by a strategic effort using CCS or offshore wind.
The Norwegian industry is recognised for its position in offshore technology for oil and 
gas production and in particular subsea technologies, its ability to run large-scale 
projects, the highly developed energy distribution infrastructure and offshore CO2
storage (Gotaas 2008). In Norway there is strong government support for carbon 
capture and storage (Stortingsmelding 2005, p 97), very limited support for renewable 
energy production (Stortingsmelding 2006) and limited reinvestment of CO2 tax
(Randers, Arnstad et al. 2006, p 32). The current situation in Norway may look as if the 
Norwegian oil industry, supported by the government, is building defences against the 
threat of renewable energy through strong support for the development of carbon 
capture and storage as the solution to the climate problem. The previous scenarios in 
this thesis indicate that the solution to the climate and energy challenge is relatively 
straightforward, not very expensive and in the long run a benefit for global and 
European value creation. 
Reaching a global agreement on climate policies is difficult due to the diverging 
interests and abilities of different regions of the world (Chapter 2). It seems as the 
solution to the climate challenge is mainly a matter of priorities and willingness. The 
global oil and gas subsidies are approximately $ 310 billion per year, which is almost 
equal to the required world investment in upstream oil and gas development per year to 
meet the growth scenario in IEA’s reference case (IEA 2008b, p 38). If these subsidies 
were invested in CCS it would add CO2 removal capacity of 300–500 million tons of 
CO2 per year. If they were invested in wind farms, it would add an electricity 
production of 700 TWh per year, assuming 50 % efficiencies and a cost of $ 2 per Watt 
(Mørch 2007). If the cost of military operations to secure energy supplies are added it 
becomes even worse (Bush 2008). It is a paradox that nations prefer to spend so much 
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to secure and subsidise oil and gas supplies compared with what they are willing to 
spend on securing sustainable energy production.
The main challenge for Europe seems to be to secure energy supplies for continued 
economic growth in competition with Asia. A reasonable scenario would be that the 
nations in the former Soviet Union and the Middle East, such as Iran, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, Kazakhstan and Russia, orient their interests more towards Asia, while Europe 
would have to base its energy security on imports of gas from North Africa, Norway 
and western parts of Russia. An increased production of domestic energy within Europe 
should be expected, based on nuclear power and renewables. An advantage for Norway 
would be its geopolitical position, on the borders of the EU and closely allied with it. 
Norway would be a reliable energy supplier to Europe, although the share of energy 
supplies from Norway would be relatively low compared with the demand in a long-
term perspective.  
Norway is in a unique position, with large natural resources, a strong financial position, 
high competence in offshore CO2 storage, offshore technology and electricity 
distribution. Norway has challenges with respect to market access and political 
priorities. On CO2 capture, Norwegian industry seems to have experience in use of the 
technology but limited experience in fabrication of the process facilities.
A large-scale development of offshore wind energy would benefit from utilisation of 
the synergies by using Norwegian hydro power capacity as a swing producer to be able 
to deliver electricity according to demand in the European market. This would require a 
strong collaboration between several players in Norway to be able to coordinate the 
development of offshore wind production capacity, hydro power output, and domestic 
electricity distribution capacity and export capacity to the European market. 
Carbon capture will have limited volume potential in Norway. The main markets seem 
to be in the Asia-Pacific and North America. The market in Europe can be expected to 
grow to approximately 500 million tons per year, requiring investments of 
approximately $ 2 billion per year in capacity build-up. The Norwegian industry can 
potentially compete on more specific parts of these facilities, and Norway can offer a 
storage solution in the Norwegian North Sea basin. The simulations using the CE2-
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model indicate that the potential cash flow related to European carbon dioxide storage 
could be up to $15–25 billion per year based on a cost of $ 90 per ton of CO2.
The Norwegian competitive position in these industries will depend on Norwegian 
policies to develop a competitive industry, and cooperation with Europe to develop 
Norwegian energy production as a reliable contributor to the European energy supply. 
Figure 67: Porter’s (1980) competitive landscape 
Using Porter’s (1980) model of the competitive landscape as illustrated in figure 67, the 
Norwegian strategic position with respect to a competitive strategy can be summarised 
as:
External Factors:
- Increasing challenge to secure European energy supplies due to geopolitical 
issues
- Increasing dependency on Russian gas in Europe 
- Peak petroleum will occur within a few decades 
- Europe is vulnerable with respect to climate change and is likely to take a 
leading position within climate mitigation policies 
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- European drive for diversification of supply in terms of type and origin 
- Increasing competition from European industry 
- Increasing energy prices in Europe 
- Norwegian access to the European market and subsidies 
Internal Factors: 
- Leading competence on offshore and subsea development 
- High competence on hydropower and electricity distribution 
- Competence on offshore CO2 storage
- Strong financial situation 
- Large wind resources on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) 
- Decreasing oil and gas production on NCS 
- Limited capacity to develop new industry in competition with oil and gas 
- Weak political willingness to develop new industries 
- Short-sighted politicians – lack of vision 
To develop the Norwegian position as an attractive energy supplier to the European 
market, a Norwegian Competitive Strategy should include:
- Visionary politicians with a long-term view on industrial development. 
- Norway needs to develop a position as a “member” of the European energy 
market. 
- To become a strong supplier of renewable energy to Europe will require 
significant investments in targeted R&D, distribution and export infrastructure, 
swing capacity by use of hydropower and industrial development of offshore 
wind.
- Develop strong commercial companies to establish a driving force in offshore 
wind power based on an initial high degree of government investment. 
- Develop commercial solutions for CO2 storage on the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf based on Norwegian offshore competence. 
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4.4 Norwegian strategic options 
The strategic options for Norway to improve value creation compared with the 
scenarios that are investigated previously in this thesis are; 
- Government investments in development of energy export infrastructure 
- Government investments in infrastructure and offshore wind power 
- Government investments in infrastructure and CCS 
Based on the previous scenarios it seems likely that these solutions will not develop in 
Norway without strong involvement and incentives by the government, including some 
form of government ownership. This is necessary because of the long term perspectives 
and commitments that are required as well as the perceived uncertainty with respect to 
future energy and carbon prices, and the short-term financial focus of commercial 
players. To make these industries competitive, Norway needs to move down the 
learning curve faster than its major competitor, Europe. Without a strong policy and 
involvement from the Norwegian government, it is likely that Europe will move faster 
than Norway, attract capital and competence to European industry and eventually out-
compete Norwegian industry.  
4.4.1 Offshore wind energy 
Offshore wind energy in Norway has an enormous energy potential, ranging from 3000 
to 14000 TWh per year with an additional potential on the UK continental shelf of 3200 
TWh per year (ENOVA 2007; Monbiot 2007, p 103). The current global electricity 
consumption is approximately 15,000 TWh per year (IEA 2007, p 92-93), which should 
lead to the conclusion that providing renewable energy supplies to Europe is not limited 
by the resource potential, but by other factors. There are a lot of risk factors such as 
cost, capital availability and technological maturity. However, based on the author’s 
observations of recent experiences related to an initiative to launch a national project on 
offshore wind energy in Norway, the main obstacle seems to be political willingness.  
The estimates in this study are based on published information from StatoilHydro ASA 
on the “HyWind” project (StatoilHydro 2008), an offshore wind demonstration project.  
An initial cost of $ 12 per Watt installed capacity is assumed, with a learning curve 
with 20 % improvement for each doubling of capacity. This thesis assumes a gradual 
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increase in investments towards $ 4 billion per year in offshore wind, which is 
approximately one-quarter of current investment requirements for maintaining 
Norwegian oil and gas production (NPD 2007). 
4.4.2 Carbon capture and storage 
CO2 capture and storage technologies (CCS) can reduce CO2 emissions from power 
generation, industry and the production of synthetic transport fuels by 20–28 %, 
allowing for continued use of fossil fuels at CO2 prices of between $ 50 and $ 100/ton 
(Newell, Jaffe et al. 2006; IEA 2006a, p 28; Stern 2007, p 194). Since fossil-fuel power 
plants with CCS have higher costs and lower efficiency than traditional power plants 
with emissions to the atmosphere it is unlikely that any commercial firm will build one 
without a regulatory mandate or a price on carbon emissions (Fiddaman 2007). 
The use of carbon capture and storage in Norway has been a long and winding road, 
with technical and political challenges (Alphen, Ruijven et al. 2009). In Norway, this 
started in 1992-1993, when Statoil as operator for the Sleipner West field, evaluated 
several field development concepts. The gas in Sleipner West contains 9 % CO2, and 
the company had to reduce the CO2 concentration to a level below 2.5 % to be able to 
sell the gas on the European market. Several options were evaluated, such as dilution of 
the gas with other sources, capturing the CO2 at the field and then emitting the CO2 to
the atmosphere, or alternatively injecting it into a more shallow sandstone reservoir – 
the Utsira formation. The main reason for choosing to re-inject the CO2 from Sleipner 
West into the Utsira formation was the introduction of a tax of $55 per ton of CO2 on
emissions on the Norwegian continental shelf. This tax was introduced as an incentive 
for oil and gas companies to reduce their fuel consumption and the flaring of gas at 
their facilities. The introduction of this tax made it economically feasible to re-inject 
the CO2 into the Utsira formation.  The licensee decided to do this by building an 
offshore amine facility. The technology was well known as it was used several places 
for the same purpose, but not previously on these dimensions offshore. The facility 
demonstrated that CO2 capture and storage could be done (Jaccard 2005, p 200-201; 
Alphen, Ruijven et al. 2009). Carbon capture and storage offers an opportunity to 
reduce carbon emissions drastically and enable many coal-rich countries to consume 
their coal resources within a carbon- restricted economy (Nuttall and Manz 2008).
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4.5 Valuation of Norwegian strategic options 
The basis for the valuation process is the “Business as Usual” scenario. This scenario 
includes a CO2 tax in Europe and Norway which is reinvested to subsidise all renewable 
energy production and CCS based on a principle that subsidies are distributed equally 
per unit of zero emission energy delivery. It is assumed that CCS removes 80 % of the 
CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel power stations.  
Government-financed development of infrastructure 
Sensitivities using the CE2-model with investments in the import/export infrastructure 
between Norway and Europe show an increase in hydropower and onshore wind 
production in Norway for export to Europe. This contributes to increased value creation 
in Norway in the first half of the twenty-first century. Significant production of energy 
in Norway will require some form of government financing of energy infrastructure to 
capitalise on the investments because price differentials will be insufficient and 
unreliable to lift a commercial investment in infrastructure.
Government-financed development of infrastructure and offshore wind power 
In this scenario, dedicated financial support from the government to offshore wind 
power of $ 2 billion per year and an additional $ 1 billion per year in infrastructure 
development to lift offshore wind power into a commercial industry is modelled. These 
investments represent approximately twice the Norwegian carbon tax revenue for the 
year 2000. The impact of government support is significant. However, sensitivities with 
less direct financial support show similar but slower effect. Government financial 
support will attract financial investors and accelerate the development of offshore wind 
power.
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Figure 68: Accumulated learning effect for offshore wind in Norway and Europe 
Dedicated financial support for offshore wind power in Norway will have a significant 
effect on the learning curve, and move the technology from being less attractive than 
the onshore renewable energies to being more attractive and cost efficient. In the 
“Business as Usual” scenario (red and brown curve), the Norwegian offshore wind 
industry is less efficient than the European industry because of higher European 
subsidies and support than in Norway. In a scenario where the Norwegian government 
invests in offshore wind power (green and blue line), Norway becomes a leader in the 
market due to the high domestic resource potential and development. As figure 68 
above also illustrates, government investments in offshore wind power in Norway will 
accelerate learning and the implementation of offshore wind power in Europe due to 
technology transfer, and further enhancing the market for offshore wind power. As 
figure 69 below illustrates, substantial export of energy from Norway to Europe will 
have a significant impact on European energy prices and benefit both Norway and 
Europe.
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Figure 69: P50 Energy Price in Europe at different scenarios 
The scenario modelling in this thesis indicates that the potential value of the offshore 
wind resources on the Norwegian Continental Shelf is comparable to the value of the 
oil and gas industry at current prices, and significantly higher at the P50 price estimate 
from Monte Carlo simulations using the CE2-model as illustrated in figure 70 below. 
However, the value is unlikely to be realised without strong governmental support and 
investments. Because the technologies are currently non-commercial, government 
investment is a key factor to initiate learning in offshore wind power to create and 
develop competitive advantages. Europe will out-compete Norway without sufficient 
financing by the Norwegian government. Sensitivities using the CE2-model indicate 
that direct investments in specific renewable industries are a more efficient tool to 
achieve competitive advantages than general subsidies for renewable energy. The CE2-
model show that a general subsidy on renewable energy flows toward existing 
commercial technologies and not to marginal projects requiring subsidies to be realised. 
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Figure 70: Modelled future energy production and value creation from the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf
The sensitivity for offshore wind based on the “Business as usual” scenario assumes 
utilisation of up to 300 TWh/year of the Norwegian offshore wind potential and 
increases the accumulated Norwegian GDP by 11 % as illustrated in figure 71.  
Norwegian Value Creation With and Without Offshore wind (300TWh/year)
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Figure 71: Norwegian value creation with and without accelerated offshore wind development 
Worldwide, the accelerated technology development initiated by Norway will 
contribute to a reduction in CO2 emissions of 22 billion tons by the year 2100 which is 
approximately five times the total Norwegian carbon dioxide emissions for the same 
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period of time. A major contributor to the value creation from Norwegian electricity 
production is increasing electricity prices in Europe. 
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Figure 72: Renewable energy production in Norway and Europe with an aggressive Norwegian 
policy 
Assuming a development with initial investments of $ 4 billion per year at an 
investment cost of $ 12/W, as in the “Hywind” project (StatoilHydro 2008), and a 20 % 
learning rate for each doubling of capacity, the offshore wind industry will be profitable 
at a 6 % discount rate with current European electricity prices of 56 €/MWh or $ 
0.09/KWh (Nordpool 2008). Using P50 prices from the CE2 modelled policy scenario 
and an expansion of offshore wind capacity towards 300 TWh per year, the cash flow 
from the Norwegian Continental Shelf could be maintained and increased beyond the 
oil and gas era as illustrated in figure 73. This would generate a pre-tax profit of $ 60 
billion at a 7 % discount rate and an undiscounted pre-tax profit of $1000 billion in the 
next 50 years. 
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Figure 73: Value creation from the Norwegian Continental Shelf with a more moderate 
development 
Finally, the CE2-model shows that the value of a Norwegian offshore wind 
development will increase if there is no CO2 tax in Europe. This is due to delayed 
implementation of offshore wind power in Europe, which again will improve the 
Norwegian competitive position.  
Government-financed development of infrastructure and CCS 
A policy with direct government investments in CCS will accelerate implementation of 
CCS in Norway compared with the Business as Usual scenario where CCS will 
contribute to reductions in Norwegian CO2 emissions as illustrated in figure 74. 
However, sensitivities show that government investments in CCS will delay 
development of offshore wind power because competition for limited resources will 
slow down the learning effect in offshore wind. 
145
Figure 74: CO2 removal in CCS in Norway for Business as Usual (green), and a sensitivity with 
direct government investments in CCS from 2015 (red). 
For CCS, it seems difficult to create any significant value in Norway, although the 
technology may be important to reduce future CO2 emissions globally, particularly in 
coal-rich nations. By use of government investments and incentives, Norway may 
achieve a leading position within this industry. However, due to the limited use in the 
domestic market, maintaining this position over time will be difficult when other 
nations apply the technology in their own domestic market. CCS will be a significant 
industry, where Norway can take a position as a technology provider, but it is probably 
easier to maintain a strong position within an industry where Norway can apply the 
technology domestically. Carbon storage might be a growing industry with a total 
undiscounted turnover in Europe of $ 1500 billion in this century assuming that one 
third of the CO2 cost is related to storage. However, since a carbon market or tax will be 
a cost to society in a short-term perspective, although it is a benefit in the long-term 
perspective, it is unlikely that this industry will become a very attractive one in Norway 
as taxes would have to be as low as possible. 
4.6 Closing the Norwegian value creation gap 
CCS has the potential to remove approximately 2 billion tons of CO2 emissions in 
Norway and 1000 billion tons worldwide by the end of the century at a relatively low 
cost. A global CO2 tax of $ 40–90/ton seems sufficient to realise this reduction if the tax 
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applies to all emissions and is reinvested to subsidise renewable energy production and 
CCS. Due to the limited domestic market, CCS is a technology where it is unlikely that 
Norway can maintain a leading position to create value in Norway, although Norwegian 
companies might become leaders in the international CCS market. As figure 75 
illustrates, there is a large potential for value creation in offshore wind power, if 
Norway succeeds in establishing competitive advantages within this industry, based on 
a significant domestic resource base. To become a successful business, CCS depends 
on a carbon price being charged. Renewable energy may become competitive either if a 
carbon price is introduced or if the margins improve due to higher energy prices or 
lower costs. CCS might be an important technology to allow for the continued use of 
fossil fuel without severe negative climate impact. It is as illustrated in figure 75 
difficult to see that CCS can play a significant role in future value creation for Norway. 
Offshore wind power, however, has the potential to become a major industry in Norway 
comparable to the current oil and gas industry.  
Decicions
Undiscounted Net Value 
Creation relative to 
Business as Usual
Percent change 
relative to Business as 
Usual
Bill $
Business As Usual 0 0.00 %
Government Investment in 
infrastructure only
-344 -1.51 %
Norwegian Energy 
and Climate Policy
Government investment in 
offshore wind (300 TWh/yr) 
and infrastructure
2529 11.12 %
Government investment in 
CCS and infrastructure -269 -1.18 %
Figure 75: Norwegian Value Creation (Accumulated GDP at year 2100) in different scenarios
Government investments in the Norwegian offshore wind industry can contribute to 
creation of a significant business in Norway due to accelerated learning and technology 
implementation, and also accelerate the implementation of the technology in Europe. 
This will create a large market in Norway and triple the European market for offshore 
wind power in the period up to 2100 compared with the Business as Usual scenario. 
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The case of offshore wind demonstrates that an active policy in Norway to develop a 
new renewable energy business can change the path of the energy system in Europe and 
the world, towards a renewable path at acceptable costs. Such policies will be beneficial 
for Norway and Europe in terms of value creation, energy security and climate 
mitigation.  
Norway is in an excellent position to help to solve the climate and energy challenges 
for Europe. Norway may use the current focus on climate change to prioritise capital 
and resources towards renewable energy production. Specifically, Norway could 
develop a combination of offshore wind and hydro power to a substantial export 
commodity, providing energy security to Europe while generating a more climate-
friendly energy supply. For Norwegian value creation, it is essential to develop offshore 
wind into an energy source that is competitive with solar and coal before the petroleum 
peak occurs with an associated rise in energy prices. Otherwise, path dependence due to 
infrastructure investments will create lock-ins in the energy system, where customers 
and investors will build on infrastructure and facilities developed by the early winners 
to provide new energy supplies, such as coal.
This study finds that the value of a Norwegian offshore wind development will 
decrease as illustrated in figure 76 as the climate changes increase, due to increasing 
capital costs in Europe. This cost increase lead to reductions in the European energy 
demand and European energy prices. To secure future value creation from a Norwegian 
offshore wind-power industry, it is in Norway’s interest to limit the climate change as 
much as possible. 
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Figure 76: Estimated value of Norwegian offshore wind versus CO2 concentration in year 2100. 
The value creation based on Norwegian offshore wind power can increase further if the 
energy is used for industrial production in Norway. Norway has a strong position 
within metallurgical industries based on its earlier industrial development, experience 
and competence. An option could be to produce silicon for solar cells in Norway for 
export to southern Europe and North Africa, where its use would produce 
approximately 30 times more electricity than would be used in the production process 
(Jungbluth, Tuchschmid et al. 2008). Using the energy for industrial production in 
Norway will increase the Norwegian value creation significantly compared with export 
of pure electricity to Europe.
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5 Discussion 
The world will change fundamentally with respect to energy and energy security in the 
next few decades. A new energy paradigm is required to understand and cope with 
these changes. Traditional economic analysis may be insufficient to explain future 
changes in the energy market due to feedback loops and delays in the overall system as 
described in chapter 3.3. The future energy prices will probably be far outside the range 
of historical experience where use of current elasticity of demand, supply and 
substitution will not hold in evaluations of the future energy system. This chapter 
discuss the results described in chapter 4 based on the theoretical background in chapter 
2 and the hypothesis as described in chapter 1. 
5.1 Modelling of a complex world 
Modelling the complexity of the real world requires an approach where problems are 
addressed and articulated in order to solve the problem without modelling the energy-
economy-environment system in detail (Sterman 2000, p 89-90). Problem articulation 
has been difficult in this context. The process in itself has been a valuable learning 
process where issues have been looked into, modelled and removed because they 
proved to be less important in the overall context. The CE2-model is complex, but the 
modelling process has created increased knowledge and understanding of the complex 
feedback processes in the real world. The modelling process can be illustrated by figure 
77, where the process changes the modeller’s view of the real world as the real world 
data gives important feedback to the modelling process. 
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Figure 77: Modelling the real world (Sterman 2000) 
It is unlikely that the global energy-economy-environment system can sustain unlimited 
exponential growth for a long period of time (Sterman 2000, p 118-121). The growth 
may decline within the relatively near future and stabilise as a response to energy 
resource constraints or overshoot and collapse as a consequence of environmental 
limits. 
5.2 Path dependence and lock-ins 
Energy and climate policies are sensitive to lock-ins and path dependency because 
companies often find it more profitable to invest in technologies that are already 
competitive as described in chapter 2.6. Currently the energy system seems locked-in to 
a fossil fuel consuming path due to historical developments and positive feedback 
mechanisms such as cost efficiency, economies of scale, fuel flexibility and a capital 
stock that reinforces the current position. A new technology requiring a different 
infrastructure than the existing one will have a considerable competitive disadvantage 
even if it offers significantly improved performance, creating path dependence. New 
technologies that can use existing infrastructure will usually be adopted more rapidly in 
the market. Many innovations will never reach commercialisation even though they are 
potentially superior to established alternatives (Grubb, Köhler et al. 2002; Löschel 
2002). It is a dilemma that new sustainable technology is forced to compete on the 
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global market with existing cost-optimised technology, which makes it extremely 
difficult to achieve change (Gether 2004, p 193). This lock-in process makes it unlikely 
that traditional measures such as carbon tax or emission rights will be sufficient to 
bring about the necessary changes in the energy system due to structural barriers such 
as the infrastructure development (Maréchal 2007).  
IEA (2006a) found that a co-ordinated international effort is required to achieve 
significant reductions in CO2 emissions. Strong co-operation will be needed between the 
developed and developing nations, and between industry and governments. This must be 
carried out before a new generation of inefficient and high-carbon energy infrastructure 
is locked into place (IEA 2006a, p 31). For instance, in the car manufacturing industry, a 
great deal of effort has been put into maintaining the existing petroleum-based transport 
system. This has included the “Hydrogen blinding”, where the belief in hydrogen-based 
technology has effectively drained the R&D efforts away from developing electrical 
cars, even though it is well known that hydrogen-based technologies are less energy 
efficient than battery- based technologies (Paine 2007). In Norway, it seems as the 
nation experience the same phenomenon, a “CCS blinding” where the R&D efforts on 
CCS drain the resources available for research on renewable energy sources. 
The energy systems are locked into fossil fuels which strengthen their position every day 
as new infrastructure based on fossil fuels is developed. A shift towards a sustainable 
path will require strong forces in order to initiate the jump away from the established 
system towards a new and sustainable solution. 
5.3 The climate challenge 
As shown in chapter 2.4, historic climate change has been driven mainly by changes in 
insolation, where changes in the atmospheric CO2 concentration is a consequence rather 
than the cause of climate change. CO2 is a greenhouse gas that will lead to increasing 
atmospheric temperature if the CO2 concentration increases. As the atmospheric 
temperature increases the ocean temperature will increase and the CO2 equilibrium 
between ocean and atmosphere will shift towards the atmosphere. 
Atmospheric temperature will increase as a consequence of increased CO2
concentration, probably 3°C for each doubling of CO2 concentration (IPCC 2007a, p 
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66). The ocean will most likely change from being a carbon sink to a carbon source as 
it gradually heats due to heat flux from the atmosphere (Cox, Betts et al. 2000). A 3°C 
warming is expected to be enough to melt the Greenland ice sheet, causing an increase 
in sea level by up to 7 metres (Archer 2007, p 153). The uncertainty related to the 
carbon cycle and the temperature effect of increasing CO2 concentration is large. 
Today, the main uncertainty in climate modelling is related to clouds, because clouds 
cool the planet by reflecting visible light, but water vapour also warms the planet by 
absorbing infrared light (IPCC 2007a, p 635). The carbon flux from the ocean to the 
atmosphere increases in strength as the ocean temperature increases and makes it 
increasingly more difficult to achieve stabilisation of the CO2 concentration in the 
atmosphere.  
The climate will change due to increasing CO2 concentration in the atmosphere, but 
there is still uncertainty with respect to the speed and magnitude of these changes. Even 
if it seems difficult to stabilise climate today, achieving stabilisation of CO2
concentrations to save the planet is a lot easier now than it will be later as the climate 
mitigation measures today do not have to compensate as much for the increased flux 
from ocean to atmosphere as in the future.  
5.4 The energy security challenge 
The world will experience that it becomes increasingly more difficult and expensive to 
maintain the current high production levels of oil and gas. The world will be more 
dependent on limited oil and gas supplies from a limited number of geopolitical 
unstable locations. This will result in increases in energy prices. These energy price 
increases may again lead to an economic recession as energy costs increases its share of 
total production costs. The economic recession may be reduced or avoided through the 
development of renewable energy production, nuclear or coal power to allow for a 
smooth transition to other energy sources. Nuclear fuel resources are, however, 
insufficient to provide stable energy supplies for a long time. Coal power is not 
sustainable, and its use will lead to severe environmental problems. To become 
sustainable, society would have to turn to renewable energy sources. Biomass as a large 
scale energy source seems to be challenging in terms of competition towards food 
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production. Other renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind power, could 
provide almost unlimited amounts of electric power to the world.  
It will be necessary to develop cheaper and more attractive renewable energy resources 
in order to keep fossil fuels in the ground. This is mainly an issue of how rapidly the 
marginal cost of renewable energy can decrease and how rapidly the marginal cost of 
non-renewable energy will increase. Policies to decrease the cost of renewable energy 
will involve R&D, subsidies and taxation of CO2 emissions and fossil-fuel energy 
sources. If nations are unable to keep fossil resources in the ground, the world has to 
find ways to capture and remove CO2 from the atmosphere to avoid severe climate 
changes.
The issues of energy security, energy resources and the environmental implications of 
energy use receive increasing attention in the society (IEA 2006b; Stern 2007; IPCC 
2007a; IEA 2008a; IEA 2008b). It is increasingly acknowledged that energy supplies 
are important to economic growth and development, and that the environmental 
consequences of energy use will cause an increasing economic burden for the society.  
The world is facing twin energy-related threats: that of not having adequate 
and secure supplies of energy at affordable prices and that of environmental 
harm caused by consuming too much of it (IEA 2006b, p 37). 
As seen in chapter 2.1.1, the global economy seems to move from a situation far from 
ecological limits (weak sustainability position) to a situation where the economy is 
restricted by these limits (strong sustainability position), resulting in a reduced flow of 
materials from the environment to the economy with increasing prices of materials – 
such as fossil fuels. Neoclassical economic theory does not include the flow of 
materials and energy into the economy, but assume that economic growth can be 
explained entirely by technological progress, capital and labour (Solow 2000). In the 
last decades, endogenous growth theories have been developed to explain how 
technological progress develops in the economy (Aghion and Howitt 1998; Barro 
2004). These models are useful to understand and model how R&D and human capital 
contributes to economic growth. Ayres (Ayres and Warr 2005) showed that the 
technological progress in the USA is linked to the development in useful energy – 
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“exergy; and demonstrated that energy could replace technological progress in the 
growth equation. The approach used in this thesis assumes that all physical capital 
requires energy to be productive, that energy and capital are complements, and 
estimates an operating capital based on the fraction of required energy that is supplied 
by the energy system as shown in chapter 2.2.2 and 2.2.3.  
Europe imports approximately 50 % of its current energy consumption, mainly as fossil 
fuels from Russia, Norway, North Africa and the Middle East. Energy imports are 
expected to increase in the years to come and thus increase European dependency on 
fossil fuels from geopolitical unstable areas. As the resources become scarcer, and an 
increasing fraction of the energy import comes from these geopolitical unstable regions, 
the geopolitical tension should be expected to increase. Securing energy supplies for a 
growing European economy will be increasingly more important and difficult in the 
future. The sustainability paradigm will gradually move from a weak sustainability 
position to a strong sustainability position. 
5.5 Future greenhouse gas emissions 
The energy-related greenhouse gas emissions in the scenarios in this thesis are 
significantly lower than estimates by IPCC (2007a, p 803) as illustrated in figure 78. 
The CE2-model estimates that atmospheric CO2 will stabilise at approximately 450 
ppm in the Business as Usual scenario if there were no non-energy greenhouse gas 
emissions. However, non-energy-related greenhouse gas emissions will increase as the 
economy grows and are likely to become the major source of greenhouse gas emissions 
toward the end of the century due to a decreasing energy share of total CO2 emissions. 
Reproducing the IPCC (2007a, p 803) emissions scenarios would require fossil fuel 
resources four times higher than the estimated resources used in this thesis. This would 
according to the CE2-model lead to an atmospheric CO2 concentration of 900 ppm in 
year 2100. Based on this study, it seems as IPCC (2007a) overestimate future energy-
related CO2 emissions. There is, however, significant uncertainty related to coal and 
unconventional oil resources. The precautionary principle should lead to a proactive 
approach in terms of climate mitigation. 
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CO2 emissions with global CO2 tax (90 $/ton)
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Figure 78: Energy-related CO2 emissions in the global cooperation scenario, compared with IPCC 
and IEA estimates. 
The climate threat should lead to an increased attention on sustainable development. To 
avoid compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs, society has to 
treat the environment as something that is intended to last forever. This should lead 
decision makers to use a zero discount factor for environmental projects (Solow 2000, p 
83; Stern 2007, p 59-60). Using a zero discount rate, and climate costs based on IPCC 
(2007a) and Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), this study finds that the accumulated 
European cost of  carbon dioxide emissions are $ 129 per ton by the end of this century. 
This is equivalent to a climate cost of $40 per barrel of oil, more than the historical cost 
of oil. It should be noticed that the cost of climate change, using the CE2-model, is 
predicted to continue to increase exponentially into the future. Using a cost of CO2
emissions of up to $ 129 per ton in Europe can therefore be justified. 
The scenario analyses show that a global climate policy on CO2 emissions can reduce 
energy-related CO2 emissions by up to 50 % in this century. The scenarios also indicate 
that national and regional approaches are less efficient than global cooperation in terms 
of reductions in CO2 emissions, and that a reinvestment of carbon tax in renewable 
energy services and CCS is approximately five times more efficient than a carbon tax 
alone. The scenarios show that international cooperation and transfer of new 
technology is important to achieve large reductions in CO2 emissions.  
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5.6 Global policies for sustainability 
The climate risk and energy security situations of different nations and regions of the 
world based on the findings in this thesis are summed up in figure 79 below.  Europe is 
in a vulnerable situation with regard to both energy and climate, together with the 
Asian-Pacific region. North America is less vulnerable to climate, but needs to improve 
its energy security position. It is likely that the European Union will continue to focus 
on renewable energy production to solve the climate and energy challenges. The Asian-
Pacific region will remain focused on the short-term issues such as energy security and 
utilise its coal resources to provide that security. Even if climate change is quite a high 
risk for the region in the long-term, the short-term economic output is more important 
for these nations due to the relatively low per capita purchasing power.
Figure 79: Energy Security and Climate risk  
The drive for energy security seems far more important for most developed countries 
than the climate threat. Currently it seems unlikely that the world will agree on global 
climate-change policies due to the conflicting interests of different nations caused by 
differences in climate risk and energy security situations. The world population are 
facing significant challenges that might deserve higher attention than climate change 
such as providing food, fresh water and materials while avoiding severe conflicts over 
these resources (Watson and A.H.Zakri 2005). When economy and welfare are under 
pressure, humans tend to become short sighted, prioritising short-term income rather 
than long-term income. The reality of Maslow’s (1952) hierarchy of needs becomes 
157
clear and visible in situations with increased stress, for persons, businesses and 
governments.  
The value of renewable energy might increase substantially in the future when society 
realises the environmental impact of the use of fossil energy sources and establishes 
instruments to mitigate climate change due to increasing political pressure and change in 
customers’ valuation of their environment. Understanding the impact of environmental 
damages due to CO2 emissions on economic development is important to achieve 
change. Climate change will create pressure on society to develop instruments to reduce 
the risk of severe economic consequences. It is necessary to develop new ways of 
measuring sustainable economic development and new practices with respect to 
discounting of the environmental costs for future generations to be able to establish a 
price on CO2 emissions. Achieving change is not an issue of economic optimisation, but 
of visions to secure the future. 
A sustainable world would require a shift in economic thinking. Sustainable economic 
development will require: 
- A shift in economic theory from growth to development. 
- Coupling of economic models to the availability of limited natural resources.  
- Measurement based on aggregated production capital, human capital and natural 
capital rather than Gross Domestic Product as today where the nation’s capacity 
to sustain production on a long time scale is in focus. 
Gross domestic product (GDP) is not a good measure of economic development but it 
is a good measure of economic costs (Dasgupta and Mäler 2001). Increasing 
environmental cost could in principle give an increasing GDP while it reduces the 
productive capacity of the country. A measure of sustainable development should be 
developed, focusing on the capacity of a nation, region or the world to sustain or 
maintain productive capacity per capita on a timescale of several decades.  
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5.7 A sustainable energy system 
The world is facing at least two fundamental challenges; the environmental challenge 
caused by pollution from the use of fossil fuels for energy production, and the 
increasing scarcity of fossil energy sources. These two challenges, the climate problem 
and the energy problem, have the potential of causing major disruptions in economic 
growth for several regions of the world. Both challenges are caused by development in 
the past, pushing the limits of the environment beyond sustainability. If the world 
population is to aim for a sustainable society, the challenges the world population face 
will create opportunities within sustainable energy production in the 21st century 
(Schwartz 1998, p 14; Meadows, Randers et al. 2005, p 263).
A sustainable energy system should be capable of maintaining or increasing energy 
output indefinitely within the capacity of the ecosystem to absorb the emissions caused 
by energy consumption. To maintain energy output indefinitely, fossil-fuel production 
capital needs to be replaced by renewable energy production capital while the 
efficiency in the energy value chain improves in order to deliver an increasing energy 
output per unit of energy input. Due to energy security issues, carbon capture and 
storage may be part of the solution in countries with large coal resources such as the 
USA and China in the first half of this century.  
There is a need to resolve the challenge of climate change within the next 15 to 20 
years. If no commercially competitive renewable energy solution exists when the 
energy challenge emerges, caused by a peak in conventional oil production, coal will 
probably emerge as the solution to the most dominant problem at that time – the energy 
challenge. The climate change issue will probably be overshadowed by the energy 
challenge. Energy prices will increase, and policies that contribute to increased energy 
prices, such as CO2 tax, will be politically difficult to establish and maintain. 
Norway and Europe should focus on energy efficiency to use existing resources as 
efficiently as possible, and develop renewable energy sources that out-compete fossil-
fuel sources. Using a large share of the limited fossil energy resources to remove CO2
seems to be the wrong approach, although it will contribute to the solution of the 
climate problem. CCS will increase energy prices significantly as it will increase the 
demand for primary energy and add costs to electricity production.
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5.8 Norwegian value creation in sustainable energy production 
To allow for continued use of fossil fuels in a CO2-restricted world, it will be necessary 
to develop CCS. As a majority owner in the national oil company, StatoilHydro ASA, it 
may be in the interest of the Norwegian government to support development of CCS to 
enhance the strategic value of StatoilHydro ASA. This thesis finds it unlikely that CCS 
can become an attractive business opportunity that will generate positive values in 
Norway. The main reasons are the limited future growth in the domestic market for 
fossil-fuelled power generation and CCS and the tax based financing. Norway may, 
however, offer storage capacity for European power companies on the Norwegian 
continental shelf.  
Offshore wind power is a major opportunity for Norway, with and without climate 
policies in Europe. This thesis shows that an active policy in Norway to develop 
offshore wind energy can change the path of the energy system in Europe towards a 
renewable path. This will benefit both Norway and Europe in terms of value creation, 
energy security and climate mitigation. Sensitivities indicate that Europe will develop 
offshore wind power and achieve competitive advantages based on the energy security 
challenge, locking Norwegian offshore wind out of the market unless Norwegian 
industry has realised the opportunity before European industries. The opportunity for 
Norway is limited in time. Norway has to establish a renewable industry before Europe 
initiates strong incentives to develop such technologies, and before the energy 
challenge caused by peak petroleum overshadows the climate challenge. Peak 
petroleum will lead to increasing energy prices where policies that contribute to further 
increases in energy prices such as carbon tax may become impossible to defend. 
Offshore wind power will generate increasing revenues for Norway as the technology 
moves down the learning curve, and the electricity prices increase as a consequence of 
decreasing fossil fuel supplies. Offshore wind development, based on the costs of the 
“Hywind” project of StatoilHydro ASA, with a 20 % learning rate and 6 % discount rate 
will generate positive values at current prices of 56 €/MWh. There are currently high 
risks for a commercial company in undertaking such a project where future energy prices 
are uncertain and current costs are clearly non-commercial. Initiating such a project 
would require substantial government support. However it would move Norwegian 
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industry into a competitive position where the industrial development can create large 
values for the Norwegian society. Norway can provide a substantial fraction of the 
European electricity need by developing the offshore wind resource into a competitive 
energy provider, delivering 300–1000 TWh per year to the European market, and thus 
maintaining the cash flow from the Norwegian continental shelf. By developing the 
offshore wind industry, Norway can change the path of the European energy system, 
contribute to sustainability and increase accumulated gross domestic product in Norway 
by up to 25 % within this century. 
5.9 Creating Norwegian competitive advantages 
The Norwegian position with respect to developing offshore wind power is strong. 
Norway can become a stable and almost domestic provider of energy to Europe due to 
its financial strength, high competence in offshore development, marine technology and 
hydropower generation, and capacity to use hydropower to balance electricity supplies 
against demand. 
Norway should, according to the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 
apply the precautionary principle to internalise environmental costs and apply economic 
instruments where the polluter bears the cost of pollution (UN 1992). Internalisation of 
environmental costs has not been widely implemented so far. Therefore, this thesis 
recommend Norway to increase the carbon tax to $ 90/ton, to account for future 
environmental costs, and reinvest these tax revenues in new renewable energy 
production. A general renewable energy subsidy will be less efficient than a more 
focused subsidy towards offshore wind in terms of reductions in CO2 emissions as shown 
in chapter 4.5. 
Developing an offshore wind industry will require closer collaboration between 
governments and industry (Stern 2007, p 393). This development can be stimulated by 
a portfolio standard for CO2 emissions or a carbon tax where the tax revenues are 
reinvested in new renewable energy production (Gerlagh and Zwaan 2006). 
Sensitivities using several different carbon tax and carbon market options in the CE2-
model indicate that the most efficient approach in terms of reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions is a carbon tax set at around $ 90–100/ton where the carbon tax revenues are 
reinvested in new renewable energy such as offshore wind. Such a policy would lead to 
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extensive investments from commercial players in renewable energy. This will initiate 
a technological learning process which could lead to competitive advantages in energy 
production and CO2 reductions for the benefit of Norway and Europe. The current 
carbon tax in Norway is $ 30–$ 55 per ton depending on use (Randers, Arnstad et al. 
2006), generating revenues of approximately $ 1.5 billion per year (SSB 2008). The 
Norwegian carbon tax should be raised gradually to twice the current level. All revenue 
from carbon tax should primarily be used as investment capital in new renewable 
energy production. 
Due to the limited fossil fuel resources and the energy cost of CCS, the resources 
currently directed towards CCS may be better utilised by focussing on energy 
efficiency and renewable energy production (Nel and Cooper 2008). Norway should try 
to move out of the current “CCS blinding” where the R&D efforts in CCS drain the 
resources available for renewable research. This could move Norwegian industry into a 
leading position in this new industry, where strong advantages can be established. 
Norway seems to be in the innovator’s dilemma (Christensen 1997, p xxii) where it has 
the choice between continued petroleum-based research or research on offshore 
renewable energy. 
Porter (1990) found that nations succeed because their home environment is the most 
forward looking, dynamic, with a challenging domestic market. Creating future 
competitive advantages will require industry foresight, ability to shape the future 
industry structure to a Norwegian advantage, and development of a strong market 
position (Hamel and Prahalad 1994, p 50). It seems as if political leaders react to the 
challenges of the society in the same way as Machiavelli recommended: 
When a problem arises either from within a republic or outside it, one 
brought about either by internal or external reasons, one that has become so 
great that it begins to make everyone afraid, the safest policy is to delay 
dealing with it rather than trying to do away with it, because those who try 
to do away with it almost always increase its strength and accelerate the 
harm which they feared might come from it (Machiavelli 1979, p 240-241;  
quoted in Sterman 2000, p 8). 
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Developing a sustainable energy business requires vision to prioritise the development 
of competence and allocation of resources rather than pure economic optimisation 
based on current knowledge. A concern is the current neoclassical thinking in the 
Ministry of Finance, which is based on a weak sustainability position. It seems as if the 
main concern for the Ministry of Finance is short-term government spending and not 
long-term economic growth. The prevailing economic thinking seems to be that a 
wealthy society is better prepared to meet the challenges of the future, rather than 
investing to avoid the risks in the future.
In several nations, experience with subsidies through R&D programmes and feed-in 
tariffs has proved to be successful instrument to achieve a transition towards renewable 
energy. The creation of knowledge related to renewable energy, and offshore wind 
energy in particular, is vital to achieve competitive advantages. This can be achieved 
through public support to research and development within renewable energy. The 
Norwegian government established a feed-in tariff of 0.08 NOK/KWh for fifteen years 
of production in November 2006 (Stortingsmelding 2006). It remains to be seen how this 
will work out, but so far it seems insufficient to support onshore and offshore wind 
energy projects.
There are very few businesses in Norway that are capable of and willing to put in the 
necessary resources to lift offshore wind into a commercial business, except some of the 
oil and gas companies. These companies have more attractive investment options which 
will provide higher short-term revenues than offshore wind energy. Since change is 
difficult in existing successful companies, such as oil and gas companies, developing 
these disruptive innovations cannot be achieved within these organisations. An 
organisation formed to develop offshore wind in Norway has to be large enough in terms 
of competence and financial strength to become the major driving force of this 
development. Development of a totally new business within an existing business is, as 
described in chapter 2.6, unlikely to succeed. 
To create scale economics and competitive advantages for offshore wind power, and to 
avoid fragmented efforts, it seems reasonable to establish a state-owned company, 
“StatWind”, based on the experiences of the Norwegian oil and gas industry. CO2 taxes 
could be reinvested into the company as equity capital. History has shown that the 
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Norwegian industry policy, with its strong government ownership in important national 
industries, has proved to be efficient as a tool for industry development in Norway. 
Examples of successful companies are Telenor, Hydro and Statoil. These former state-
owned companies are now partly privatised. The offshore wind energy is a significant 
national resource with substantial risks for commercial companies and large capital 
requirements. A national offshore wind company should develop and operate 
infrastructure and facilities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, and would contribute 
to create the benefit of economies of scale with associated substantial cost reductions. 
The company would have to invest between $ 2 billion and $ 4 billion per year. When 
this company becomes a fully commercial business, the values could be harvested 
through a privatisation of the company. The operating company should utilise domestic 
and international industrial competence and capabilities to develop as a competitive 
energy provider. This would result in large development contracts to Norwegian and 
international industries – such as the Danish wind-turbine industry and Norwegian 
shipyards, and create the drive and rivalry within Norwegian industry to develop 
competitive advantages. 
5.10 Critique 
This thesis has tried to identify strategic opportunities for Norway in sustainable energy 
production. The approach, by use of a system dynamic simulation model, has created 
insights into the problem that otherwise would have been harder to achieve. The CE2-
model is complex, maybe too complex.  
The more complex and large a business, the more complex and large the 
scope of the scenarios. Thus, scenarios have to be simple, dramatic, and 
bold – to cut through the complexity and aim directly at the heart of an 
individual decision (Schwartz 1998, p 193). 
A simpler model would have been preferable, but simplifications lead to reduced 
dynamic insight as important feedback mechanisms are excluded. The approach in this 
study has been to incorporate many details initially, and then remove those that seem to 
be less important in the time perspective and problem that is investigated. The CE2-
model is useful for the purpose of this work. The CE2-model is not capable of 
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reproducing the historical development of energy prices because of political influence 
on the energy investments and supplies from major oil and gas producing nations, 
which lead to a non-equilibrium behaviour. The CE2-model is, however, capable of 
modelling the underlying cost development of energy production. The main 
mechanisms that influence the future energy system will probably be different from the 
past; leading to the conclusion that historic behaviour may be less important.  
The CE2-model includes a response by energy prices to demand and energy efficiency 
improvements which reflects observations in the US market (Unander 2004). There are 
significant uncertainties related to how this process works. Energy efficiency 
improvements as a response to increasing energy prices may reduce the future energy 
demand significantly. Energy efficiency improvements are likely to be partly offset by 
the rebound effect, which can reduce the benefit of energy efficiency improvements by 
up to 60 % (Frondel, Peters et al. 2008). 
Finally, as Solow (2000, p xxvi) warned, this thesis may “try to do more than can be 
done”. Further research is recommended on issues such as: 
- Non-energy related CO2 emissions 
- A thorough assessment of global fossil resources 
- Structure and organisation of a renewable energy industry 
- CO2 market or tax mechanisms as tools to reduce emissions 
- Incorporate natural resources into economic theory 
- Develop indexes for sustainable economic development to replace GDP 
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6 Conclusion 
The threat of “peak petroleum” is significant and could lead to economic recession for 
several decades unless the world prepares for a smooth transition to renewable energy. 
Norwegian oil production has passed the peak. Norway needs to develop industries that 
can replace the value creation from the oil and gas production within a few decades to 
maintain the current welfare level. Offshore wind is one attractive option capable of 
generating such values. 
Increasing scarcity of natural resources such as oil, gas and water might lead to 
increasing geopolitical tension and armed conflicts leading to difficulties in maintaining 
sufficient investments in energy production and infrastructure in the energy-rich 
regions. This will lead to increased energy prices and increasing value of renewable 
energy production. 
This study finds that the fossil-fuel resources available are unlikely to cause a 
catastrophic climate development because the temperature increase caused by energy- 
related CO2 emissions probably will be below 3oC. Reproducing the CO2 emissions 
scenarios by IPCC will require fossil-fuel resources three times higher than estimated 
by IEA, which seems unlikely. Coal and unconventional oil resources, however, may 
change this conclusion. Extensive use of these resources will require CCS to avoid 
severe climate change.  
Climate change may lead to severe changes in the long run, and the precautionary 
principle should apply to global climate policies. This study finds that a policy based on 
a carbon tax which is reinvested in renewable energy production is the most efficient in 
terms of accelerating investments in renewable energy production and CCS to reduce 
CO2 emissions significantly. This thesis finds that a carbon tax of $ 90/ton will not have 
any negative effects for the world economy. 
The potential value creation in offshore wind power on the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf is significant, and can increase accumulated GDP by more than 10 % by the year 
2100 given that Norway acts early to create competitive advantages towards European 
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industries. Because limited climate changes will enhance the value of Norwegian 
offshore wind resources due to increased European energy demand, it is in the interest 
of Norway to work towards a strong international climate agreement.  
CCS will at best be a zero-sum game for Norway, although it may be an important 
technology for the world to allow for the continued use of fossil fuels without large 
impacts on climate. The current situation, with limited fossil fuel resources, should call 
for increased focus on energy saving and energy efficiency rather than wasting limited 
energy resources on carbon capture and storage.
Norway can develop the offshore wind power industry into a business capable of 
replacing the declining value creation from the Norwegian oil and gas industry. This 
will require stable policies and instruments such as: 
- Include the environmental costs of CO2 emissions in the cost of energy and 
products through a carbon tax of $90/ton (Internalise externalities). 
- Recycle carbon tax back to new renewable energy investments.  
- Establish public procurement programmes where governments require a high 
degree of renewable energy in public purchases.
- Increase public R&D on renewable energy production. 
These instruments will probably be sufficient to achieve a transition towards a more 
sustainable energy system in Norway. To achieve a more rapid, large scale transition to 
deliver electricity to Europe, other more powerful instruments are necessary. 
Establishment of a state-owned company in offshore renewable energy could be such a 
strong instrument to achieve fast and large-scale transition toward renewable energy 
production. The real confirmation of a strong interest in this industry is that governments 
and companies allocate capital and their best personnel resources towards renewable 
energy. To develop a sustainable energy system, governments have to decide to leave a 
healthy environment for future generations, and put words into action. 
Mostly we know what to do but we lack the will to do it. 
Sir Crispin Tickell (quoted in Houghton 2004, p 210) 
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